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China and the 
nsibility 
Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin 
wer 
Why does China behave as it does in its foreign policy? How and 
why does China behave differently from other Great Powers in 
international society? How does China's understanding of the 
responsibility associated with its rising power explain its 
international behaviour? In what sense can we argue that China 
has become more (or less) responsible in international relations? 
In China's search for its Great Power status, how do domestic 
politics and historical experience matter in its understanding of 
the responsibility of power? Does China think it is well served by 
a responsible approach to the rights and duties bestowed on it by 
international society? How do others evaluate whether China is 
living up to its obligations as a rising power? These are among a 
particular set of questions that individual essays published in this 
collection reflect on and debate. Collectively, this book explores 
a gap in the existing literature on the studies of Chinese foreign 
policy and focuses on whether and how a particular idea-the 
idea of the responsibility of power-helps to shape as well as 
explain China's changing behaviour in international relations. 
The rising power of China has been one important theme in 
the discourse of post Cold War international relations. Recent 
and current debates have revolved around two important 
questions.What are the implications of the rise of China for regional 
and global international order? And how should others, particularly 
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the United States, respond to the rise of China? 1 On the first 
question, a realist reading suggests that changing power relations, 
particularly those of a rising power vis-a-vis the pre-eminent power 
(that is, China vis-a-vis the United States), will inevitably lead to 
conflicts and even war. Further, China is revisionist and destabilising 
because of its historical grievances and irredentist agenda. It is 
bent on challenging and changing the existing international order. 
A realist reading is quick to point out that, historically, the rise of 
Japan and Germany as two have-not powers has provoked major 
wars. Even a liberal reading of the rise of China is likely to reinforce 
the realist wisdom. China is the remaining Leninist state. The 
Chinese Communist Party still presides over an authoritarian 
political system and repressive regime that is antithetical to 
democratic values. Naturally, Beijing continues to hold conflicting 
worldviews about the nature and structure of the international 
system. The distorted relationship and tensions between state and 
society and the lack of social balance of power in China's state-
society complex also makes a strong China more of a threat than 
a contribution to peace and stability.2 Such readings underlie the 
variegated interpretations of the 'China threat'. 
On the second question-how best to respond to or manage 
the rise of China-proposed strategies in the debates differ sharply, 
ranging from containment to constrainment, to conditional, 
constructive and comprehensive engagement.3 Realist arguments 
emphasise the containment and constrainment of China, whereas 
liberal arguments favour engagement. Either implicitly or explicitly, 
realist arguments in general posit that China is a classic dissatisfied 
but rising power like Nazi Germany and the former Soviet Union. 
China and the United States are therefore destined to clash with 
each other or become strategic rivals, or at least strategic 
competitors.4 For realists, the historical lessons of the failure of 
the British appeasement policy in the 1930s and the success of US 
containment policy during the Cold War support their arguments 
for the containment strategy.5 Some further argue that, as China's 
approach to international relations remains realpolitik, only 
concerted power can deter or constrain it. In East Asia, therefore, 
a new balance of power should be established for that purpose.6 
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Realists believe that liberal arguments for engaging China are based 
on shaky ground. It is true that economic interdependence 
between China and the world economy is intensifying. Economic 
interdependence alone, however, is insufficient to change Chinese 
behaviour decisively and is at the mercy of Chinese leadership's 
cold calculation of cost and benefit. It is also true that China's 
participation in regional and global international institutions is 
growing. Regional international institutions in East Asia, in contrast 
to Europe, are, however, too weak to exert any real influence in 
modifying China's security policy and behaviour in the region. While 
engagement policy may encourage the Chinese government to 
liberalise internally, other domestic variables such as succession 
politics and the vulnerability of the political system are more 
decisive of the future of China's democratisation. 
The contributors to this volume share many common concerns 
with the current debates. We also believe that the rise of China is 
central to the future shape of the regional and global international 
order and China's international behaviour will change as its power 
grows. Further, China's growing power needs to be managed 
carefully to minimise its disruptive effect on the international 
system. We differ, however, on the assessment that the rising 
Chinese power is necessarily and inevitably destabilising and 
threatening. A crucial variable here is China's attitudes towards 
the responsibility of its rising power in international relations. Does 
China view power as a means or an end, and a means to what 
end? What is the conception among Chinese elites of China's 
responsible role in international relations? As a rising power, does 
China share with other Great Powers similar understanding of 
their responsibility for managing the international system? Where 
is the gap? How can international society induce a rising China to 
play an increasingly responsible part in the emerging international 
order? Answers to these questions, we argue, have important 
bearings on our understanding of the implications of an ascendant 
China for the future international order. 
We seek therefore to join the debate by investigating this missing 
dimension in the current discourse on the rise of China and to 
invigorate the debate by taking us beyond the sterile discussions 
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of a rising power vis-a-vis a pre-eminent power. Regardless of 
one's theoretical preferences, the role of theory is to aid in 
understanding and explaining. There are two additional reasons 
why this line of enquiry should be pursued. First, China has often 
been stigmatised as an irresponsible power and a 'rogue state'.7 
Evidence drawn from, for example, China's evolving arms control 
policy and its policies towards North Korean nuclear and missile 
programs, as well as its behaviour during the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997-98 and its missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 is, 
however, inconclusive and contradictory at best. Such contradictions 
need to be analysed carefully. Second, unique among Great Powers, 
China has developed a set of uneasy and unusual social relations 
with global international society. Our investigations must be 
embedded in that social context and are to contribute to our 
understanding of that social context. 
Power exacts responsibility. Even in the anarchical and hierarchical 
world of international relations, this conventional wisdom remains 
unpalatably true.8 Hedley Bull once explicitly argued that it is 
precisely because of the embedded inequality of states in terms 
of power in international society that Great Powers enjoy special 
rights and privileges at the same time when they assume duties 
and managerial responsibilities for maintaining and sustaining 
international order. Great Powers also have a greater stake in 
the existing international order.9 Bull argues more specifically that 
Great Powers contribute to international order 'by managing their 
relations with each other; and by exploiting their preponderance 
in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the 
affairs of international society as a whole'. 10 The persistent vitality 
of G7 (now G8), the uncompromising privileged status of the 
exclusive nuclear powers club, and recent debates over the reform 
of the United Nations Security Council are testimony of the 
continued relevance of Bull's arguments after the end of the Cold 
War. Two points need to be made here, though. First, the concept 
of the responsibility of Great Powers is fundamentally different 
from that of the state responsibility. Whereas state responsibility 
is legally and explicitly defined in international law (for example 
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the responsibility to protect aliens and their property)," Great 
Power responsibility is politically as well as morally postulated 
implicitly rather than explicitly. It rests on shared understanding 
principally among Great Powers. Collective expectations of 
international society therefore underlie the conceptualisation of 
the responsibility of power. Second, in his discourse on the duties 
and stake of Great Powers in international order (largely 
conducted in the 1970s), Bull dearly privileges order over justice 
in world politics, although he is not entirely comfortable, and is 
sometimes ambivalent, as to where he situates justice vis-a-vis 
order.As lan Harris has noted, Bull's ambiguity in his treatment of 
justice results from lack of an enquiry into international ethics. 12 
Further, Bull's discussions suggest that the rights and duties of Great 
Powers are mostly, if not exclusively, structurally determined. There 
is little elaboration in Bull's discussions about how the domestic 
constitutions of individual states shape their attitudes towards 
power and their understanding of the responsibility associated 
with it. 13 Discourse on the responsibility of power which is deprived 
of normative content and blind to the role of domestic institutions 
and ideas can no longer be either justified or left unchallenged. 
The responsibility of power, arguably one of the most fundamental 
concepts in international relations, remains one of the most 
underexplored in international relations theory. We are not here, 
however, to launch a study of the ethics of power and responsibility 
in international relations. Important as it is, it belongs to an entirely 
different enquiry. 14 Our purpose here is simply to highlight how 
notoriously difficult ethical considerations of power and 
responsibility can be and why they are likely to remain contentious 
and controversial. Ethical judgment of how and whether a power 
fulfils its responsibility is ultimately subjective. Difficulties in 
investigating Chinese behaviour in this kind of analytical construct 
are further amplified by the differences in Chinese philosophical 
tradition and political culture that sustain China's historical 
assumptions about power and responsibility. 15 Whereas a system 
of legal and institutional checks on the exercise of political power 
has been developed in the Western political tradition, the Chinese 
5 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
political tradition has relied more on the ethical and moral 
character of rulers to restrain the abuse of power. 
This is not in the least the only complexity to consider. Chinese 
revolutions in the twentieth century and China's turbulent relations 
with other Great Powers have also conditioned its understanding 
of the responsibility of power. In particular, China's unique 
experience of socialisation into international life in the second 
half of the twentieth century has helped produce a special set of 
social relations between China and the changing international 
society. As Yongjin Zhang argued recently, Revolutionary China's 
relationship with international society in the 1950s and the 1960s 
is best characterised as alienation rather than isolation. 16 It is not 
hard to imagine why Revolutionary China did not feel obliged to 
take any social responsibility to an international society of which 
it was not regarded part and in which its legitimacy was tenaciously 
denied. In this context, it also makes perfect sense to talk about 
how and whether China is (re)joining the world. 17 
Yet, China's position in international society remains a curious 
one. China has been a declared nuclear power for almost forty 
years and has been one of the Permanent 5 in the United Nations 
Security Council for more than thirty years. It is now universally 
regarded as a rising power. Its membership in the Great Power 
club is nevertheless at best contentious. In the post Cold War 
international society, inference more often than direct reference 
is made to China being a 'rogue state'. China's full membership in 
international society continues to be questioned, but from a 
different angle. Human rights and democratisation are now the 
litmus test, as Rosemary Foot argues in her chapter. 18 As the 
lingering Westphalian system becomes less tolerant of political 
heterogeneity, 19 the nature of the domestic political system, 
democratic process and institutional set-up become increasingly 
significant in defining not only the domestic legitimacy but also the 
international legitimacy of a particular regime. 
It is against this background that contributors to this volume 
conduct their conceptual and empirical investigations. It is in this 
context, we believe, that power and responsibility in Chinese foreign 
policy should be evaluated and understood. 
Introduction 
Responsibility: an evolving concept and a 
moving goalpost 
The first two chapters analyse conceptually the issue of 
responsibility in greater depth than the others. Rosemary Foot 
and Gerald Chan identify different aspects of the question of 
responsibility in the international system. Their perspectives are 
mutually complementary in that Foot looks at the question from 
outside-in, that is, largely from the perspective of international 
society, whereas Chan examines the problem from inside-out and 
offers a Chinese perspective.Their analyses taken together suggest 
an interpretation as follows. The concept of the responsibility of 
power has not remained static in recent decades. It is for some 
purposes a highly subjective concept, and therefore it may remain 
difficult, if not theoretically impossible, for China to ever actually 
meet a benchmark of responsibility. 
Foot notes the principle, which in our view is fundamental, that 
the privilege of statehood-being recognised as a state by the 
international community of states-carries with it an obligation 
to contribute to world order. She then sketches how the concept 
of responsibility in meeting that obligation evolves through three 
phases, from a more basic concept relating to the discourse and 
practice of diplomacy and embrace of international law, through a 
more expansive phase of not just minding one's own business, but 
also contributing to a series of multilateral regimes that 'make up 
the substance of international life' in a world marked by far more 
interchange and more mutual responsibility. The third phase is one 
marked by a new 'willingness to promote the protection of 
individual security, or human rights, and to foster legitimate forms 
of representation' of popular will. 
Foot notes that determination of a particular state's level of 
responsibility will be in itself a political act, but suggests that some 
objectivity (or at lea;;t consensus) is possible in respect of China 
by reference to the degree to which it meets the measures of 
responsibility in the first two phases mentioned above. Foot 
suggests, as do several authors in this volume, that by these 
standards China has been quite responsible. She also notes 
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appropriately a lack of scholarly consensus on the motivations for 
this pattern of behaviour by China. Is China a 'system maintainer' 
or a 'system exploiter'? 
It will be much harder, Foot concludes, for China under the 
current system of government to meet the standards of 
responsibility in the third phase of evolution of international 
society-respect for human rights and appropriate representation 
of popular will. Until China meets this standard, Foot believes that 
'China will remain outside global society'. 
Chan takes the discussion into another dimension, proceeding 
from the view that, in Chinese tradition, the level of responsibility 
that a person is obliged to take depends on their position in a 
hierarchy of power. He links this to the rise in China's power, and 
asserts-correctly in our view-that Chinese leaders and many 
ordinary Chinese people expect China to be accorded a level of 
responsibility relative to its rising power. This is dearly different, 
Chan notes, from being seen or judged as responsible by other 
members of international society. There seems to be no evidence, 
in his view, that Chinese leaders have any conscious thought that 
China should be seen to be responsible to the world when they 
make foreign policy decisions. Chan also makes an interesting 
distinction that he thinks does exist in the minds of the Chinese 
leaders that the type of responsibility a state possesses is linked 
to whether it disposes of soft power (cultural appeal) as well as 
hard power. 
Chan concludes that it is indisputable that China is more 
responsible now than it was two decades ago. Second, he concludes 
that if we want to analyse how responsible China is, then this 
must be a comparative exercise: how does China's level of 
responsibility compare with other powers? 
Domestic changes and the Party-state: 
international implications 
The next two chapters address the internal foundations of the 
power of the Party-state.ln Chapter 4, GregAustin focuses broadly 
on leadership perceptions of the government's power against the 
Introduction 
backdrop of a rapidly changing society, whereas You Ji addresses in 
Chapter 5 the gradual but inevitable divorce of the armed forces 
from the Party. Both chapters identify important implications of 
these significant domestic changes for China's international power 
and responsibility, though these are deliberately asserted rather 
than elaborately argued.These assertions are quite justified in both 
cases, however, since any in-depth analysis of the very complex 
relationships emerging in domestic political power does not leave 
room for much analysis of the international implications. 
Austin sketches the political and social effects of the whirlwind 
of economic reform in what he sees as a weak state. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), he argues, is facing mounting discontent 
on too many fronts and, on the basis of recent evidence, seems to 
be losing in Western Xinjiang. Austin sees the Chinese state as 
weak not only because of these mounting challenges, but also 
because the political system itself is fragile. The Communist Party 
has withered on the vine and no new substitutes for it have been 
found, though nee-authoritarianism has surfaced, in rhetoric at 
least, as a possible alternative. The strike-hard campaigns might 
lead some to conclude that this choice has been made, but Austin 
contends that the strike-hard campaigns are a reflection of the 
weakness of the state and the nervousness of its leaders, and not 
evidence of a post-Communist transition to a stable form of 
authoritarianism. 
Austin concludes that the 'very foundations of domestic 
governance, and therefore of China's international position, remain 
fragile'. In his view, the battle for the future of Chinese politics 
will be fought between more radical, more liberal minded 
reformers and less radical, less liberal reformers in the Communist 
Party and by the supporters of both camps in the armed forces 
and security services (such. as the Ministries of State Security and 
Public Security). He also concludes that the scale of disadvantage 
and disaffection in China is so great and growing so quickly that 
major social and political turmoil seems inevitable. It will be in the 
response to such outbreaks of disorder that the future of the 
Party-state and its policies will lie. If the more liberal reformist 
elements of the Party come to dominate these decisions, coercion 
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will be avoided in favour of spreading democracy (and the blame) 
and by patching up regional welfare problems on an ad hoc basis. 
If the less liberal, though still reformist, elements in the leadership 
dominate decisions, then sustained resort to coercion and a 
deterioration of the social contract are inevitable. If the discontent 
is not defused more quickly and more effectively than it has been 
so far, the outcome will almost inevitably be more consistent 
resort to force and fragmentation of the society. 
You Ji reviews the slowly changing 'marriage' between the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) and the CCP-a direct consequence of 
the fundamental nature of the authoritarian state, where the armed 
forces must serve an internal security role. He predicts an eventual 
divorce or, more interestingly, 'widow' status for the PLA, since 
the CCP may well simply die. Under either scenario, he sees a 
much m'ore 'normal' constitutional relationship between the PLA 
and the Chinese government. That is, however, his longer-term 
prediction. Whatever happens, he notes, each side in the 
relationship has become weaker, and the military in particular now 
has to vie for influence alongside a larger number of other interest 
groups with increased influence. 
You Ji's assessment of the shorter term is based on his view, 
with which it is difficult argue, that for the last two decades the 
two sides have been getting on quite well. He complements the 
civilian government for its performance in striking a good balance 
between allowing the military to feel that it occupies an important 
place in the political order while at the same time advancing a 
broader development agenda and denying the PLA undue influence 
in domestic politics. At the same time, he concludes that the PLA 
is 'still the most awesome political institution' in the country 
because of its size and physical power, because of its popular 
support, and because of its 'constitutional status' established through 
the highly autonomous Central Military Commission of the CCP. 
The main trend though has been towards professionalisation and 
depoliticisation of the armed forces, and this trend has been strong. 
You Ji sees the PLA and the CCP leaders as being in general 
agreement over the strategic threats to the country, but says there 
10 
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has been visible discord about relative priorities in two important 
policy areas-military posture (more or less defence expenditure) 
and Taiwan (more or less military pressure). He sees a continuation 
of the dominance of the line of the civilian leadership on both 
counts-except perhaps in the event that a crisis is forced on China, 
in which case the civilian leadership may be forced to side with a 
more aggressive military posture demanded by the PLA in order 
to avoid being tarred with the brush of betraying national interests. 
Towards a responsible power? Practice and 
evidence 
Chapters 6-9 provide brief case studies and offer accounts of 
how China's recent international behaviour in specific issue areas 
reflects on the question of whether and how China can be said to 
have become more responsible in international relations. In 
Chapter 6, Ann Kent discusses what China's participation in 
international organisations tells us about its learning about the 
responsibility of power. Stuart Harris, in Chapter 7, examines 
China's recent diplomacy in Northeast Asia. While in Chapter 8, 
He Baogang, addresses Beijing's policy toward Taiwan's bid for a 
UN seat, Gary Klintworth takes up in Chapter 9 controversial 
issues surrounding China and arms control. 
China and international organisations 
Ann Kent introduces her article with some general propositions 
that seem in close agreement with those of other authors. The 
most important of these is that 'participation in international 
organisations both confirms sovereignty and constrains it'. She 
notes that the power conferred on states by such participation is 
'balanced by the increased responsibility such participation entails'. 
On the strength of these propositions, Kent gives an overview of 
how China's participation in international organisations 'sheds light 
on its practical understanding of power and responsibility'. 
Some authors in the volume take the view that China is not too 
different in its interest-based approach to responsibility from other 
11 
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powers, but Kent pays more explicit attention to this proposition 
and gives a good succinct statement of it. What does single China 
out, according to Kent, is that it has had a 'steep learning curve, 
mediated by its own ambitions, changing perceptions and unique 
perspectives'. In sketching these perceptively, Kent reminds us of 
China's 'self-constructed identity as a Club of One'; of China's 
special place as the one among the five Permanent Members of 
the Security Council which has to be courted more than the others, 
of China's tendency to free-ride on some big issues (thus evading 
responsibility), and of the pragmatic nature of Chinese foreign 
policy in spite of its articulation in highly principled and absolute 
terms. One of the most important observations in this section of 
Kent's chapter is that 'China's attitude to the international rule of 
law and its behaviour within international organisations is heavily 
influenced by its attitude to the domestic rule of law and its political 
culture'. 
Kent concludes that China has both learned responsibility from 
its role in international organisations as well as learned the benefits 
of the appearance of being responsible. She notes that 'China's 
power has been enhanced by its willingness to negotiate its 
sovereignty'. At some domestic political cost, China continues to 
support international society and global norms because 'just as 
the world needs China, China needs the world'. 
Northeast Asia 
Harris' analysis of China's diplomacy in Northeast Asia begins with 
some theoretical observations about the international system and 
norms that put him in close agreement with the general 
conclusions of Foot and Chan-there are some fairly basic 
standards which allow for some assessment of responsible 
behaviour, but these norms (such as peaceful resolution of disputes, 
respect for sovereignty, and appropriate engagement with 
international community regimes) can change in their subjective 
content over time. Harris therefore looks to China's Northeast 
Asia diplomacy for evidence of 'cooperative relationships in 
conformity with generally accepted international norms'. 
12 
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Harris, echoing Chan's arguments, recognises that China's 
approach to international relations may not always be articulated 
in ways that conform to the concept of responsibility as it is 
understood in the West. He argues, however, that it is possible to 
track its behaviour against this benchmark, although it is difficult, 
he concedes, to ascribe motivations in all cases of China's foreign 
policy behaviour. Harris notes that realist-style interests of China 
are often visible and even prominent in China's foreign policymaking 
but also sees alongside these explicit foundations of China's 
behaviour a number of implicit ones, which he elaborates in his 
examination of China's recent diplomatic practice in Northeast 
Asia. 
In a country-by-country review of China's diplomacy in Northeast 
Asia from an interests-based perspective, which is far too 
comprehensive to summarise easily here, Harris produces some 
important observations that reflect the views of some other 
authors within this volume to an extent. In discussing Chinese 
policy toward Xinjiang as an issue in Sino-Russian relations, Harris 
notes, as Foot did in general terms, that China's use of draconian 
internal repression measures in pursuit of what is definitely a 
legitimate security interest 'conflicts with what would be widely 
seen as the appropriate norms'. He notes that China, through the 
declarations of the Shanghai Five, is trying to reassert its view of 
the unacceptability of external interference in what it would still 
like to see as internal affairs. 
In reviewing Sino-Japanese relations, Harris notes what appears 
to be a deeply ingrained Chinese instinct to avoid war with Japan, 
an instinct arising from the experience of war. On the US 
relationship, he notes the survival of some ideologically-based 
perspectives from an earlier era that give a competitive flavour 
to China's diplomacy. Harris notes that China sees and accepts 
considerable responsibilities toward regional stability in restraining 
North Korean missile developments. Harris' general concluding 
assessment is even more telling: the threats to Northeast Asian 
stability and peace are not likely to arise from any abrogation by 
China of its responsibilities, but from other causes. 
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Taiwan 
A fresh look at the China-Taiwan relationship from the perspective 
of China's responsibility in the international system is offered by 
He Baogang. He confirms Chan's intuition that for China, the 
greater its power, the greater the sense of responsibility it is likely 
to take or want in respect of the international system. Interestingly, 
He suggests that this is also the expectation of the international 
community-the more powerful a state, the greater its 
responsibility. He appears to reject instinctively a realist 
interpretation of international affairs, but contends that the 
proposition about the link between power and responsibility is 
'not a moral issue' but a 'real political matter' (by which we infer 
'realpolitik').A state like China, he says, has so many impacts on the 
world, especially its neighbours, that it must bear responsibility to 
them. 
He's chapter is more specifically about China's approach to 
Taiwan's bid for a seat in the United Nations. Starting from the 
proposition that China's past position on Taiwan was a manifestation 
of the traditional concept of sovereignty, He argues that China 
can afford to exploit the flexibility of the sovereignty norm to 
take an interest-based approach to the Taiwan problem. He warns 
that, if China does not do this, the thorny question of Taiwan's 
representation in the United Nations will continue to raise its 
head throughout this century. The suggested innovation is to work 
for Taiwan's admission to the United Nations in a second China 
seat, rather than a separate Taiwan seat. Citing the precedents, He 
gives an exposition of how the change in China's position could be 
justified within the framework of its existing rhetoric on the Taiwan 
issue. 
He's approach provides corroboration for some of the general 
conclusions presented in the chapters by Foot and Chan. There is 
room for a third-wave approach to sovereignty as something far 
from absolute. He goes further, saying that China's practice on 
sovereignty has already gone beyond strict adherence to its 
rhetoric on the sacredness of sovereignty. He cites the adjustments 
seen in China's Taiwan policy as evidence of its 'learning' about the 
possibilities of a flexible approach to the concept of sovereignty. 
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Returning to the interest-based analysis we have seen in other 
chapters, He concludes that the only question now is whether 
China's political leaders are prepared to bear the political costs 
associated with this innovative approach, an approach which would 
truly demonstrate that China had reached a very high level of 
maturity in its appreciation of the responsibility now falling on its 
shoulders as a rising Great Power. 
China and arms control 
In his analysis of China's responsibility in acceding to, and then 
complying (or not complying) with, arms control regimes, Gary 
Klintworth is the only author in this volume to confront head-on 
the main source of the big questions about China's current position 
in the international community. There is no doubt that the question 
derives in large part from a 'black view of China' and that the 
currency and prominence given to the question is influenced largely 
by trends in US-China relations. Klintworth correctly observes 
that it is only the United States with its intelligence assets that is 
able to tick or cross the box on China's arms control compliance 
record. He does not offer a detailed analysis of the 'black view', 
preferring instead to cite one very good example of it. He contrasts 
this 'black view' with the US government's view during the second 
Clinton Presidency, which gave China a pretty good report card 
on compliance. 
Klintworth's chapter, like others, is appropriately couched in 
terms of the theoretical debate about learning and motivations, 
though these aspects are not discussed at length. He canvasses 
two broad options for explaining China's unambiguous move to 
significant participation in a variety of arms control measures. The 
first is the basic instrumentalist one, that 'China's interest in arms 
control stems solely from concerns about realpolitik, defined in 
terms of a concern about China's global image and a desire to 
rein in the power' of the United States or Russia. The second 
flows from what Klintworth implies is a genuinely felt conviction 
in China, one of support for the 'same common security values as 
the United States'. He says that China wants to reduce global 
tensions where possible, especially in its relations with the United 
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States, in order to concentrate on economic development. At the 
same time, he is prepared to admit that in the longer term, this 
motivation may transform itself in a way which makes its current 
arms control commitments seem but an 'interim ploy pending 
China's attainment of superpower status'. 
The Klintworth chapter provides one of the best catalogues of 
China's arms control record that is available in brief form. His 
article appropriately concludes with some observations about 
differences between the United States and China on national missile 
defence that go to the heart of a sophisticated understanding of 
the dual nature of responsibility-on the one hand, the Great 
Power's obligation to comply and behave, and on the other, an 
obligation for it to oppose (through peaceful dialogue) what it 
believes is unacceptable international behaviour. 
Contextualising China's understanding of 
power and responsibility 
In a tantalising theoretical and historical essay on China's identity 
construction and the question of responsibility in international 
society, Yongjin Zhang in Chapter I 0 addresses in a different fashion 
some of the issues flagged by Kent when she talked of China's 
steep learning curve mediated by its 'ambitions, changing 
perceptions and unique perspectives'. Zhang discusses China's 'self-
constructed identity', but poses this in the context of mutually 
constructed identities. He asks: 'if identity construction is mutual, 
that is, it is constructed by distinguishing self against the Other, 
then how does perceiving China as the Other constitute part of 
China's identity formation?' Interestingly, he asks, 'why is there 
such a persistent dichotomy of China vis-a-vis the world (the West 
writ large)?' 
The central analytical concern of Zhang's essay is to problematise 
China's security. Zhang begins with an important set of issues rarely 
addressed in commentary on China's security posture: 'How and 
why do the Chinese elites perceive what as the main problems 
for China's security?' Taking an inside-out perspective, Zhang looks 
at what he sees as the three most penetrating and transformational 
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social experiences of China since 1949, namely, revolution, war 
and reform. He offers a series of interpretations, based on a 
sociological approach, as to how these three domestic social 
processes have significantly affected China's security conceptions 
and behaviour. He argues that it is these domestic social processes, 
interacting with the same social processes in international society, 
that have contributed significantly to China's identity construction 
of self vis-a-vis the Other. Such interactions have also made China 
a persistently insecure power and helped produce China's insecurity 
complex. For these reasons, Zhang suggests, revolution, war and 
reform as social processes in both China and international society 
and their interactions constitute an important social context within 
which proper understanding and judgment of China's attitudes 
towards power and responsibility can be evaluated. 
The chapter by Zhang is in the tradition of historical sociology, 
tracing the direct impact of the broad social upheavals on 
perceptions of security. But it appears to have two other 
intertwined approaches. The first, an explicitly stated proposition, 
is that revolution, war and reform are not seen as purely domestic 
Chinese experiences, and for this reason the real sociological 
significance of these events can only be understood if the link 
between them and international society is fully appreciated. The 
second, more subtextual in nature, is that the issues of revolution, 
war and reform were so central in the formation of the Chinese 
elite and so traumatic that each of these as a process has had a 
deep impact on the cognitive processes of Chinese elites, an impact 
that extends beyond the conscious or unconscious memories of 
specific events. 
We do not pretend that the essays in this book have provided 
answers to all the questions that were posed at the beginning of 
this introduction. This is not, after all, the purpose of this book. 
Our contributors perhaps differ as much as they agree on the 
question of subjectivity and perspectives in their evaluation of 
power and responsibility in Chinese foreign policy. We do hope 
that this collection suggests more lines of thought than it elaborates 
and opens up new areas of enquiry that go beyond the simple 
caricature of China as an erratic state and an irresponsible power. 
17 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
Notes 
International Security has carried in the last few years a number of 
essays that engage in such debates. These include in particular, 
Avery Goldstein, 'Great expectations: interpreting China's arrival', 
International Security, 22, no.3 (Winter 1997-98), 36-73; David 
Shambaugh, 'Containment or engagement of China? Calculating 
Beijing's response', International Security, 21, no.2 (Fall 1996 ), 180-
209; Gerald Segal 'East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China', 
International Security, 20, no.4 (Spring 1996), I 07-35; and Thomas J. 
Christensen, 'China, the U$-Japan Alliance and the security dilemma 
in East Asia', International Security, 23, no.4 (Spring 1999), 49-80. 
The above essays are now published, with a few others, in a 
convenient collection by Michael Brown et al. (eds), The Rise of 
China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). 
On the social balance of power, see John M. Hobson and Leonard 
Seabrooke, 'Reimagining Weber: constructing international society 
and the social balance of power', European Journal of International 
Relations, 7, no.2 (200 I), 239-74. 
For a brief summary of the national debate within the United States 
on this issue, see Michel Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy, 
'Introduction: China joins the world', in Elizabeth Economy and 
Michel Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: progress and prospects 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), in particular, 
pp. 7-15. Oksenberg and Economy have identified two groups 
which they call 'accommodationist' and 'confrontationist'. See also 
James Shinn (ed.), Weaving the Net: conditional engagement of China 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996); and Ezra F. 
Vogel (ed.), Living with China: U.S.-China relations in the twenty-ftrst 
century (New York: Norton, 1997). 
See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with 
China (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1997); and David Shambaugh, 'Sino-
American strategic relations: from partners to competitors', Survival, 
42, no. I (Spring 2000), 97-115. 
Such a containment strategy, in Sean Lynn-Jones' words, 'usually 
implied treating China as a potential military adversary, attempting 
to limit its economic growth, restricting its accesss to militarily 
significant technologies, punishing China for violating human rights, 
and strengthening US alliances and military capabilities that are at 
least potentially directed against China'. See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 
'Preface' in Michael E. Brown et al (eds.), The Rise of China, xii. 
18 
Introduction 
See in particular Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in East 
Asia: what are the risks as the Asian balance of power undergoes a 
fundamental change? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and 
Thomas J. Christensen, 'Chinese Realpolitik', Foreign Affairs, 75, no.5 
(September 1996), 37-52. 
For a caricature of different perceptions of China, see David 
Lampton, 'China', Foreign Policy, no.l I 0 (Spring 1998), 13-27. 
For the most recent debate, see Alberto R. Coli, 'Introduction: 
American power and responsibility in a new century', Ethics and 
International Affairs, 14, (2000), 3-1 0; and Tony Smith, 'Morality and 
the use of force in a unipolar world: the 'Wilsonian moment'?', 
Ethics and International Affairs, 14, (2000), 11-22. 
See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics 
(London: Macmillan, 1977), 200-29. 
10 Ibid, 207. 
1 1 For state responsibility in international law, see, among others, lan 
Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: state responsibility (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983). 
12 I an Harris, 'Order and Justice in 'The Anarchical Society' ,International 
Affairs, 69, no.4 (October 1993), 725-41. 
13 In dismissing Revolutionary France and Hitler's Germany as Great 
Powers, Bull only stated that '[s]tates which, like Napoleonic France 
or Nazi Germany, are military powers of the first rank, but are not 
regarded by their own leaders or others as having these rights and 
responsibilities, are not properly speaking great powers'. Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, 202. 
14 See for example, DanieiWarner,An Ethic of Responsibility in International 
Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991 ); and Stanley 
Hoffmann, 'Political ethics of international relations', Seventh 
Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy (New York: 
Carnegie Council on Ethics and Foreign Affairs, 1988). 
15 For a succinct and vigorous discussion of historical assumptions of 
power and responsibility in the Western political thought, see 
Leonard Krieger, 'Power and Responsibility: historical assumptions', 
in Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (eds), The Responsibility of Power: 
historical essays (London: Macmillan, 1967), 3-33. 
16 See Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: alienation 
and beyond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). 
17 Oksenberg and Economy, China Joins the World, is the most recent 
example. 
19 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
18 This follows a similar line of arguments by Andrew Nathan and 
Strobe Talbott, among others. Andrew Nathan, for example, argues 
that China should 'behave in a way [in terms of human rights] that 
does not offend the conscience of that [international] community' 
in return for the benefits of full membership. Andrew Nathan, 
'Influencing human rights in China', in james R. Lilley and W L. 
Willkie (eds.), Beyond MFN: trade with China and American interests, 
80. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State of the first Clinton 
Administration was more explicit, stating, 'We believe China cannot 
be a full partner in the world community until it respects 
international obligations and agreements on human rights, free 
and fair trading practices, and strict controls on the export of 
destabilising weapons and military technology'. Strobe Talbott, 'US 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's speech to the Japan 
National Press Club on 25 January 1995' (Washington, DC: US 
Department of State, 1995). For theoretical arguments on human 
rights as legitimising norms, see Jack Donnelly, 'Human rights: the 
new standard of civilisation?', International Affairs, 74, no. I Uanuary 
1998), 1-23. 
19 See K.J. Holsti, 'Dealing with dictators: Westphalian and American 
strategies', International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, I (200 I), 51-65. 
20 
hinese power and the 
idea of a responsible 
state 
Rosemary foot 
The interrelated themes of 'power and responsibility' are useful 
tools for understanding Chinese foreign policy during a troubled 
yet remarkable span of half a century of Communist Party rule. 
Evaluations of the behaviour of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) over these five decades have often related directly to 
concerns about the use the PRC has made of its material and 
ideological resources. Has Beijing worked to support the dominant 
norms of the international order, or has it striven to overturn 
them? Has it ever deserved to be termed a 'responsible power', 
as the dominant states in the system have sought to define that 
term, or has it acted irresponsibly? To place this more explicitly 
within an international relations framework, has China shown itself 
since 1949, and more especially during the period of reform and 
opening since 1979, as capable of being socialised into supporting 
global norms, or have there been signs that its rising power over 
the past two decades-as realists would predict-has generated 
new tensions in the international system? Looking more to the 
future, what kind of challenge does its enhanced capabilities pose 
to the status quo? 1 
This chapter links the concept of power to the idea of a 
responsible state, or more exactly and in reference to an important 
body of writing in international relations, it links power and 
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responsibility with those states that are judged to belong to 
international society. It tries to respond, therefore, to the question 
of whether China has had a responsible government over the 
past 50 years by connecting this assessment of its behaviour with 
the concept of international society. Writing in 1977, and building 
on the earlier work of Martin Wight and others, Hedley Bull argued 
that international society exists when a group of powerful states 
recognise that they share certain common interests from which 
limited rules of coexistence can be derived, and exhibit a willingness 
to share in the working of institutions that maintain those 
arrangements. Importantly, international society in this formulation 
acknowledges diversity in values but also a set of reciprocal 
interests. 2 
When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, it 
undoubtedly posed a major challenge to those common interests 
and the rules that had been developed to underpin them, a 
challenge that lessened over time as China experimented with 
new forms of participation in the global system in the wake of its 
decision in the early 1970s to emerge from isolation and its later 
decision to embark on far-reaching reforms.At the time that China 
was beginning to move in this direction, however, those membership 
criteria were themselves undergoing change, embracing 
requirements beyond those that Bull had regarded as essential to 
include solidarist rather than pluralist conceptions of international 
society. Under these solidarist conceptions, common values and 
some notion of the common good, rather than the independent 
if common interests of sovereign and diverse states, were given 
priority.3Thus, Beijing found that it was lagging behind the dominant 
definitions of the responsible state soon after it had decided to 
become more fully integrated into international society. Moreover, 
the changes in definition posed particular dilemmas for a 
government keen to be recognised as a Great Power, yet 
vulnerable to certain of the criteria that more recently had 
become associated with the modern state in international society, 
especially those that shone the spotlight more directly on the 
domestic organisation of states.4 
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The responsible state and international 
society 
Great Powers in Hedley Bull's estimation derived that identity 
from characteristics that included but went beyond capacity, 
particularly military capacity. Such states also had to involve 
themselves in the provision of international order; indeed, they 
had special rights and duties when it came to maintaining order. 
This custodial role required agreement on a set of core and 
reciprocal interests, and then on the sets of institutions-such as 
war, diplomacy, international law, and the balance of power-that 
needed to be utilised in order to fulfil these requirements. Great 
Powers formed the core of international society not only because 
they shared an important set of interests and could generate a 
set of rules, but because they were capable of passing these rules 
on to others within the system. As Chinese leaders of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century discovered, the standard 
for their country to satisfy at a minimum involved the protection 
of the lives and property of foreign nationals, the conduct of 
diplomatic relations through the institutions of ambassadors and 
a foreign ministry, and an embrace of international law.5 In this 
particular understanding of international society, sovereign status-
that is, internal supremacy and external independence from outside 
interference-was seen as an essential starting point. 
In more recent times, the UN Charter and the institution of 
the Security Council has been taken to reflect at least one 
important element of this Great Power management role. Article 
2 of the Charter acknowledges the sovereign equality of states, 
and the norm of non-interference in domestic affairs. In addition, 
it emphasises the need for the pacific settlement of disputes and 
the non-use of force except for purposes of self-defence. In the 
first three post-war decades, states that generally supported these 
rules and that recognised the benefits that these norms of behaviour 
bestowed were designated responsible and capable of being 
embraced within the society of states. Those that rejected them 
were shunned, deemed irresponsible, and perceived as subversive 
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of international order. Although other articles in the Charter 
limited the absolute rights of sovereignty and made reference to 
the need to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all, for most of the Cold War period, the Charter was 
interpreted in such a way as to keep the main focus on inter-state 
relations and to underpin the norm of non-intervention. 
1950s 1960s 
One such state that appeared to have rejected this status quo 
definition of international society was the People's Republic of 
China, established in October 1949. Its discourse, and much of its 
behaviour, suggested that it was not prepared to play entirely by 
the rules. The vigour with which it launched its challenge and its 
decision to make common cause with the Soviet Union gave 
meaning to the belief that not only had two power blocs come 
into being, but so had two ideological systems. In the early years 
of the PRC's existence, the new revolutionary state refused to 
take on automatically the diplomatic obligations that it had inherited 
from the Nationalist government, preferring as Mao described it, 
to 'open a new stove' and to 'sweep the house dean before 
entertaining new guests'. The arrest in Shenyang of the US Consul-
General, Angus Ward, on 24 October 1949, on the spurious charge 
that Ward had 'seriously injured' a Chinese messenger at the 
Consulate, raised fears in the United States that diplomatic 
immunity would not be respected by the new Chinese government. 
China's primary goal in 1949, as the Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai 
put it, was to obtain swift recognition and establish 'brotherly 
friendship' with the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, while at 
the same time being 'hostile to the imperialists and to oppose 
them'.6 Moreover, the Chinese leadership took more seriously 
than we once believed Stalin's invitation to Beijing to take 
responsibility for supporting revolutions in Asia, as its aid to Kim II 
Sung's and Ho Chi Minh's plans for reunification and independent 
statehood demonstrated.7 Beijing's decisions to assist with these 
struggles in Korea and Vietnam, assistance which has been described 
as crucial to the defeat of the French in Vietnam in 1954 and to 
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North Vietnam's ability to resist American might in the period 
1965-68, stemmed in some considerable part from its ideas of 
socialist solidarity and commitment to world revolution. Its later 
material and verbal support for armed struggles in the Third World, 
together with its-albeit selective-support for Communist Parties 
in states ruled by the bourgeoisie also contributed to an image of 
a Chinese world order that saw virtue in contention and upheaval, 
not in order and stability.8 Unsettled border claims and the 
continuation of the civil war struggle with the Nationalists on 
Taiwan regularly resulted in violence, representing-alongside its 
activities in support of the revolutionary struggles in Southeast 
Asia-direct challenges to the norms of non-interference and non-
use of force. 
What made these challenges particularly potent in the 1950s 
were that this apparent rejection of the dominant norms of 
international society coincided with a significant increase in China's 
power resources. During its first five year plan, finally begun in 
late 1952, growth rates were impressively high. US estimates put 
the annual increase in gross national product (GNP) at between 
seven and eight per cent in this period, with the expectation that, 
by the end of the decade, China would have 'tripled its electric 
power output, more than doubled its coal production, and increased 
the value of its machine industry some two and one-half times'.9 
This had been achieved on the basis of a political-economic model 
that represented a firm rejection of that offered by the liberal-
capitalist states. These economic advances, coupled with China's 
holding the US armed forces-the most sophisticated military 
power in the global system-to a stalemate on the Korean 
battlefield, added to a picture in the 1950s of China as the 'wave 
of the future', 10 able in the near term to develop an alternative 
and potentially attractive vision of international society that would 
appeal particularly to the newly-decolonised states and would be 
based on its own distinctive membership criteria. As Zhou Enlai 
put it at the first conference of Afro-Asian countries held in 
Bandung in 1955, the various delegations should put aside 
differences and band together on the 'common ground' of 
overturning the 'sufferings and calamities of colonialism'. 11 
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Further Chinese challenges to the established diplomatic order 
were to come in the 1960s, although these were clearly less 
positive in terms of the political and economic outcomes for Beijing 
than had been the case in the 1950s. During Zhou's visit to Somalia 
in February 1964, he proclaimed-much to the chagrin of a number 
of the vulnerable, newly-decolonised states-'revolutionary 
prospects are excellent throughout the African continent'. 1965 
saw the publication of Lin Biao's Long Live the Victory of People's War. 
It divided the world into the countryside (Asia, Africa and Latin 
America) and the cities (Europe and North America) and argued 
that a united front among the poor and oppressed in the Third 
World would overwhelm the oppressors in the metropole. The 
behaviour of its diplomats in overseas postings during the Cultural 
Revolution resulted in over a dozen countries severing diplomatic 
relations with China. Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, for example, in 
September 1967, charged Beijing with interference in his country's 
internal affairs in violation of the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence. 12 Beijing also decided to bring home all but one of its 
diplomatic personnel from abroad during this period in order 
that they could undergo intensive re-education in Maoist 
revolutionary precepts. The domestic chaos was permitted such 
free rein that the central authorities lost control of the Chinese 
foreign ministry for a time; and in Beijing the British mission was 
set on fire. 
More broadly, China's contribution to global discourse on some 
of the core issues of the day connected with peace and security 
appeared particularly uncompromising. It depicted the arms control 
negotiations between the two superpowers as a sham and an 
attempt to impose hegemonic control, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions as leading predators in a capitalist economic order, 
and the United Nations in 1965 as a 'dirty international political 
stock exchange in the grip of a few big powers'. It charged that 
the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations was part of 
a plot to convert the United Nations into a 'US-controlled 
headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp 
out the revolutionary struggles of the world's people'. 13 China's 
determination to force a breach in relations with the Soviet Union 
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in the early 1960s made more prominent still its role as outsider 
even within its nominal identity group, especially at a time when 
Moscow and Washington had embarked on negotiations that 
illustrated thek Great Power management role and common 
purpose in the avoidance of nuclear wa/ 14 Beijing's promotion of 
a vision of a world in flux, one where hegemons had to be 
weakened and old political orders overthrown, rendered it a 
determined opponent of international society, not a potential new 
entrant into the club of responsible states. 
as candidate Great Power and 
responsible state 
Undoubtedly, China was always more complex as an international 
actor than the depiction presented so far. An identity as a radical 
socialist revolutionary state was clearly important to its leaders, 
but there was always another identity-that of a Great Power-
that Beijing sought to acquire, together with the mutual 
acknowledgment if not respect of other powerful states in the 
system.The PRC, for example, wanted the seat on the UN Security 
Council that was held by the Guomindang (GMD); it delighted in 
its participation in Great Power deliberations at Geneva in 1954; 15 
and it moved to develop and promote such norms of international 
conduct as the five principles of peaceful coexistence with its own 
stress on the value of state sovereignty, mutual interest, and non-
interference. Like the other major states, it also began to embark 
on an overseas aid program even though its populace was poorer 
than many of its aid recipients. 
Although China promoted the perception that it gave unqualified 
support to revolutionary movements wherever they might arise, 
in fact its level of support in the 1960s depended on the degree 
to which they, or the state of which they were a part, were willing 
to adopt policies acceptable to Beijing. It was 'not the objective 
class character of the society in question or the proclaimed 
ideology of the party in power' 16 that determined the attitudes of 
Chinese leaders. Moreover, for some of the weaker states in the 
global system, particularly those that had emerged from anti-
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colonial struggles, Chinese actions did not go beyond the bounds 
of appropriate behaviour. They were favourably disposed towards 
states such as China that had rendered them some assistance, 
even if that assistance had often only been verbal. Ambiguities in 
international law on the subject of the non-use of force in respect 
of national liberation movements 17 also undermined some of the 
claims that China was failing to uphold the principles of the UN 
Charter. 
Yet, in the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese behaviour overall was 
overwhelmingly interpreted as reflecting a desire to articulate 
new conceptions of international society based on China's own 
historical and political-economic experiences, not as attempts to 
enter the existing club of Great Powers. Its more traditional 
diplomatic actions at the state-to-state level were insufficient to 
sway the dominant image of China as, quite probably, the most 
radical of the revolutionary states in the global system. 
That depiction of China was to change, however, with China 
eventually seen more as a 'system maintainer', even 'system 
exploiter' than a 'system challenger' from the 1970s and early 
1980s onwards. 18 During this period Beijing started to establish 
diplomatic relationships on a global basis, entered the United 
Nations ( 1971 ), and the Bretton Woods Institutions ( 1980) and, 
crucial to all these developments, improved and then normalised 
its relationship with the United States, even at the expense of its 
erstwhile socialist allies in Asia-North Korea and Vietnam. In the 
1970s, despite greater international engagement, it still did not 
take on the responsibilities that came with its position as one of 
the Permanent 5 on the UN Security Council. It remained passive 
in the United Nations, failing to participate in many of the 
organisation's statutory subsidiary bodies, rarely sponsoring a draft 
resolution, or using its veto. 19 It continued to reject deep 
engagement in the global economy. Its decisions about trade 
reflected the principles of import substitution. It incurred neither 
foreign nor domestic debt, nor made use of foreign direct 
investment. Only gradually, especially after Mao's death and the 
introduction of Deng Xiaoping's reform agenda, during which 
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'Chinese themselves repudiated the 'Chinese model",20 did the 
Beijing leadership begin to act as though it wanted to fulfil the 
entry requirements of contemporary international society. 
Those entry requirements still related to the idea of Great Power 
management of the system, but in the 1980s a responsible state 
had also come to be perceived as one that was in good standing in 
the international regimes that made up the substance of 
international life.21 International regimes and organisations had 
rapidly advanced in number and issue area by this decade-to 
contribute to the central international society goal of international 
peace and security, expectations were that a state be involved 
with, among other matters, arms control arrangements, UN 
peacekeeping operations, the protection of the environment, and 
be supportive of the world trading order, all areas where China 
began to participate more fully. 
This normative agenda, albeit demanding enough in its own terms, 
was to be further developed through the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Connected strongly with the ending of the Cold War, but 
also representing a longer process of normative change, there 
was a third turn in meaning associated with the responsible state 
in international society. This involved new and broader 
understandings of the concept of security to embrace intra-state 
relations, and the idea of human security and human rights. The 
responsible state thus came to include one that was concerned 
less with the division between the domestic and international 
realms, but one that demonstrated a willingness to promote 
individual security within states and to foster legitimate forms of 
representation through adherence to democratic forms of 
government. An earlier conception of international society had 
rested on an understanding of sovereignty that emphasised non-
intervention and non-interference and the freedom to act 
independently. Over the course of the post-war and especially 
post-Cold War eras, however, these normative foundations were 
to be weakened by the advent of global actors other than states, 
the embedding and development of different norms, and the 
creation of additional regimes designed to manage a more 
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interdependent global system. Rather than building an international 
order of states that accepted differences in values but attempted 
to define a set of common interests, now there was a concern 
with world order, a desire to promote convergence towards 
certain core values, and a focus on the sovereignty of individuals 
rather than of states. The breakdown of the ideological Cold War 
divide provided new structural conditions that made it possible to 
promote ideas that affected directly the domestic organisation of 
states, and space to contemplate the methods necessary to bring 
about convergence towards a set of common values on which a 
solidarist global society could rest. 
Much of the writing on state sovereignty in the 1990s, then, 
points to this third evolution in our understanding of what it means 
to be a sovereign state, ideas that are often subsumed under the 
term legitimate sovereignty. Legitimate sovereignty refers not just 
to an ability to control territory and peoples and to achieve 
recognition of that fact, or to be in good standing in international 
regimes, but now implies acceptance of certain rules that result in 
particular domestic structures. As Jack Donnelly has observed in 
reference to human rights, there has come into being a new 
standard of civilisation-states will only be entitled to full 
membership of international society to the extent that they meet 
the new criterion of observing international human rights 
standards. As he explains it, 'human rights represent a progressive 
late twentieth century expression of the important idea that 
international legitimacy and full membership in international society 
must rest in part on standards of just, humane or civilised 
behaviour'. He goes on, noting that 'despite the continuing split 
between national and international law embodied in dominant 
conceptions of sovereignty, the society of states has come to accept 
that our common humanity makes the way in which any state 
treats its citizens a legitimate concern of other states, foreign 
nationals and international society'.22 
This, however, is not just the view of scholars working in this 
issue area. Many governments and their officials during this period 
demonstrated that they were already attuned to these 
requirements, some of whom resented these expectations as 
impositions by the strong, and others of whom either agreed with 
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these broader goals or perceived them as an opportunity to 
indicate that their state had embarked on a new path. In the late 
1980s, for example, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, said to an audience of Soviet diplomats: 'The image 
of a state is its attitude towards its own citizens, respect for their 
rights and freedoms, and recognition of the sovereignty of the 
individual'. With the advent of political change within the former 
Soviet bloc, Hungary decided to signal aspects of its new identity 
when in 1988 it became the first East European state to ratify the 
Optional Protocol of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights-the right of petition for individuals who claim to 
be victims of a violation by a State Party. 23 Many states made similar 
moves, for example, Brazil and Indonesia, both of which set up 
National Human Rights Commissions as part of this desire to signal 
a change in domestic political behaviour. 
Some of the major international institutions also came to be 
associated with the promotion of democratic politics and the 
humane treatment of one's citizens, often under the heading 'good 
governance'. While the World Bank has been constrained by its 
Articles of Agreement from advocating pluralist democracy, its 
definition of governance comprises such matters as improving 
accountability, transparency, the promotion of civil society and 
the rule of law.24 Progress towards these goals and policies on 
military spending are taken into consideration when the World 
Bank makes lending decisions. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development incorporated into its founding 
charter the requirement that aid recipients be 'committed to 
applying the principles of multi-party democracy, pluralism and 
market economies'. The Organization of American States (OAS) 
adopted a resolution in June 1991 that, in its preamble, required 
the 'political representation of [member] states to be based on 
effective exercise of democracy'. The resolution 
called for the organisation's Secretary-General to hold an 
immediate meeting of the OAS Permanent Council 'in the event 
of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular 
interruption of the democratic political institutional process or 
of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected 
government in any of the Organization's member states'.25 Although 
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the supremacy of the norm of democratic entitlement may be 
honoured more in the breach than in the actual fulfilment, 
nevertheless by the mid 1990s some 130 governments had 
announced a legal commitment to holding open, multiparty 
elections based on a secret ballot and universal franchise. Moreover, 
many political actors had sought international validation of these 
electoral processes-that is, had decided to invite 'interference' 
in their own domestic affairs. International observers have been 
used not only to show to the world the country's commitment to 
democracy, but also to confirm the fairness of the result to 
domestic audiences, thereby undermining the basis for any internal 
challenge to the authority of the newly elected.26 
Alongside the development of state-based international 
organisations, there has been a vast increase in the numbers and 
influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in recent 
years. These too have created new norms and have played roles in 
shaping the determination of whether a government deserves 
the title responsible or not. NGOs, as new sites of authority,27 can 
influence international perceptions of a particular state through 
the information they provide and their transnational networking 
capabilities. Their capacities can be considerable-between 1950 
and 1993, the number of groups working primarily on human rights 
was estimated to have increased fivefold, doubling between 1983 
and 1993.28 One of the most prominent, Amnesty International, 
has built up a staff size and budget that compares favourably with 
the level of resources that the United Nations devotes to human 
rights issues as a whole.29 NGOs have provided a vital input into 
such UN bodies as the UN Commission on Human Rights, the 
Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture, as well 
as working with individual governments and the world's media. 
These UN bodies are highly dependent on the information provided 
by the human rights NGOs, especially when attempts are made to 
move beyond the setting of standards into the monitoring of 
compliance.The pressure to conform to some notion of a common 
good now comes, therefore, from many different points of the 
system, rendering it difficult for any state to avoid some of the 
negative consequences of transgressing the dominant norms of 
the current global order. 
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new 
Neither political actors nor scholars are in agreement as to 
whether China seeks to fulfil over time all, some, or only a limited 
number of the current requirements for membership in the dub 
of the responsible. Such an assessment is complicated because we 
have no clear signposts as to how much participation is enough to 
acquire the designation 'responsible', and because we have moved 
from what one scholar has labelled an international gemeinschaft 
community-a tighter more coherent community-to a 
gesellschaft-a looser more informal society. 30 A looser 
international society implies a larger range of views over what 
constitutes the dominant norms and a weakening of the basis of 
agreement over what best promotes international, or perhaps it 
would be more accurately described as global, order. 
The developmentalist and cultural relativist rhetoric in the human 
rights area, for example, challenges the idea of the indivisibility 
and universality of human rights. Developmentalist arguments 
suggest that both domestic and international order is best 
maintained by states that are economically strong and advanced, 
and that the protection of civil and political rights has to give way 
when necessary to that larger goal of economic development. 
Moreover, this particular argument over human rights is difficult 
to interpret. It leaves observers unsure as to whether states such 
as China would otherwise seek to reach international standards 
as quickly as possible but for the constraint of their relatively low 
levels of economic development. 
The assessment of compliance with the criteria for responsible 
statehood is made more problematic still because some major 
international regimes allow considerable room for manoeuvre, 
including the expectation of a period of delay when it comes to 
domestic implementation, a willingness often to accept procedural 
compliance without real fulfilment of regime norms, and a lack of 
action when states weaken treaties by filing reservations at the 
time of ratification. 
The interpretation of behaviour in this looser international 
society is made even more difficult by the realisation that consensus, 
on which states exhibit responsible behaviour is, and has always 
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been, a highly political act. The views of the most powerful states 
have always dominated, especially those of the United States since 
1945. The hegemonic position of the United States, which derives 
from its all-round strength as a state and its influential role in 
many of the multilateral international organisations, has led it to 
take on what it and certain others perceive as a custodial role in 
the global system.Yet that same perceived role-whatW. Michael 
Reisman describes as the 'actor of last resort in matters of 
fundamental importance to contemporary international politics'-
has brought the United States to act unilaterally, and at times 
unlawfully, to preserve the ultimate goals of international society 
as it perceives them.31 China and other states have justifiably cried 
hypocrisy and pointed to double standards when these instances 
of unlawful behaviour occur, but despite these criticisms, states 
have continued to invoke America's custodial role in moments of 
crisis. Nor have these criticisms made the United States refrain 
from labelling states 'rogue' or 'responsible', or as being in 
international society or outside of it. 
On the eve of Premier Zhu Rongji's April 1999 visit to 
Washington, President Clinton on the whole described China's 
global and regional roles in positive terms, in marked opposition 
to the kinds of sentiments expressed in the US Congress and 
parts of the US media. China, he said, had helped convince North 
Korea to freeze the production of plutonium and refrain from 
further missile tests; it had helped avert nuclear confrontation in 
South Asia in 1998; in the 1990s it had joined the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons 
Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and 
accepted the safeguards, reporting requirements and inspection 
systems that went with them. It no longer provided assistance to 
Iran's nuclear program, had stopped selling Iran anti-ship cruise 
missiles, and had halted assistance to Pakistan's nuclear facilities. In 
the environmental arena, China and the United States were 
working together on developing cleaner technologies and cutting 
pollution. He hoped for and expected further progress on China's 
bid for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), with 
China finally agreeing to open its internal markets. 32 It was a 
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remarkably positive picture that projected China as being in good 
standing in many of the core regimes of the global system, a country 
that over the course of the 1980s and 1990s had stepped inside 
the tent in many key areas of concern. 
Academic analyses of security questions, economic integration, 
and the environment have also reached some reasonably positive 
conclusions about Chinese behaviour. In disarmament and arms 
control negotiations, Michael Swaine and lain Johnston argue that 
the Chinese perspective has shifted over the last I 0-15 years 
from viewing arms control as largely irrelevant to its concerns to 
a position that recognises that there are benefits to be had from 
participation. Whereas it had signed up to only I 0-20 per cent of 
the arms control arrangements for which it was eligible in 1970, 
by 1996 this had reached 85-90 per cent. Much of this more 
positive behaviour, according to Swaine and Johnston, relates to 
China's wish to be viewed as responsible-in reference to Beijing's 
signature of the CTBT, they note that Chinese officials felt a 
pressure to join the process and move towards signature in tandem 
with other members of the UN Security Council and once dear 
support for the treaty emerged among the developing countries. 
China signed the CTBT even though this represented a 
considerable 'sacrifice' for China and a constraint on its power.33 
With respect to China's increased participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations, observers have noted that developing countries have 
pushed Beijing to become more actively involved in an activity 
that they saw as beneficial to domestic stability and regional peace, 34 
similarly suggesting a Chinese concern with its international image. 
Concerning the international trade regime, Margaret Pearson 
notes that China has made substantive concessions to gain entry 
to the WTO, has restructured its laws and regulations to attract 
foreign technology, investment and trade and has joined the global 
intellectual property rights regime. Further progress along these 
lines will be troublesome, but overall, Pearson concludes, it is 
'difficult not to be impressed with the speed, magnitude, and depth 
of China's integration into the global economy during the post-
Mao era'.35 Many have commented on the social and economic 
costs that Chinese workers will initially bear as a result of 
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membership of the WTO-especially those in much of the state-
owned sector-but China has expressed its desire to take its 
place in this organisation both in order to reap economic advantages 
over the longer term, and out of a concern to establish its rightful 
place in the world's most important trading body. China's 
environmental policies have exhibited a similar blend of incremental 
progress, Lester Ross has argued. Beijing has become extensively 
involved in environmental treaties, provided these are not 
perceived to constrain its search for higher levels of economic 
development. Some of the domestic consequences of this 
involvement include the development of new institutions to help 
with the implementation of treaty requirements,36 suggesting a 
sustained commitment to these decisions. It could be expected 
that China's new environmental bureaucracies would resist any 
attempts by Beijing to reverse course. 
Obviously the nature of the international regime in question, 
especially its level of intrusiveness, the extent to which it might 
erode strategic independence, threaten political control or actually 
serve to enhance China's power have influenced Beijing's 
compliance and involvement, for reasons that have become familiar 
in studies of Chinese foreign policy behaviour. Clearly, China 
benefits materially from membership in multilateral organisations 
such as the World Bank, where it has long been the largest recipient 
of the Bank's development aid. Thus, instrumental interest may 
explain its cooperative and compliant behaviour in this instance, 
alongside the conditions for membership that each of the economic 
organisations imposes. 
In other issue areas such instrumental reasoning is more difficult 
to advance. What becomes more salient is a Chinese concern for 
its international image and a desire to be regarded as a cooperative 
and responsible great power. Beijing constantly refers to its good 
record in adhering to the core regimes of international society, 
often contrasting its supposedly favourable record with that of 
the 'unilateralist', 'hegemonic' United States. In the area of arms 
control, China has acceded to treaties that have imposed some 
constraints on its military power since 1980, even though non-
participation was unlikely to have incurred severe material costs.37 
36 
China and the idea of a responsible state 
Although Beijing is extremely wary of Security Council 
authorisations under chapter VII provisions of the Charter (these 
relate to enforcement measures in reference to breaches of the 
peace) between 1990 and 1999 Beijing supported these 84 per 
cent of the time, abstaining on the rest.38 Even in the problematic 
area of human rights, China has signed the two international 
covenants, and accepted some domestic scrutiny of its practices 
by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a UN Working 
Group and one of the United Nation's special rapporteurs. This 
participation in the international human rights regime came partly 
in an attempt to undercut support for a draft resolution at the 
UN Commission on Human Rights that would condemn its human 
rights record. States have long since given up their attempts to 
impose economic and political sanctions (military sales remain the 
exception) against China as a result of its lapses in the human 
rights area, and the human rights regime itself does not contain 
material enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, even in the 
absence of such directly coercive means, China has been steadily 
drawn into procedural if not substantive support of a regime that 
in some senses represents a threat to Communist Party rule.39 
With the exception of some in the US Congress, certain members 
of the current Bush administration, and more widely the 
proponents of the 'China threat' school, many would accept on 
the basis of this record that in a number of areas China has become 
more responsible since the 1980s, especially in comparison with 
its behaviour in the first two decades of the PRC's existence. 
Why China should be concerned about international image and 
an identity as a responsible state is not easy to explain, and the 
concern may arise for different reasons in diverse policy areas. 
Some leaders may also be more concerned about image-the 
foreign ministry, for example-than others. The explanation for 
its normative compliance in areas where instrumental reasons 
seem relatively weak appears to relate to a desire, particularly in 
multilateral venues, not to be singled out for disapprobation.Verbal 
sanctioning-potential or actual-argumentation and persuasion 
have had the effect of enhancing China's adherence to certain 
norms that are shared by many others-Beijing has seen the need 
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to link itself to what is seen internationally as appropriate standards 
of behaviour, to "mirror' the practices of significant others over 
time'.40 As Johnston and Evans report with respect to the arms 
control arena, 'in interview after interview of arms control 
specialists, [and in documents for internal circulation] a common 
response was that China had to join such and such a treaty or 
process because it was part of a world historical trend, because it 
was part of China's role as a responsible major power, because it 
would help improve China's image, and, more concretely, help China 
to break out of the post-June 4 attempts by some Western states 
to isolate China diplomatically'.41 
The new standard of civilisation: human 
rights and democratic governance 
A number of governments and scholars are still reluctant to depict 
China as a responsible state because it is not yet clear how China 
will utilise the material power accumulated during economic 
reform over the longer term. To some extent, this relates to 
Beijing's stated willingness to use force, if necessary, to solve the 
Taiwan reunification issue and the suspicion that it might be willing 
to do the same in reference to outstanding claims in the South 
China Sea. China's domestic political arrangements have added to 
the uncertainty. President Clinton's positive appraisal of China, 
outlined above, inevitably contained less positive aspects, including 
calls for Beijing to 'respect the human rights of its people and to 
give them a chance to shape the political destiny of their country'. 
Many of the other democratic states would agree with this call 
and are motivated to pursue 'bilateral dialogues' with China in 
part to enhance the prospects for Beijing's adherence to 
international human rights standards. The Chinese government 
has been made aware that these matters of human rights and 
democratic governance have become the new standards of 
civilisation, the new set of criteria for membership in international 
society. This understanding helps explain why China decided in 1997 
and 1998 to sign the two key covenants of the international human 
rights regime-first, the International Covenant on Economic, 
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Social and Cultural Rights on the eve of President Jiang Zemin's 
1997 summit in Washington, and then, in October 1998, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the United 
Nations began celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)Y As of June 1997, 
it was joining I 38 state parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and 136 to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, an act that signalled Chinese understanding of the new 
normative requirements and an unwillingness to remain an outsider 
in the UDHR's celebratory year. 
Nevertheless, the human rights and democratic governance 
criteria for membership in international society are extraordinarily 
difficult for Beijing to satisfy because they threaten core values of 
the Party-State.The Chinese leadership witnessed the way in which 
political activists in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe 
used those governments' signatures to the human rights provisions 
of the 1975 Helsinki Accords to publicise their demands and to 
exercise political leverage. Although Beijing has expounded the 
benefits of developing a rule of law43 and has introduced much 
new legislation designed to improve human rights protections, 
proper adherence to international standards threatens Party rule 
and the leadership's view of how to secure domestic political and 
social stability. When Party leaders see what they regard as 
dangerous evidence of instability, they promote the so-called 
'strike-hard' campaigns, which send signals to those in charge of 
law enforcement to cut corners to increase the numbers of arrests 
and convictions. Organised political activity not sanctioned by the 
Communist Party invites swift retribution and only cursory 
reference to the new criminal codes. Calls for the development 
of multi-party democracy elicited a statement by Li Peng-Chair 
of the National People's Congress-to a German newspaper that 
any independent group that tried to 'go for [a] multiparty system 
[or] to negate the leadership of the Communist Party [would] 
not be allowed to exist ... China promotes democracy and practices 
the rule of law but our road is not patterned on the Western 
approach that features the separation of powers, a multiparty 
system and privatization'.44 
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Similarly alarming from Beijing's perspective has been the 
international debate over humanitarian intervention in response 
to evidence of gross violations of human rights, as articulated in a 
conspicuous form by the UN Secretary-General in September 
1999. Kofi Annan's speech to the 54th session of the UN General 
Assembly averred that the global community had learned that it 
could not stand idly by watching gross and systematic violations of 
human rights, that state sovereignty was being redefined to 
encompass the idea of individual sovereignty, and that in our 
contemporary reading of the UN Charter we were 'more than 
ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, 
not to protect those who abuse them'.45 The Chinese government, 
although it was by no means alone, took a particularly strong stand 
against these ideas, preferring instead to highlight the benefits of a 
more traditional definition of state sovereignty and non-
interference. Beijing argued that these were the 'basic principles 
governing international relations', and that their absence would 
lead to new forms of'gunboat diplomacy' that would 'wreak havoc'. 
More revealing still were alarmist Chinese statements in response 
to NATO's military intervention in Kosovo following the bypassing 
of China's and Russia's expected veto of any resolution tabled at 
the UN Security Council. In an authoritative article in Renmin Ribao, 
'US-led NATO' was described as having 'cooked up' the 'absurd 
theory that 'human rights transcend sovereignty". NATO's action 
demonstrated that 
once the United States believes that an incident of some 
kind has happened in one of these [developing and 
socialist] countries that does not fit US-style human rights 
or suit US interests, the United States can interfere in 
that country's internal affairs, violate its sovereignty, and 
even resort to the use of force, under the pretext that 
'human rights transcend sovereignty'.46 
As with the original European-based concept of international 
society, the Chinese government interprets the advancement of 
norms relating to humanitarian intervention, human rights and 
democratic governance as an imposition of the strong on the 
weak, based on a presumption of the superiority of values in one 
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civilisation over those of another. For a time, other countries 
that had espoused cultural relativism or a commitment to Asian 
values had provided some protection and support for China and a 
period of respite, but this particular discourse faded in the wake 
of the Asian economic crisis. Nevertheless, many developing 
countries, along with China, do continue to see the concept of 
non-interference and sovereign equality as the final defence against 
the rules of a divided, unequal world. Beijing's interpretation of 
sovereignty highlights its identity as former semi-colony and Third 
World socialist state, not its position as Great Power with UN 
Security Council membership, nuclear weapons, and rising economic 
clout in the global economy. As such, its views can form the basis 
for a coalition among some of the weaker states in the global 
system, states that endorse China's arguments that the strong are 
not held to the same standards of accountability. Beijing is struggling 
to muster these forces in support of the more traditional 
definitions of state sovereignty against a normative order that has 
already shown clear signs of moving beyond this earlier and stricter 
interpretation. China is caught between the need, on the one 
side, to build coalitions with states that reinforce an identity that 
it has been trying to shed and, on the other, a desire to embrace 
the norms articulated by the most powerful states and influential 
international organisations in the global system. 
Chinese leaders argue in response to criticism of China's 
domestic arrangements that they deserve praise and not blame 
for the developments that have occurred since 1949-that they 
have achieved enough domestically over the past five decades to 
satisfy the rules of international society. The Party has united the 
country, ended decades of civil war, sustained civilian rule, pacified 
the country's borders and most recently brought millions out of 
poverty. Despite these achievements, however, all of which have 
come at great cost to individuals, families, and communities, Beijing 
cannot escape the fact that the normative agenda of international 
society has expanded, as have the ambitions of China's domestic 
political reformers. Many of these reformers and political activists 
perceive in international human rights standards and in ideas of 
legitimate sovereignty the key to real political development in 
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their country.47 Undoubtedly, many outside and inside the country 
recognise that shifts from authoritarian rule to a more democratic 
form of governance are hazardous and pose enormous challenges 
to the maintenance of domestic order and thus to the stability of 
China's neighbours. Nevertheless, a continuing failure to address 
political reform in a serious way, on balance, risks more than trying 
to cling to the current political arrangements. If such change were 
seriously to be attempted, incrementally through constitutional 
and institutional reform, then this would clearly warrant China's 
depiction as a state responsible not only in the international but 
also in the domestic realm. In the absence of such shifts, China 
will, in important ways, remain outside global society. 
Acknowledgment 
An earlier version of this paper was published in The China Journal, 
45,January 2001:1-19.The author is grateful for all the comments 
received on earlier versions of the paper and also thanks The China 
journal for permission to reprint the article in slightly updated 
form in this edited collection. 
Notes 
Reading that is relevant to these polar positions includes Ross 
Munro and Richard Bernstein, 'China 1: the coming conflict with 
America', Foreign Affairs, 76, no. 2 (March 1997): 18-32; Robert S. 
Ross, 'Beijing as a conservative power', Foreign Affairs, 76, no. 2 
(March 1997):33-44; David Shambaugh, 'Containment or 
engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's response' International 
Security, 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 180-209; James Shinn (ed.), Weaving 
the Net: conditional engagement with China (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1996); Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth 
(eds), China as a Great Power: myths, realities and challenges in the 
Asia-Pacific region (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). For one 
important reaction from the East Asian region see Jose T. Almonte, 
'Ensuring security the ASEAN way', who has written: 'East Asia's 
greatest single problem is how to incorporate China into its regional 
arrangements-how to 'socialise' the country by reducing the 
42 
China and the idea of a responsible state 
element of threat while accentuating the positive elements in China's 
regional relationships'. Survival, 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997-98):80-
92. 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics 
(London: Macmillan, 1977). 
For a valuable discussion of Hedley Bull's work and his explanation 
of pluralist (accepting an ethic of difference) and solidarist (the 
idea of a global common good) conceptions of international society 
see Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds), Hedley Bull on 
International Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), especially chapter 
I. 
To name but three of these criteria, the concepts of good 
governance, humanitarian intervention and protection of human 
rights pose particular challenges. 
See Gerrit W Gong, The Standard of'Civi/isation' in International Society 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); G.W Gong, 'China's entry into 
international society' in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The 
Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984): 171-84; Yongjin Zhang, China in the International System, 1918-
20: the Middle Kingdom at the periphery (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1991 ). 
Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: the making of the Sino-
American confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994):chapter 2 and p. 59. 
Chen Jian, China's Road, especially p. I 0 and pp. 73-75; Cold War 
International History Project, 'The Cold War in Asia', Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7, Winter 1995/96 
(Washington DC: Wilson Center); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam 
Wars 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000); and more generally J. David Armstrong, Revolution and World 
Order: the revolutionary state in international society (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993). 
Steve Chan, 'Chinese perspectives on world order', in T.V. Paul and 
John A. Hall (eds), International Order and the Future ofWorld Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 203. 
Department of State 'National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): 'Chinese 
Communist capabilities and probable courses of action through 
1960', Foreign Relations of the United States, 1995-57 (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 3:230-55; 'NIE: Communist 
China through 1961 ', Foreign Relations 1955-57, 3:497-510. 
43 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
10 As a US National Security Council staff study of 6 November 1953 
put it: The achievement of the Chinese Communist regime in Korea 
has been a military defeat of no mean proportions, and instructive 
as to the extent of Chinese Communist military capabilities. The 
Chinese Communists, with Russian assistance, were able to organise, 
train, equip, supply, and commit massive ground forces in the Korean 
peninsula. These forces fought with courage, aggressiveness, and 
with notably few desertions'. Department of State, Foreign Relations 
I 952-54, 14:289-90. The 'wave of the future' reference is taken 
from a private statement by the US Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, to the press on 18 February 1957. See Department of State, 
Foreign Relations I 955-57, 3:482. 
11 Quoted in Department of State, Foreign Relations I 955-57, 3:251. 
12 See Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's 
support for wars of national liberation, (Berkeley, California: University 
of California Press, 1970), 20 I. 
13 Samuel S. Kim, Thinking globally in post-Mao China', journal of Peace 
Research, 27, no. 2 ( 1990): 193; Beijing Review, I 0, no. 5 (March 1965. 
14 China's direct and open criticism of the Soviet Union began after 
Moscow signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. 
15 As a Renmin Ribao editorial put it after China's participation at the 
Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China: 'For the first time 
as one of the Big Powers, the People's Republic of China joined the 
other major powers in negotiations on vital international problems 
and made a contribution of its own that won the acclaim of wide 
sections of world opinion. The international status of the People's 
Republic of China as one of the big powers has gained universal 
recognition'. Quoted in Michael B. Yahuda, Towards the End of 
Isolationism: China's foreign policy after Mao (London: Macmillan, 1983), 
100. 
16 Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, 189. 
17 This ambiguity is discussed in Adam Roberts and Benedict 
Kingsbury (eds), United Nations, Divided World: the UN's roles in 
international relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 22-29. 
18 These terms were first introduced by Samuel S. Kim. For one example 
of their use see his 'China's international organizational behaviour', 
in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign 
Policy: theory and practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 431. 
19 Discussion of this passivity is in Samuel S. Kim, China, the United 
Nations and World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979). 
44 
China and the idea of a responsible state 
20 Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: the politics of economic reform in post-
Mao China (London: Macmillan, 1993), 3. 
21 Using Stephen Krasner's formulation, regimes are usually defined 
as the 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations'. S.D. Krasner, 
(ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983). For more on this idea of good standing See Abram Chayes 
and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: compliance with international 
regulatory agreements (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 27; and Thomas M. Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
190. 
22 Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights: a new standard of civilization?', 
International Affairs, 74, no. I Qanuary 1998): 18, 21. 
23 Shevardnadze quoted in Opening Speech by Lord Howe to Amnesty 
International London Seminar on Human Rights in China, 9 
September 1996, 2. Information on Hungary from Dominic 
McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: its role in the development 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Politics Rights (Oxford: 
24 
Clarendon Paperbacks, 1994), 17-18. 
World Bank, Governance: the World Bank's experience (Washington 
DC: 1994). 
25 Quoted in Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), I 13. 
26 Franck, Fairness, I 17-18. 
27 See Ann Marie Clark, 'Non-governmental organizations and their 
influence on international society', journal of International Affairs, 48, 
no. 2 (Winter 1995):507-26. 
28 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: 
advocacy networks in international politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), I 0-1 I. 
29 A.M. Clark, 'Strong principles, strengthening practices: Amnesty 
International and three cases of change in international human 
rights standards', (PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1995), 
8. 
30 Barry Buzan, 'International society and international security', in 
Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds), International Society after the 
Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996 ), 262. 
31 W. Michael Reisman, 'The United States and international 
institutions', Survival, 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 63. Reisman 
45 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
also points to other factors that complicate the US role in multilateral 
institutions and contribute to its inconsistent behaviour: its 
'prophetic and reformist role', its 'infra-organisational role', and its 
'domestic-pressure reactive role'. 
32 President Clinton's speech on US foreign policy, given at the 
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, under the auspices of the US Institute 
of Peace, 7 April 1999 (published as NAPSNET Special Report, 8 
April 1999). Of course, President Clinton was making these remarks 
partly in the hope of generating a positive atmosphere within the 
United States and between himself and Prime Minister Zhu on the 
eve of the visit. 
33 Michael D. Swaine and Alastair lain Johnston, 'China and arms 
control institutions', in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg 
(eds), China Joins the World: progress and prospects (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), I 00-10 I, I 08; Johnston and 
Paul Evans, 'China's engagement with multilateral security 
institutions', in Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds) 
Engaging China: the management of an emerging power (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 251. 
34 Kim, 'China's international organizational behaviour', 421. 
35 Margaret M. Pearson, 'China's integration into the international 
trade and investment regime', in Economy and Oksenberg, (eds) 
China Joins the World, 191. 
36 Lester Ross, 'China and environmental protection', in Economy 
and Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World. 
37 Johnston and Evans, 'China's engagement', 247-51. 
38 It voted for 91.5 per cent of all the 625 resolutions passed in this 
period. For details see Sally Morphet, 'China as a Permanent Member 
of the Security Council, October 1971-December 1999', Security 
Dialogue, 31, no. 2 (2000), Table 2, 154, 160. This compares with a 
42 per cent level between November 1971 and December 1981; 
66.7 per cent 1982-86; and 86 per cent 1986 and July 1990. With 
reference to chapter VII resolutions, it is worth noting that the 
period 1990-99 included the Gulf War, the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, East Timor, and so on (some 
174 chapter VII resolutions in all). 
39 For a fuller exposition of this argument see Rosemary Foot, Rights 
Beyond Borders: the global community and the struggle over human 
rights in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
40 The influence of norms in socialising states and in inducing 
compliance with international regimes is discussed in such works 
46 
China and the idea of a responsible state 
as Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty; Martha Finnemore, 
'Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention', in Peter 
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: norms and identity 
in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Franck, 
The Power of Legitimacy; Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: 
the struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1995); and Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why do nations obey international 
law?', Yale Law journal, I 06, no.8 (1997).The idea of'mirroring' others' 
behaviour as a result of social interaction is discussed in Alexander 
Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction 
of power politics', International Organization, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 
397. 
41 Johnston and Evans, 'China and multilateral security institutions', 
253. 
42 China has now ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights but, as of writing (August 200 I), not the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 
43 In March 1999, the Chinese Constitution had been revised to read: 
'The People's Republic of China shall be governed according to 
law and shall be built into a socialist country based on the rule of 
law.' See BBC Monitoring Reports, Summary of World Broadcasts, 
(SWB), Asia-Pacific, FE/3486 G/9-1 0, 18 March 1999. 
44 'Li Peng on press freedom, legislation and political parties', Beijing 
Review, 4-10 January 1999, 35-42. 
45 United Nations, 'General Debate', UN document A/54/PV.8, General 
Assembly (Washington DC: United Nations, 22 September 1999). 
46 Chinese reactions can be found in Renmin Ribao, 14 May 1999, 
excerpted in Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/3535, G7 -8, IS May 
1999; FE/3512, G/6, 19 April 1999; FE/3525, G/ I, 4 May 1999; and 
International Herald Tribune, 24 September 1999. 
47 As the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen bloodshed drew near, 
Bao Tong, former aide to the deposed Zhao Ziyang claimed his 
constitutional right to free speech and the positive benefits that 
had come from earlier challenges to political orthodoxy: 'Who 
says divergent views are of no avail? Every bit of progress China 
has made since the S'h April Tiananmen Movement in 1976 and 
the third plenary session of the I I th Party Central Committee in 
1978 ... are all attributed to the Chinese common people's efforts 
to rectify and overcome the mistakes made by Mao Zedong'. 






Sharing the same bed while dreaming 
different dreams. 
Chinese saying 
This chapter focuses on two aspects of China's international 
relations-power and responsibility. As the concept of power in 
international politics is well known, the chapter will pay more 
attention to the concept of responsibility. 
Is China a responsible state in international society? This question 
is becoming increasingly interesting as China grows strong and 
comes to play a greater role in world affairs.To answer the question, 
one has to consider the following subsidiary questions. 
" What is meant by responsibility? 
" How can the responsibility of a state be assessed? 
., What is China's responsibility? 
" To whom is China responsible? 
., What international society are we talking about? 
" Why raise the issue of China's responsibility now? 
Before I attempt to answer these questions, I have been agonising 
for quite a while over whether I should use the phrase 'China's 
international relations' or 'Chinese international relations' in the 
title of this chapter. 'China's international relations' gives the 
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impression that China is a single political entity-the Chinese state 
in this case-whereas the use of the word 'Chinese' in 'Chinese 
international relations' opens up a much wider scope to include 
not only the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a single political 
entity, but also Chinese thinking, Chinese style, Chinese political 
philosophy, and much more, apart from other political actors in 
China. In the following analysis, the word 'China' sometimes carries 
the wider connotation of including things 'Chinese'. 
This chapter is basically a concept paper.' It aims to make a 
survey of the area covered by the questions presented above 
from a macro-perspective. It does not attempt to define rigorously 
what is meant by power or what is meant by responsibility because, 
in so doing, it would be all too easy to become mired in disputes 
over details concerning definitions. Fortunately, many scholars have 
done excellent research in defining the concept of power, if not 
the concept of responsibility. I will only touch on some working 
definitions for the purpose of facilitating an analysis of more 
substantive issues. 
by 
According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary, the word 'responsible' 
can mean 
'liable to be called to account (to a person or for a 
thing) ... morally accountable for one's actions; capable 
of rational conduct; and ... of good credit, position, or 
repute; respectable; evidently trustworthy'. 
Seemingly the word 'responsible' or 'responsibility' carries some 
legal, moral, as well as social, connotations. As legal, moral, and 
social standards vary, to a greater or lesser extent, from one culture 
to another, the concept of responsibility is therefore laden with 
value-judgments-responsibility refers to something ethical or 
desirable. In comparison, the concept of power is more concrete 
and real; it refers to something feasible or practical.2 
The word 'responsibility' in Chinese is zeren. The first character, 
ze, carries the idea of duty, and the second character, ren, carries 
that of burden. In traditional China, duties and burdens are handed 
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down or assigned by superiors and elders to their juniors and the 
young in a hierarchically structured society. Duties and burdens 
also come with certain social and occupational positions within a 
family or in the wider society. There are certain duties that one is 
expected to perform and burdens that one has to shoulder. In 
other words, there are things that one, as a member of a family 
or society, ought to do. This word ought carries a moral rather 
than a legal obligation. 
Indeed morality plays a significant part in Chinese foreign-policy 
behaviour, depending on the time and circumstances in which events 
take place. As Shih Chih-yu has skillfully argued, Chinese leaders 
often 'present themselves as the supreme moral rectifiers of the 
world order'.3 He gives the following examples to support his 
argument, 
" China's policy towards the Soviet Union was aimed primarily 
at shaming the Soviets for their betrayal of socialism 
" China's policy towards the United States demonstrates 
China's anti-imperialist integrity 
" China's Japan policy blames the Japanese for a failed Asiatic 
brotherhood 
" China's Third World policy is intended to be a model for 
emulation.4 
To the traditional Chinese mind, responsibility flows from 
something that one owes to another. Chinese leaders today probably 
feel they owe little or nothing to the outside world or, for that 
matter, countries in the West. Rather, it is the West that owes them 
a 'debt', because Western imperialists exploited China and humiliated 
their people for over I 00 years before 1949. Why then should 
China be responsible to the outside world, or to the West, since 
it does not owe them anything? On the contrary, the West should 
according to this thinking be held responsible to China for what it 
had done to the country in the past. As a first step, Western 
countries should refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs. 
Some Western analysts have pointed out that Chinese leaders 
are using this kind of 'victimhood' to drum up domestic support 
for their policies and to shore up their bargaining position with 
Western powers by shaming them.5 Some even suggest that the 
'culture of shame and humiliation' is a 'nationalist myth'.6 To the 
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many Chinese who have suffered enormously, either physically or 
mentally, directly or indirectly, however, it was and is still very real. 
The fact that the story ofWestern exploitation of China and the 
lessons to be learnt have been passed on from one generation to 
another as a painful reminder does suggest that it is a factor to be 




responsibility of a be 
A common way to judge the credibility of a state is by judging 
what it does rather than what it says.ln other words, a state could 
be judged by its deeds, its actions. But who is in a position to pass 
judgment? Is the UN Security Council, or its General Assembly, or 
its International Court of Justice capable of doing so? Is it countries 
in the West or in the East? Those in the North or in the South? 
Some powerful states? Or some form of international regimes 
or norms? How valid are their judgments if they do pass them? 
We know that there is no complete consensus on this amongst 
states, sometimes not even amongst a group of like-minded states. 
There are few generally accepted principles of international 
common law, except perhaps the UN Charter. But even some of 
the fundamental principles of the UN Charter are under dispute. 
For example, member states of the United Nations are divided as 
to whether humanitarian intervention should take precedence 
over national sovereignty.8 Some states choose to obey some laws 
while breaking others, whether they relate to human rights, trade, 
or political sovereignty. What is responsible to some may appear 
irresponsible to others. International responsibility is by and large 
a product of international civic awareness, but is very much 
grounded in, and defined by, local cultures and ideologies and is 
therefore severely contested at times.9 
If absolute or complete consensus is difficult to achieve, then 
relative or near consensus may be possible. Very often, a group of 
like-minded states take collective action to tackle world problems 
on the basis of some sort of relative or near consensus. 
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To the Chinese mind, the linkage between power and 
responsibility depends on one's position in the scheme of things. It 
is of utmost importance to position oneself properly-only when 
one's position is properly established and 'named' can one behave 
in a 'correct' way. 10 The idea of dingwei or positioning therefore 
becomes significant in determining one's behaviour. Apart from 
positioning, the term dingwei can mean the search for a place, the 
seeking of a proper role, or the undertaking of a process of 
negotiation to firm up one's position, thereby enabling one to 
avoid potential conflicts in the future. Because of the Chinese 
sense of history and collective memory, it is not inconceivable to 
assume that the idea of dingwei can be extended from China's 
domestic situation to its view of the world. 
The Chinese sense of responsibility is very much tied to one's 
position of power, as indicated by the saying quanti yu yiwu jundeng, 
which can be roughly translated as, and represented by, the 
following approximation 
duty + burden z power + benefits 
where yiwu should be understood as 'appropriate' work (duty + 
burden) in the traditional meaning of the term, rather than 
'voluntary' work. 
It is useful to make a distinction between two forms of power-
power as of right, which is derived from one's proper position; 
and power as of might, which is an empirical substance.The wielding 
of power can therefore be righteous when exercised from a 
proper position, but can be hegemonic and imperialistic and 
therefore morally corrupt when exercised for the purpose of 
selfish gain without rightful entitlement according to some set of 
moral principles. The conflict between China and the West, 
therefore, may not be purely over material interests or relative 
power gains, but may also be over ideological and moral principles, 
more so than most people would readily admit. 
China's international position will therefore affect how it is going 
to behave, exercise its power, and fulfil its 'responsibilities'. To 
Chinese thinking, China's position in the world is buttressed by its 
power relative to others, and hence there is a need to understand 
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and determine accurately its comprehensive national power and 
that of other countries so that China can know where it stands in 
relation to others and how it should relate to or behave towards 
them. 11 
Although the concept of comprehensive national power and its 
measurement lack precision, 12 its utility, to some Chinese analysts 
at least, lies in its ability to serve as a rough guide to assessing 
one's position in the world. One of the reasons why this concept 
has become so popular amongst Chinese analysts these days is 
that, since China is becoming strong, there is a need to take stock 
of its powers and its power base. Here of course we are dealing 
with something fuzzy rather than something precise, as the power 
of a state is difficult to measure and the situation of the world is 
ever changing. Hard power, such as military hardware, is relatively 
more static and is easier to measure, while soft power, such as 
culture or morality, is more fluid and hence more difficult to 
measure. 
is 
If we follow the Chinese line of thinking about dingwei di wenti 
(the issue of positioning), then we need, first of all, to ask what 
China's global position is before we attempt to make an assessment 
of its global responsibility. China conjures different images for 
different people. Some of the salient features of China's position 
may include the fact that China 
" has a huge population 
" is a nuclear power 
" is a permanent member of the Security Council of the 
United Nations 
" is a member of many important international organisations 
" is a contributor as well as a recipient of aid. 
Any assessment of China itself, let alone its responsibilities, must 
start with an understanding of China in the recent past, a China 
that had suffered for some I 00 years under Western imperialism, 13 
experienced periods of internal strife, civil wars, and Japanese 
invasion, and then 30 years of excesses under revolutionary, 
communist rule. It has only begun to open up to the outside world, 
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more 'voluntarily' than before, since the late 1970s, and has by 
now attained some sort of normality and stability. China, however, 
is facing many difficulties in its development path-apart from its 
huge population, it is still a relatively backward developing country 
in the midst of drastic and fundamental socioeconomic change. 14 
It is still suffering from domestic political insecurity arising from 
crises of identity and legitimacy. 15 What can one expect of China 
in its international behaviour? 
A huge population. The task of feeding and sheltering 1.3 billion 
people has not been easy for China. The government is determined 
to eradicate poverty and raise the living standard of its people to 
the extent that it argues that the right to subsistence is more 
important than individual freedoms. Deng Xiaoping once reminded 
us that, if the Chinese were starving and forced to flee their home 
country in search for food elsewhere, would it not cause problems 
for the neighbouring region and the world at large? The world 
therefore has an interest to see that China can bring its people 
out of abject poverty and that the country can remain stable. In a 
speech made at Cambridge University in October 1999, President 
Jiang Zemin said that 'to ensure [the rights to subsistence and 
development] for our people is in itself a major contribution to 
the progress of the world's human rights cause'. 16 To achieve the 
goals of modernisation and to raise the living standard of its people, 
China has been opening its doors and adopting new economic 
measures since the late 1970s, including the establishment of Special 
Economic Zones and the opening up of coastal and regional cities 
to foreign trade and investment. 
A mu:lear power. The successful testing of China's first atomic 
bomb in 1964 came as a morale boost to a people who had 
suffered and sacrificed so much.The depth of pride felt by Chinese, 
including those overseas, that China could join the rank of nuclear 
powers was almost boundless. China is proud not only because it 
is a nuclear power, but also because it is a signatory to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which it signed in September 1996. 17 
In the wake of the Pakistani and Indian missile and nuclear tests in 
April and May 1998, there were rumours that China might 
reconsider its treaty obligations and resume nuclear testing. On 3 
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June 1998, President Jiang Zemin pledged, in his first public reaction 
to nuclear tests in South Asia, that 'China has no intention of 
restarting its nuclear tests'. 18 Either as a strategic move or as a 
gesture to maintain world peace, China has also pledged not to 
use nuclear weapons first and has asked other nuclear powers to 
do likewise. So far it has not stationed a single soldier or held 
military exercises outside its claimed territorial boundaries. 
As a regional power, China has joined the Four-Party talks to 
find ways to end the conflict in the Korean Peninsula. It has joined 
and actively participated in regional security dialogues, such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific, and in regional economic groupings, such as the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council. In the recent East Asian economic crisis, it 
resisted temptations to devalue its currency because a devaluation 
would have triggered another round of crisis. Consequently, China 
has had to endure a fall in economic competitiveness and 
consequent decline in exports. It has also made financial 
contributions to help some neighbouring countries affected by 
the crisis. 19 
A permanent member of the UN Security Council. As one 
of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with 
veto power, China can influence world events in a significant way 
and can bargain with other powers from a position of some 
strength. It speaks out on principles of non-interference, thereby 
helping the world's poor to resist the world's rich because in most 
cases of foreign intervention in domestic affairs it is the rich that 
intervene in the affairs of the poor rather than the other way 
round. China's burgeoning involvements in UN peacekeeping 
activities in Cambodia in 1992 and operations in Kuwait, Palestine, 
Liberia and the Western Sahara have enhanced its image as 'a good 
international citizen'. 20 Its most recent response, in which it chose 
not to exercise its veto after Jakarta agreed to the UN intervention 
in the East Timor crisis, is seen as 'responsible'.21 
A member of key international organisations. Even by Asian 
standards, China is a latecomer to the world of international 
organisations, when compared with countries like Japan and India. 
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China only started joining inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) 
when it gained its seat in the United Nations in 1971 and 
international non-government organisations after it adopted its 
open-door policy in the late 1970s. China is now a member of 
some 282 IGOs and 2,31 I INGOs, 22 including the United Nations, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and other 
major organisations such as the International Red Cross and the 
International Olympic Committee. The reasons for joining these 
organisations are many, and include China's concerted effort to 
establish and consolidate its international legitimacy in competition 
with Taiwan, the transfer of technology, investment attractions, and 
so on. China's involvement in international organisations is very much 
a process of mutual legitimisation and mutual learning. It offers 
China an opportunity to learn about international norms, practices, 
and expectations.23 China's participation in and contributions to 
international organisations, though increasing steadily, are still limited 
and hindered by a number of factors. These include 
" tradition and ideology-the global structure of international 
organisations is very much a product ofWestern experience 
and most Chinese find participation in a social setting on an 
equal, individual footing, as exemplified by China's 
participation in international organisations, more alien than 
other cultures 
" power dominance-the goals and agenda of international 
organisations are dictated by Western interests 
" China's own lack of civic awareness and international 
understanding 
• the paucity of its financial resources for participation in 
international organisations 
• the use of English as the medium of communication in most 
international organisations. 
Despite these limitations, China has intensified its participation 
in international organisations since the 1970s, and joined the World 
Trade Organization in 200 I, having reached an agreement with 
the United States in November 1999 on the terms of entry, which 
included the freeing up of China's telecommunication and banking 
industries.24 
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The and receiving of aid. China gave the largest amount 
of aid when it was relatively poor. This was largely directed to 
African countries such as Tanzania and Zambia in the 1950s and 
1960s, for reasons that have been seen as ideological and strategic 
in nature. Now that China is getting relatively richer, it still 
sporadically gives aid-usually on very generous terms-to 
countries in Africa and elsewhere in order to compete with Taiwan 
for diplomatic recognition. More interestingly, it is not shy of asking 
for and receiving international aid when it suffers from natural 
disasters or giving aid, increasingly through the International Red 
Cross, to others to alleviate their sufferings when approached.25 
Apparently, the philosophy of aid-giving in China has changed from 
purely strategic considerations to a combination of strategic and 
humanitarian objectives. The fact that it is willing to accept 
humanitarian aid from a wide variety of outside agencies and 
countries demonstrates that China has become more 'normal'-
receiving aid from the outside is not regarded as a national shame. 
Apart from the above points, China has more generally 
cooperated with other countries in certain areas of global concern, 
such as human rights, environmental protection, and arms control. 
It has signed or ratified some 220 multilateral conventions,26 and is 
currently involved in the codification and development of 
international law, serving as members of Chinese nationality in 
the International Law Commission of the United Nations, the 
International Court of Justice, and the International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia War CriminalsY China has been seen as 
doing its part in maintaining the smooth transition to Chinese 
sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999. It has also 
curbed excessive outbreaks of anti-US feelings as a result of the 
US bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the US spy 
plane incident at Hainan Island in April 200 I. In an effort to make 
its government policies more transparent to its own people as 
well as to outsiders, the Information Office of the State Council 
of the PRC started to publish White Papers in 1990.28 So far, 26 
White Papers have been published on policy issues ranging from 
human rights, defence, to those relating to Taiwan andTibet.29 China's 
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human rights record leaves a lot to be desired, but the country 
has signed the two international covenants on human rights-the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-and 
has engaged in human rights dialogues with other countries and 
groups.30 
This is not to suggest any direct causal relationship between 
China's sense of responsibility and its foreign-policy behaviour, but 
rather to indicate that China might be seen as behaving more 
responsibly these days. 
Responsible to whom? 
Aside China's responsibility to its own people (an interesting subject 
of investigation in itself given the fact that China is slowly evolving 
into a slightly less authoritarian system), to whom is it responsible 
outside its borders? If we accept the Chinese thinking that it owes 
little to the outside world, then this will be a moot point. Also, 
little room may be left for growth of a spirit of voluntarism and 
adventure, and a greater sense of responsibility towards the outside 
world given centuries of inward-looking development. A number 
of Chinese scholars have, however, just begun to debate China's 
responsibility to the outside world, especially to the Asia Pacific 
region.31 
What international society? Is China in or 
out?32 
The international society as we understand it today is, like it or 
not, dominated by the West, particularly the United States. The 
existing set of international laws, rules, and norms are very much 
the product of Western experiences. Tying China to international 
society therefore basically means making China agree to the rules 
of the games played by Western powers. To what extent should 
China be involved in such a system? Should it instead make an 
effort to change or redefine the system? These are some of the 
issues that China has been struggling with since it came into 
substantive contact with the outside world. The process of 
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interdependence and multilateralism is not new; rather the actors 
involved in the international system are changing, as is the power 
distribution amongst them, their relationships, and the issues 
involved in such relationships. 
Underlying the idea and practice of bringing China to international 
society33 is the assumption that China is not in-it is out; it is the 
Other. This is basically a Western perspective. From China's point 
of view, it has long been part of international society, but has not 
been a hegemonic power in the global sense of reaching out and 
setting rules for others to follow; rather it has been an underdog 
of the system. China has been struggling through this system, trying 
to change the rules but without much success, mainly because it 
was weak. Now that it has become stronger and more confident, 
it wants to integrate more with the outside world, demanding 
international respect and the place that it thinks it deserves and 
establishing a presence that the West cannot ignore. 
US policy towards China has been one of 'congagement'34-a 
combination of containment and engagement. During the Cold 
War, containment predominated, but in the post-Cold War era 
engagement has come to the fore. The United States is sometimes 
unsure whether it should engage or contain China because it is 
not certain whether China is in or out of international society. If 
China is in, then one set of rules will apply. If it is not, then another 
set of rules applies.35 
Engaging China means socialising China into the existing system 
so that it can become one of Us-a responsible member, abiding 
by its rules and norms. As pointed out by Wang Hongying, 36 
however, socialising China has its limits. First, while China can learn 
to be more cooperative through participation in multilateral 
activities, it can also come to realise and reassure itself of the 
effectiveness of the use of force in world affairs. In other words, 
China can become more liberal as well as more realist (in the 
realpolitik sense). China suffered tremendously under the West's 
so-called 'gunboat' diplomacy in the past and has recently witnessed 
the use of force by the United States in the Gulf War and in 
Yugoslavia. Chinese leaders were shocked when they saw on 
television the pin-point accuracy and firing power of high-tech 
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weapons and the scale of destruction caused. They realised how 
far behind their weapons system was and decided that their military 
modernisation had to be accelerated. 
Second, the process of multilateralism only affects a very small 
number of Chinese officials who are dealing with foreign affairs 
and trade. Their preference for multilateralism faces strong 
domestic opposition from the military as well as from the state 
industrial sector. 37 The effects of these officials' individual learning 
are yet to be established empirically, not to mention the generally 
assumed spill-over effects from the individual level to the state 
level.38 
Third, the traditional world view based on Sinocentrism and on 
a hierarchically structured world order presents obstacles to 
embracing multilateral ism. The Chinese realist school of thought 
tends to favour bilateral dealings over multilateral cooperation.39 
China's policy towards resolving disputes over the Spratly Islands 
in the South China Sea is a case in point. 
Socialising is a slow and tortuous process, especially for an old 
and established civilisation like China. For most Western observers 
and decisionmakers, who expect quick results, socialising China 
can be a frustrating exercise because China sometimes appears 
to be responsible, sometimes not. 
The reason for raising the issue of responsibility seems obvious-
China is becoming strong, or has the potential to become very 
strong. In parallel with its growing strength, China is increasingly 
involved in world affairs. When China was weak and isolated, 
responsibility did not seem to figure much as an issue, especially 
when viewed from a Western perspective.At that time it was, for 
the West, a matter of trying to contain China, confront it, stop it 
from spreading its form of communism and revolution, and use it 
as a lever to balance the power of other countries such as the 
former Soviet Union. The assumption here is that a rising China 
should assume greater responsibilities in world affairs. 
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However, responsibility to international society is not the language 
used by decisionmakers in China.40 Nevertheless, the meaning of 
responsibility has changed over time-in the revolutionary days, it 
meant responsibility to support and promote international 
struggles. Mao Zedong was of the opinion that it was responsible 
behaviour to help the proletariat of the world revolt and 
overthrow the decadent, imperialist regimes and the 'old world 
order'.41 Now the term means Great Power responsibilities. As 
pointed out by Jia Qingguo, a professor of international politics at 
Peking University, China opposed military intervention in Yugoslavia, 
partly to fulfil its responsibility of upholding international law.42 
More generally, China pledges never to become a hegemon 
(meaning a bully) even if it becomes rich. This, to Chinese leaders, 
is responsible behaviour towards achieving world peace. 
The term responsibility is not used by Chinese academics in 
their writings. A comprehensive and up-to-date Chinese 
encyclopaedia of international politics makes no reference 
whatsoever to the term 'responsibility'.43 On the contrary and as 
should be expected, the ideas of power and power politics are 
covered extensively; so are related topics such as national interest 
and national sovereignty.44 By and large, Chinese international 
relations literature dwells mainly on policy analysis at the state-
to-state level.45 When China exercised its veto against the 
deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in certain countries that 
had diplomatic relations with Taiwan such as Haiti and Guatemala,46 
it was obviously trying to balance its national interests with its 
international obligations as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. When China negotiated its terms of entry to 
the World Trade Organization, it was again trying to balance its 
national interests with its international obligations to adhere to 
the rules and regulations of the international (read Western) 
trading regime. The contradiction between realist and idealist 
aspirations,47 though not clearly spelt out in the current academic 
literature, does seem to enter into the calculus of decisionmakers 
in China nowadays. 
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Let me sound a note of warning here. Since there is no concrete 
evidence to show that Chinese leaders take their global 
responsibility into account when they make foreign-policy 
decisions, there is a danger that we may be setting up a straw man 
only to destroy it-an academic exercise in futility. 
Having said that, we may still ask: is China then a responsible 
state? The answer to this question is elusive. Unless we have a 
commonly accepted set of standards to help us to make an 
assessment, we can hardly say for sure that one country is more 
responsible than another. Also, unless we make an international 
comparison across countries, we can hardly say conclusively that 
country A is more responsible than country B. 
If we compare China's situation now with its situation say some 
twenty years ago, then, by using the correlation between position 
and behaviour as a yardstick, we may reasonably conclude that 
China has become more responsible. If Chinese leaders, by dint of 
their positions of power in the country, do feel some strong sense 
of responsibility, then it is most likely to be a sense of responsibility 
towards their own families and eventually their nation and 
civilisation, rather than towards the outside world. After all, the 
'outer' world was, at least in the pre-modern days, unimportant 
to most Chinese, elites and commoners alike.48 Things have 
changed, of course, especially as a result of globalisation of various 
kinds, but tradition and culture still persist.49 
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China is fighting to contain the dynamism of its society as numerous 
forces compete for the spoils of power and wealth in a rapidly 
evolving political, legal and social milieu.This struggle was unleashed 
by the Chinese government itself when it decided to move away 
from doctrinaire policies of a command economy and total control 
of ideology, a process which began very slowly and cautiously in 
1978, but one which has been gathering pace and momentum ever 
since. So, at the same time as managing the liberalisation of the 
economy and society, the government of China is struggling to 
institutionalise a new social and political contract to set the rules 
by which the new competition for wealth and power will be 
governed. 
But the circumstances are not easy. To adapt an observation 
made by the Economist magazine, if Japan is a country in trouble, 
China would probably like to swap its troubles for Japan's. 1 Even 
when China's GDP matches that of Japan, the per capita levels will 
be one-tenth those in Japan. That means one-tenth of the money 
to spend on schools, health, and housing. In circumstances of 
growing public demand for even a modest share of China's new 
prosperity, the low per capita GDP available for social goods 
increases pressure on the government to be frugal in allocating 
money to military forces. President Jiang Zemin reportedly 
observed to former Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita that his 
biggest task since taking office had been to feed and clothe the 1.2 
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billion Chinese? Former Vice-President Rong Yiren has said that it 
will be at least fifty years before China becomes a middle-income 
country.3 But when President Jiang Zemin sketches what he calls 
'grim challenges', he also notes that China has 'unprecedented 
favourable conditions' to meet them.4 This is the reality of China 
as perceived by its government. 
This chapter reviews the domestic political foundations of China's 
power as it passed the 50 year anniversary and in the year or so 
since. The chapter is an attempt to describe leadership perceptions 
of the government's power against the observable reality of the 
dynamically evolving society that it faces. The chapter assesses 
China's power by the relatively simple yardstick of how 
governmental and national capacities, along with the government's 
record of achievement, have responded to the dynamic evolution. 
political effects of the whirlwind of 
economic reform a weak state 
The 22 year history of the boom in China's national economic 
performance, beginning with strategic decisions on opening up 
and reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, is well 
known. Between 1978 and 2000, the Chinese economy enjoyed 
dramatic annual growth rates which, according to official Chinese 
statistics, averaged about I 0 per cent per year. In gross GDP, China 
was set to overtake japan within several years and the United 
States in several decades. Deng's decision to reform grew in part 
from the problems of governance facing China as a result of the 
Cultural Revolution and the excesses of communist dictatorship 
even before that. 
There is no doubt, however, that the reform policies, equivalent 
not only to radical structural adjustment in the national economy 
but also to redefinition of political power, national identity and 
purpose in the political sphere, brought their own share of even 
more serious governance problems and large-scale turmoil. In 
large part, the student 'rebellion' in Tiananmen Square in 1989 was 
just one manifestation of this massive change. In the decade since, 
the scale of the governance problem facing the Chinese leadership 
70 
China's power: searching for stable domestic foundations 
has become a common theme among scholars writing about China's 
economic future, even scholars with an optimistic outlook on 
China's future. Problems of income distribution, jobs, and sustainable 
development posed major challenges to policy. One assessment 
from the early 1990s noted that a 'scenario of leadership 
factionalism, provincial indiscipline, popular political antipathy, 
government financial squeeze and bureaucratic foot-dragging' could 
not be dismissed.5 The consequences of such an eventuality, the 
author noted, would be a rapid decline in economic performance 
and a rapid rise in political confrontation. Such assessments could 
also be found amongst Chinese commentaries, many of which 
acknowledge that the Communist Party needed to reform itself, 
particularly to deal with the debilitating effects of corruption on 
social order.6 
But through the early 1990s, the implications of the revolution 
in China's economy for the continued political order of the country 
became more severe? A growing consensus developed among 
the leadership, all with fresh memories of the Tiananmen incident 
in 1989, that without more political stability the whole edifice of 
the state (the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) might collapse, 
leading to their own loss of power, or even worse, their prosecution 
and possible execution for crimes. At the 1997 session of the 
National People's Congress (NPC), the government introduced a 
new defence law which highlighted the continuing priority for the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in preventing 'domestic armed 
rebellions or armed riots aimed at subverting state power, and 
overthrowing the socialist system', to quote the Defence Minister, 
Chi Haotian.8 Chi said that such rebellions and riots remained a 
serious threat in China.9 Thus, while impressive growth rates and 
increasing national self-coMidence became a defining feature of 
the Chinese economy in the 1990s, so too did a growing sense of 
vulnerability and urgency begin to seize Chinese leaders about 
their capacity to maintain economic and social stability. 
The dynamism of China's society is more than matched by the 
dynamism of some of China's leaders and their policy settings to 
address the country's problems in recent years. In March 1998, a 
blueprint for the most radical shake-up of China's government 
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since 1978 was revealed. The essence of the new policies was to 
make China 'rich, strong, democratic and civilised'. 10 The country's 
leaders decreed a historic metamorphosis of the purpose of the 
central government in China from control of the economy to 
supervision of it. There were four planks to the radical shake-
up-strong economic leadership to sweep away the last vestiges 
of socialism, including universal welfare supports, radical reform 
of the armed forces and defence industry, strong legal leadership 
to build durable foundations for a stable free market society, and 
the expansion of participatory democracy. These four planks 
corresponded in the Chinese leaders' eyes to the four goals-
rich, strong, democratic and civilised. This new spirit was to be 
China's way of burying the ghost of the Tiananmen Square 
repressions and reincarnating the spirit of Chinese glasnost and 
Chinese perestroika that existed between 1985 and 1989, but which 
since then had in some important respects been suppressed by 
the government itself. 
The future directions of Chinese domestic policy were sketched 
by the Chairman of the State Council, Zhu Rongji, in a press 
conference in March 1998 immediately after taking up his 
appointment. 11 They included 
• transformation by the end of 1998 of both the purpose and 
structure of the national administration by cutting 44 ministries, 
commissions or other agencies to 29, of which a number had 
been, or were to be, corporatised 12 
• stabilising some 450 medium and large state-owned enterprises 
as fully corporatised entities by the year 2000 
• completion of a regulatory framework for the banking sector 
premised on prudential supervision and depoliticisation of their 
operations by the year 2000 
rationalisation of the domestic grain market to ensure political 
stability and allow eventual removal of subsidies 13 
• transformation of the domestic investment and capital market 
system to br'mg it fully into line with internationally accepted 
market practices 
• the total commercialisation of all residential properties to 
change housing from a welfare offering of the state into a 
market commodity 
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introduction of a new national medical health scheme removing 
free universal medical care 
reform of the tax system. 
In contrast to these medium-term goals, which must have been 
endorsed by other senior leaders, Zhu also announced that the 
most urgent policy priority would be substantial increases in 
domestic investment to maintain economic growth and provide 
insurance against flow-on effects from the economic crises in South 
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. 
Two years later, in March 2000, Zhu was able to report that the 
government had had considerable success in implementing these 
reforms and that the country had weathered the changes quite 
well. He said the country faced more opportunities than challenges. 
In particular, he claimed early success in turning around the state-
owned enterprises in the textile industry one year ahead of 
schedule (he did not mention though that this sector is 
uncharacteristic in that it enjoys a high level of foreign investment, 
has therefore enjoyed high levels of technological renovation, and 
has high levels of export earnings to hard-currency destinations). 14 
He also claimed significant progress in the old industrial bases of 
China, especially the Northeast, where low productivity, high 
unemployment and bankruptcy had become common 
characteristics of state-owned enterprises. Reasonable progress 
was made in the other areas of policy, according to Zhu, especially 
in social welfare reforms, such as unemployment compensation. 
In December 2000, Zhu reported that the state-owned 
enterprises had 'basically' achieved the goals set for them in the 
three year period. 15 But there were still serious problems, Zhu 
said. One of these he noted on the same occasion was that 'the 
incomes of peasants in some principal food producing areas had 
declined'. He predicted that, if these and other problems were 
not addressed immediately, there would be a major negative effect 
on stability in rural areas. 
Without reference to stability in the 'rural areas' of China, it is 
impossible to appreciate fully the gravity of the situation facing 
China's leaders as they see it. The 'rural areas' of China represent 
900 million of the country's 1.3 billion people. Stability of the rural 
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areas is quite simply the stability of the country as a whole. Zhu 
Rongji has described a problem of public order at the grass roots 
level, 16 a problem he characterised on another occasion as urgent. 17 
The Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National 
People's Congress, Li Peng, admitted in March 200 I that 'not enough 
has been done to find out about the real state of law enforcement 
at the grass roots'. 18 In February 200 I, the government issued a 
White Paper on 'improving agricultural work' which reasserted 
the primacy of the rural areas of China in the country's overall 
national economy and its social stability. 19 It called for lifting 
unnecessary burdens off the peasants' backs and a better response 
from officials to otherwise unexplained 'mass incidents'. Through 
the 1990s, there have been a number of large-scale violent incidents 
in China's countryside that have largely gone unreported in the 
West but which underpin the new-found determination of the 
leaders through the 1990s to lift burdens off the peasants' backs.20 
The prospect of new social unrest in the cities is also something 
the Chinese leadership is actively contemplating as part of the 
necessary structural adjustments associated with greater 
internationalisation of the economy. A number of public 
commentaries have warned of the inevitable impact on the 
country's economic security (and by implication on its social order) 
of the structural adjustment that will be necessary as a consequence 
of China's accession to the WT0.21 
There are a number of other sources of the public order crisis 
in China and, as much as China would like to deny the possibility, 
these sources do include the classic problems of cross-border 
ethnic loyalties. This is really only significant in western China, 
where members of the Uighur community and some other Turkic 
ethnic groups have been waging a terrorist campaign against the 
Chinese government in support of claims for independence from 
China. According to sources in Beijing, the Chinese government 
now feels it is losing the fight against the Muslim separatists. The 
reasons cited for this by Beijing sources are as follows.22 There is 
now a net outflow of Han Chinese from Xinjiang. This has come 
about because the policy of migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang 
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was a policy of forced migration, when jobs were assigned by the 
Party and people had little choice but to go where they were 
sent. Now that China effectively has a free labour market and 
controls on residency have largely evaporated, many of the forced 
migrants to the west are returning to their original homes (for 
family reasons) or to other places in the richer provinces for 
economic reasons. Even a number of Han Chinese born in the 
west find it more attractive for economic reasons to migrate 
eastwards. This net outward migration is a long-term problem for 
the Chinese leadership and, though it can be corrected over time 
with special incentives, the issue bears heavily on leadership 
calculations of the nature of the problem. 
The rebellion in western China weighs even more heavily on 
Chinese leadership perceptions of internal security because official 
sources in Beijing believe that China has lost control of infiltration 
across the borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, two tiny countries 
of Central Asia facing immense problems of governance and armed 
incursions of their own. China has significantly increased its military 
relations with Kyrgyzstan at least and is providing support to the 
development of its border surveillance programs. But these 
programs are at a low level and the flow of weapons, money and 
drugs to support the operations of the rebels in Xinjiang has 
increased in recent years. 
But even if this sort of cross-border ethnic strife is in China 
confined largely to the western border, the 'separatism' that it 
represents is demonstrated profoundly and gravely by two other 
cases-those ofTaiwan and Tibet. And these, as is well known in 
the West, evoke particularly neuralgic responses from senior 
Chinese officials. Beijing's long-term assessment of both of these 
problems individually is not good.23 This is the reason in the case 
of Taiwan for Beijing's new threat in the White Paper on Taiwan in 
2000 that Taiwan should not indefinitely delay reunification and 
that doing so would be tantamount to a declaration of 
independence. The planned visit to Taiwan in 200 I of the Dalai 
Lama represents Beijing's worst nightmare in terms of the two 
territories and the independence goals of their leaders. 
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In the midst of such concerns, the rise of a politically robust 
movement such as Falun Gong, claiming millions of adherents 
throughout society, but especially in the Communist Party, the armed 
forces, and the security services, saw anxiety levels in the Chinese 
leadership over internal security reach a level in 200 I not seen 
since the height of the Cultural Revolution or the first years after 
the 1949 victory. The level of their concern can be judged by many 
manifestations-the ferocity of the crackdown on Falun Gong, 
the emphasis on internal security in the current missions of the 
PLA, increases in pay for the PLA, the creation of new government 
mechanisms to coordinate internal security policy, and repeated 
leadership statements about the urgency of solving the public order 
crisis in all fields from gun smuggling to border security. 
China: a weak state? 
The issue identified in Chinese official sources as a crisis of public 
order should more correctly be seen as a crisis of political 
legitimacy. Chinese leaders appreciate this better than most outside 
observers. The impressive gains of the 1980s and 1990s brought 
some new legitimacy to the Communist Party, which had 
squandered most of its popular support before 1978 through 
repeated political campaigns or repression, and through several 
sharp economic reversals that remained bitter memories despite 
impressive economic and social gains in some years. But a continuing 
crisis of legitimacy arises from the government's inability to find 
quickly enough politically acceptable solutions to a number of 
serious problems, some firmly rooted in China's demographic 
pressures and resource foundations (and therefore largely beyond 
short-term solutions over which Beijing has control), and others 
more of a systemic or political character (equally hard to change 
in the short term with radical readjustments in political order). 
Demographic pressures and resource foundations 
China is a resource rich country, both in natural and human terms. 
The large population size suggests massive potential economic 
advance because it presents a large pool of skilled workers and a 
large internal market to boost domestic demand, and therefore 
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domestic production. China does have a huge imbalance between 
arable land and population-? per cent and 25 per cent of world 
totals respectively. But China now has little difficulty producing 
enough food for most people in the country. Per capita 
consumption levels of meat, fruit, eggs, aquatic products and 
vegetables are all higher than world averages. China will face little 
difficulty feeding itself as long as weather conditions, market 
conditions and distribution systems remain at least as they were 
through most of the 1990s. Advances in technology, especially 
genetic engineering, take-up of reserved wasteland which is 
currently not used, and institution of a number of financial 
instruments to insure against losses due to natural disasters will 
contribute to a general improvement in China's food supply 
situation. 
Yet China does face huge resource constraints for an 
economically developing country and these constraints do shape 
leadership perceptions of China's power position in the world. 
China's dependence on the outside world for critical resources, 
critical technologies and critical investment funds dictate not only 
friendly policies toward the providers of those, but also a domestic 
economy responsive to their continued provision. An absolute 
precondition of this responsiveness is an economy that is open to 
investment and innovation, and from the point of view of internal 
stability this means continual adjustment to the global market 
through domestic structural reform. Chinese officials are acutely 
aware that China has no 'birthright' to foreign investment in a 
global order where many_ other developing countries are even 
more attractive as investment destinations, and they are aware of 
the downturn in new foreign investment into China in the last 
two years. 
While on current indications China can easily feed itself well 
into the next century, it is highly unlikely that China will be able to 
fuel itself for decades to come. Even before China became a net 
importer of oil in 1993, it needed to import oil to obtain certain 
types of product or to supply certain localities. Between 1990 and 
1993, crude oil imports jumped from 2.9 million tons to 15.6 million 
tons. Imports of petroleum products more than doubled in 1993 
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compared with the previous year (from 7.68 million tons to 17.4 
million tons).24 In 1996, oil imports were 37.5 per cent higher 
than the 1995 level, and 700 per cent higher than the 1990 level. 
Import requirements in 1997 were projected to hit 25 per cent 
of total Chinese consumption.25 The market impact of China's 
purchase of oil on the international market, and the level of its 
consumption of domestically produced oil, will be such as to 
increase the dependence of major oil consumers, including China 
and Japan, on Middle East oii.26 The pace of development of Chinese 
offshore oil and gas resources has picked up considerably in recent 
years but offshore fields are unlikely to redress a situation of 
Chinese dependence on substantial imports of energy. The offshore 
fields will produce only a fraction of total Chinese energy 
requirementsY 
A similar picture is presented by industries dependent on oil 
extraction, such as petrochemicals. China is now self-sufficient in 
many petrochemical products but does import significant amounts 
of selected products, in some years importing more than 50 per 
cent of consumption.28 By 2005, according to one estimate, China 
will import over 40 per cent of its naphtha consumption, over 50 
per cent of its gas oil, and over 30 per cent of its gasoline 
consumption.29 Its dependence on imports will extend to almost 
all intermediate petrochemical products, with actual import 
quantities dependent on pricing policy and technology shifts in 
domestic production. According to industry specialists, this 
increasing dependence will not be significantly altered by the 
availability of projected new sources of offshore crude oil in 
disputed areas and China will probably be forced to abandon its 
preference for self-sufficiency in petrochemicals. 30 
The only solution for China in the medium term will be to import 
substantial amounts of oil and petrochemicals, and to develop 
simultaneously new nuclear and hydropower sources. In 1993, China 
decided to increase investment in expansion of the power industry 
by 25 per cent of its current share of GDP. Foreign investment in 
domestic power production was also to play an important part in 
easing power shortages, but even with these expansion plans, the 
prognosis was still bleak-energy shortages across the country 
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would basically only ease.31 Some reliance on other forms of energy 
production, such as solar, wind, tidal and waste cycle, can be 
expected but there is little sign of the massive government 
investment in these sectors that would be needed for them to 
make more than a tiny contribution to the energy mix. To continue 
to import oil and other industrial inputs in increasing volumes, 
China needs to maintain high levels of foreign exchange reserves 
and/or high export volumes. It is the judgment of China's economic 
decisionmakers that both depend on increasing the openness of 
China's economy. 
China is also technologically dependent on the outside world. 
As one commentator put it in the People's Daily in February 200 I, 
'the pressure [on China] caused by the leading edge of economically, 
scientifically and technologically advanced countries ... will exist 
permanently'.32 When China began its economic reforms in 1978, 
the rapid development of the technology base was one of the 
leader's dreams. It had been hoped that, if China could quadruple 
its GDP by the year 2000, then advance in technology would come 
almost by itself as part of the economic advance.33 The decision to 
allow foreign investment had been justified within the leadership 
of the Communist Party in large part on the grounds that such 
investment would bring the high technologies that would enable 
China to become even more self-reliant and more powerful. The 
flows of high technology did not happen, partly because of the 
sharp interruption to China's international economic links after 
the Tiananmen Square repressions, but mainly because China simply 
was not attractive as an investment site for high technologies. 
One of the biggest obstacles to this was the failure for many 
years of China to join international regimes for protecting 
intellectual property rights, and even after it did join, to enforce 
them. In addition, incentive regimes for import of technology were 
often frustrated by other control mechanisms.34 
By 200 I, the technological part of the open door policy had not 
been fulfilled and the leadership began to fear that China was 
falling even further behind. Chinese productivity levels remain very 
poor. The need to advance the country's science and technology 
base was put up as the long-term unifying strategy or rationale 
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for all government policy. The belief, as expressed by President 
Jiang Zemin at the 15th Party Congress and echoed by his new 
Prime Minister in 1998, was that advanced technology, understood 
in its broadest sense, was the key not only to national strength in 
conventional military terms but also in terms of economic 
competitiveness, resilience and adaptability. Repair of China's flawed 
record on intellectual property rights, which has even resulted in 
executions for crimes relating to intellectual property rights, has 
to be a central part of this strategy. 
China's perceived vulnerabilities in relation to rapid technological 
advance in the United States helped galvanise political opinion in 
the leadership in 1997 and 1998 for the massive governmental 
changes, including reorganisation of ministries, announced in March 
1998. These moves included reorganising the State Science and 
Technology Commission into a Ministry, having pointedly dismissed 
its head some several months earlier, and reorganising the 
Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defence (COSTIND) by increasing its powers, bringing under its 
wing powerful research and development capacities, and appointing 
a civilian head to direct it. 
China remains a developing country in many respects, and its 
leaders think of it in this way as often as they see its more positive 
features, such as rapid economic growth, substantial international 
trade, and very high levels of gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
The population of China has reached 1.3 billion, of which one 
billion live outside the major cities.As suggested above, even with 
purchasing power parity estimates of Chinese gross national 
product (GNP) which put it just behind Japan, Chinese per capita 
GNP would be one-tenth that in Japan, a relativity which has 
enormous consequences in a range of areas from living standards 
to infrastructure spending. Things have been so bad in China in 
this respect that in 1994 the government had to establish an 
international poverty alleviation fund to help it support the 130 
million citizens then living below China's poverty line.35 In 1998, 
the number of poor people in rural areas alone was 50 million in 
spite of four years of relatively successful work in poverty 
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alleviation.36 And unemployment pressures continue to mount 
because of structural adjustment in the economy. In 1998, the 
relevant Chinese minister announced that each year for the 
following several years, six million new job-seekers would be 
looking to enter the workforce, and four million former workers 
would be retrenched from state-owned enterprises and 
government jobs. This would represent an addition to a floating 
labour force estimated to be in the tens of millions that is highly 
dependent on the construction industry and other sources of 
temporary manual labour. According to Chinese government 
statistics, about seven million new jobs were created in 1997. 
Without rapid expansion of the employment market, China could 
accumulate ten million additional unemployed people in three years. 
If these are concentrated in older industrial cities in the northeast 
which are in fairly rapid decay, the social and political consequences 
would be serious. 
China's government has settled on a course of 
internationalisation of its economy in three dimensions-trade, 
inward investment, and outward investment. As a signatory to the 
Bogor Declaration on reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
and as a member of the WTO, China is committed to open and 
free trade to the same extent as other members of the world 
community. On some estimates, China is one of the most trade 
dependent economies in the world-some 30 per cent of GDP in 
1996, and more than 40 per cent for the several years before 
that.37 China's receptivity to foreign investment in recent years is 
well known, but has developed only gradually beginning in 1978 
with moves in the offshore oil sector, and extending eventually to 
almost all sectors of economic activity, including by 1995 to some 
of the most sensitive strategic minerals and military industry 
sectors. According to a Chinese official, the country was the second 
biggest recipient of new foreign investment for each of the five 
years to 1997.38 Joint ventures using foreign investment accounted 
for 37 per cent of China's total trade in 1994.39 By the late 1990s, 
the third leg of China's internationalisation strategy-outward 
investment, such as the buying of foreign companies or funding of 
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foreign enterprises-was still embryonic, but as in the case of 
Japan, one of the most important aspects of China's impact on 
global economic relations will be its capacity to accumulate external 
assets. 
Since China had in relative terms both a closed economy and a 
closed society in the 1960s and 1970s, the rapid pace of the 
internationalisation process by 1998 guaranteed that China's entry 
into the global economy would be a very bumpy ride, bringing 
with it a variety of conflicts with trading partners, foreign investors 
and international organisations. The ability of the Chinese 
government to resolve these economic conflicts easily in the 
twenty years after 1978 was seriously impeded by the slow pace 
of development of its domestic legal institutions and its 
bureaucracy. Not only were these hobbled by the political chaos 
of the Cultural Revolution, even after 1978 they were hobbled by 
continuing serious divisions in the leadership of the Communist 
Party about the virtue of opening up to the outside world and 
about how that was incompatible with Communist ideology. Even 
in 1997, after the collapse of the currencies in South Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand, there were strong voices in the higher 
levels of the Communist Party arguing that China had allowed 
itself to be too exposed to the global economy. The correct policy 
for China, according to this view, was self-reliance, and this 
terminology still figures prominently in the rhetoric of China's 
leaders. Jiang Zemin reportedly told top leaders that no other 
country would help China if it were faced with a similar crisis.40 
Political fragility 
The above factors which might more or less be regarded as long-
term or relatively persistent 'environmental' conditions can be 
contrasted with what could usefully be called politically contingent 
factors. China can change these comparatively quickly, though not 
without cost, if it wants. While communist ideology has all but 
disappeared in practice in China, important remnants of the 
totalitarian regime of governance that accompanied the ideology 
remain in place. But, without a coherent ideology, the political 
system has no social glue that gives the government legitimacy in 
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the eyes of most of the people. The struggle to find a new ideology 
and to establish a new social contract with a very distrusting 
population is a defining feature of Chinese politics today. How 
that struggle resolves itself in terms of the institutions of politics 
will determine the future directions of Chinese foreign policy and 
will therefore determine ultimately China's real international 
power. 
Political power in China remains diffused through an immensely 
powerful informal network surrounding several formal organs of 
the Communist Party and there are no publicly-visible political 
conventions or rules on how to replace the top leaders. Each 
succession is a contest of political wills that involves mobilisation 
of key constituencies throughout the informal networks. The 
leaders of the coercive instruments of the state (the armed forces 
and security services) remain central to all major transitions of 
power. In such a system, a change of leadership represents a greater 
risk of political instability than in a system where the leadership 
jockeying is confined to leading groups in a political party. 
The government structure of China exists in name and practice 
under a state constitution promulgated in 1982 (the fourth in 33 
years), but the highest level leadership of this formal structure is 
subordinate to control by senior leaders of the CCP. Thus a 
Minister, or the State Council (of Ministers), carries out the orders 
of small group of senior CCP members who may or may not hold 
the leading positions in the CCP. Thus, when Jiang Zemin steps 
down from the post of President of China, and possibly from the 
post of Secretary-General of the CCP, he will probably remain 
the most powerful politician in China and retain his post as 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission as a manifestation 
of this. 
Under the Constitution of the CCP, its leading bodies are 
nominally subject to control from the Central Committee of the 
CCP, whose authority is exercised between meetings of its 
Politburo. The authority of the Politburo is exercised between its 
meetings by a Standing Committee. In practice, the real lines of 
authority have operated downwards from the Standing Committee, 
with the Central Committee subject to its direction, and the 
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Politburo itself occupying some sort of middle ground. Cross-
cutting these official structures are powerful informal networks 
(that could loosely be termed 'factions')41 typical of any political 
leadership system. 
The Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of the CCP is in some respects the most powerful 
formal organ across the full range of policy, but at different times 
it has been rivalled by the Party's Central Military Commission 
(CMC) in respect of security policy, by its Political and Legal 
Commission (PLC) in respect of internal security and law and 
order, and by its Secretariat in respect of ideology.42 Decisions of 
the Standing Committee are subject to direction and influence 
from other sources. The most important are informal networks 
under the influence of retired or serving leaders of the CCP whose 
authority does not depend on a formal appointment in the 
government or in the CCP. The role of Deng Xiaoping in directing 
major decisions by China's government after his retirement from 
all formal positions was a good illustration of this. But other 
informal networks and channels of political authority exist. Deng 
was only the foremost of a group of veteran leaders, such as 
former President Yang Shangkun, former Defence Minister Zhang 
Aiping, and former Politburo members, Wan Li and Bo Yibo. This 
system is quite distinct from a parliamentary system in a liberal 
democracy where informal power exists but is largely subordinate 
to more transparent processes of administration on the floor of 
the national parliament and in the offices of the leaders of the 
executive branch of government subject to parliamentary control, 
supervision or appointment. 
The power of the informal networks has been enhanced by 
several structural or contingent features of the political system. 
China is governed from Beijing as a self-styled dictatorship centred 
on the core organs of the CCP. Its constitutional and legal system 
emerged from a revolution which comprehensively replaced the 
existing political structures of the Chinese state. Though a very 
large country, China's administrative controls were so weak and 
its national wealth so dissipated that it was ravaged by a long civil 
war, foreign invasion and the depredations of colonial interference 
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for the first half of this century, China presented to the CCP a 
very weak foundation on which to build any legal and constitutional 
system. Even after 1949, the foundations of domestic order did 
not fare well. CCP leaders have acknowledged they were their 
own worst enemies. Political and legal authority was consistently 
subject to severe strains from successive power struggles within 
the leadership or sharp disagreements on policy (often the one 
inflamed, or was used for, the other). For most of the history of 
China, the country has not had a stable political system which 
might have eventually matured into one which could deliver 
constitutional legitimacy to the rulers or methods they used to 
rule. The continuing house arrest of the former Secretary-General 
of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, who was purged prior to 
the Tiananmen Square repression on 4 June, is an example of the 
lack of order in the political system.Another example of the latent 
instability of China's political system is the introduction into the 
National People's Congress (NPC) in March 1997 of a law which, 
inter alia, explicitly provided for control of the armed forces by 
the CCP rather than by the government of the state (State 
Council) as provided for in the state constitution of 1982.43 
The standing threat to regularisation of the system first emerged 
in 1957, peaked in the so-called Cultural Revolution, and, although 
much reduced by 1998, has not altogether subsided in spite of 
considerable progress toward the rule of law through a process 
of national legislation, judicial renovation, and an easing of many 
aspects of the totalitarian system. New forces and contingencies 
have emerged to threaten the steady progress toward rule of 
law promised both by Deng's 1982 state constitution and by a 
blossoming of political reform between 1985 and 1989. While the 
massive economic progress registered by China in the last decade 
gives the CCP leaders new opportunities for control, the wealth 
has created new centres of power (wealthy entrepreneurs or 
provincial authorities) and new processes of power (corruption 
for personal wealth). Both of these factors act against regularisation 
of any formalised constitutional processes. Thus, the decisionmaking 
environment is conducive to the continued role, and perhaps even 
enhancement, of the informal networks, including through the 
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traditional mechanism of enlarged meetings. The power of the 
person, and the informal political levers he or she is able to control, 
remain more of a consideration than authority deriving from 
formal occupancy of leadership positions. Even when these most 
respected veterans of the pre 1949 years have died, other second-
generation veterans will still seek to interfere. For example, the 
former Politburo member, Qiao Shi, who retired from his 
leadership posts in 1997 and 1998, will continue to be an important 
second level force in Chinese politics through the network of 
patronage by appointment that he established through his decades 
of work at the highest levels of the country's legal system and 
intelligence services. 
The most serious contingent element of the leadership policy 
environment in the 1990s was the transition associated with the 
death of Deng Xiaoping who, though his power was far from 
absolute, was the single most powerful ruler of China after 1978. 
This contingency has been complicated by the death of other 
leading revolutionaries who ruled China after 1949 and who relied 
on that historical role for political authority. It was these other 
senior leaders, such as Peng Zhen and Chen Yun, with whom Deng 
shared power in his position as 'first among equals'. The transition 
from strong, personalised leadership to leadership by consensus 
of a larger group without dear commanding authority, creates 
the danger of prolonged and more severe bureaucratic disputes' 
and weak policy decisions.44 
The uncertainty generated in the early 1990s by the imminent 
death of Deng had all but dissipated by the time of his eventual 
passing in February 1997. Chinese policymaking had settled into a 
fairly routinised process within the upper circles of the CCP albeit 
through informal as well as formal mechanisms. Yet one 
fundamental characteristic of political leadership in China remains 
its lack of constitutional stability and the resulting inability to 
command a functional level of responsiveness in many 
circumstances. Reliable evidence for this exists at middle levels of 
government (since no studies are available of the highest level of 
policymaking) but it seems more than reasonable to assume that 
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the lack of institutional regularity at lower levels, which seriously 
impedes policy implementation,45 is also present at the highest 
level. The prognosis must be that unless there is a sustained 
abatement of political competition in the leadership, and some 
consolidation of process and norms, then political direction in 
China will continue to be contested and followed only fitfully.46 
In this situation, where the top leadership must obtain the 
consensus of a larger number of constituencies at the centre, and 
where there has been a relative decline of centralised economic 
power in favour of provincial authorities, policy decisions which 
favour one group at the centre at the expense of many others 
will not be politically viable.47 This factor appeared to be in play in 
the deliberations for leadership changes in the lead-up to the I 5th 
Party Congress where, according to independent sources, the 
various contesting parties could not agree on a resolution without 
direct intervention of one or more of the veteran leaders. The 
retention of former Prime Minister, Li Peng, as second highest in 
Party protocol standing even after he resigned the job of Chairman 
of the State Council was almost certainly at the urging of Party 
elders. Such incidents would confirm the observation that the 
structure of 'court politics' in China still 'calls forth a supreme 
leader',a 'final arbiter', to save the court from institutional deadlock 
or unresolved personal rivalries.48 
China thus remains an authoritarian state without a core ideology 
other than that of the corporatist state. Even though the I 997 
Party Constitution allows for complete intra-Party democracy 
(Article I I), including the election of Party officials at all levels, 
the Party did not allow nomination of alternate candidates for 
senior Party posts at the I 5th Congress at which the new 
Constitution was adopted. The new Constitution forbids public 
dissent by members from Party decisions and prohibits circulation 
of internal party deliberations without approval (Article I 5). Until 
1999, the focus of state coercion against 'dissidents' was limited 
largely to those advocating the end of Communist party rule, the 
creation of free trade unions, or the secession of any part of the 
country, or those making public personal attacks on particular 
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leaders. As in many other states, China continued to protect 
through coercion what it regarded as 'state secrets' and 'public 
morals'. China's legal system remained draconian when engaged 
against any of its citizens, not just political dissidents. 
By 200 I, the brutal crackdown on the Falun Gong movement 
had achieved an intensity not seen since the repression in 1989 of 
student and democracy movements, but the Falun Gong 
repressions took on a far greater scale given the reported size of 
the movement, its penetration of party and military organisations, 
and its geographic spread throughout China (not to mention Hong 
Kong, the United States and elsewhere outside China). The re-
emergence of the Political and Legal Commission within the 
Communist Party at the end of the 1990s in an era of sustained 
internal unrest and an intensifying crackdown on Falun Gong has 
reopened a new point of institutional contest in a leadership system 
that was only just beginning to settle into some order. The head of 
the Commission, Luo Gan, who supervises all civilian internal 
security operations is simultaneously a Party Secretary, Politburo 
and State Council member, making him one of the most powerful 
men in the leadership. Luo shares responsibility for the People's 
Armed Police with the Central Military Commission and the 
General Staff Headquarters. 
China's leaders also sense the fragility of their political system 
and the weakness of their state in terms of centre-region relations. 
According to Hu Angang, one of China's leading experts on 
relations between the central government and the provinces, 
'China's economic miracle has taken place at the expense of the 
central government'.49 Writing in 1993, Hu and a colleague, Wang 
Shaoguang, reported that the central government's income and 
expenditure as shares of GDP in 1989 were the second lowest in 
the world after Yugoslavia, and that China would pay the same 
price in political terms if it did not remedy this defect. 5° The Chinese 
government responded by instituting the first national taxation 
system in the history of the country in 1994, but by mid 1995 Hu 
saw the national income as a share of GDP still dropping-to 9.1 
per cent as opposed to 14.2 per cent in 1992.51 These problems 
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are compounded by disagreements between regions on internal 
trade, where some provinces or localities actually create their 
own barriers to movement of goods. One writer has predicted 
that a 'fragile equilibrium' between the central government and 
the regional administrations will continue 'until a general crisis 
unfolds or until the time is ripe for constitutional reform'.52 An 
Australian government report in 1997 observed that, without 
radical tax reform, Chinese policies aimed at bringing to the 
poorer parts of China the economic advances some of the coastal 
provinces have enjoyed would not suceed.53 
The problems of governance have been increased as a result of 
pressures for a new relationship between the central government 
of China and regional authorities. On the one hand, the central 
government has favoured a multitude of forms of government 
and these forms increased in the period of reform. While provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions existed under Mao, Deng 
added new types of regional status-special economic zones 
( 1979), open port cities ( 1984) and coastal economic areas ( 1985). 
By 1988, Hainan Island was declared a new province and became a 
special economic zone. In 1996, the city of Chongqing was declared 
a municipality. The motive for re-crafting administrative relations 
between the centre and regions in the above cases was largely 
economic, but the central government has also been responsive to 
more sensitive political issues of regionalism .This is unambiguously 
the case in respect of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
established for Hong Kong under the 'one country, two systems' 
concept. The Chinese government holds out the hope of applying 
a similar system to Taiwan, with the island retaining its own armed 
forces. The leaders have also been sensitive to the need to combat 
separatist sentiment in Xinjiang and Tibet with concessions on 
regional autonomy (combined with more traditional iron fist 
methods). With the status of Taiwan as part of China increasingly 
under threat-since most people in Taiwan do not want to be a 
part of China-there is even greater pressure on the government 
of China to maintain its nascent federalism-'one country, many 
systems'-and to develop it exclusively in peaceful directions. 
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Genuine federalism would be a complete innovation in China's 
political history. The communists have in political terms rejected 
federalism as being synonymous with warlordism, as a 'recipe for 
feudalism and national disintegration'. 54 Yet, as prominent Chinese 
scholars have pointed out, the historical patterns of centre-region 
relations cannot be sustained. The only practicable solution would 
be to improve the tax base of the central government while giving 
the regions 'by means of constitutional procedures, far reaching 
legislative autonomy'.55 
Persistent weakness 
As night follows day, the radical policies announced in March 1998 
were certain to provoke strong opposition from organised political 
forces, from newly organising political forces, and from the natural 
conservative tendencies in society. In the fiftieth anniversary year, 
the reform wing of the Communist Party was clearly ascendant 
within the Party itself, and was sufficiently entrenched to weather 
challenges from conservatives within its ranks for some time in 
the absence of a major social, political or economic upheaval. 
Moreover, the reform wing has sufficient disposition to the use of 
coercion to repress competing political forces outside the Party, 
such as the free trade-union movement, that there is little sign of 
an alternate government. There is a broad awareness in China 
that politics can undo economic gain if it becomes uncontrolled. 
Memories of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 
and of the economic and social backwardness of China in 1978 
are fresh enough to convince many people to let politics take 
care of itself. 
By 200 I, the reform wing of the party was still clearly ascendant, 
as discussion below of changes in ideology suggests, but there 
appeared to be a resurgence of sorts by more doctrinaire elements 
and of the coercive arms of state power, such as the PLC of the 
Party. It is more than likely that the issue of how to balance the 
quest for new popular legitimacy and the leadership consensus on 
a need to crack down hard was a central battleground of leadership 
politics. 
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By 200 I, with the adoption of the Tenth Five Year Plan, the 
government was advocating even faster reform as the only means 
of addressing the country's balance sheet of problems. Zhu 
identified faster economic liberalisation as the only way of easing 
unemployment pressures. 56 But the main lines of the government 
response have not been in economic policy, but in reform of the 
basic approach to governing the country. The government is looking 
for a new social contract based on greater democratisation, with 
Chinese characteristics, while strengthening the coercive position 
of the state to limit and channel that democratisation. 
systemic fragility 
This systemic fragility will not be too difficult for Chinese leaders 
to cope with as long as no organised opposition group mounts a 
frontal assault to take power from the CCP. A continuation of 
gradual evolution to more participatory politics in circumstances 
of rising living standards will help prevent a strong opposition group 
from emerging in the population at large, but, as discussed above 
in connection with internal security, there are serious doubts within 
the CCP leadership about its ability to satisfy public demand for 
perpetuation of the state welfare system. The only way China can 
now avoid a major political upheaval in the country is to speed up 
the pace of democratisation so that the blame for decisions that 
undermine the welfare and rights of significant sections of the 
population can be shared. This conclusion has been reached by the 
CCP leadership, who believe that use of force against 
demonstrators on a large scale such as in 1989, would only bring 
down their system more rapidly, not sustain it. 
Most of China's leaders have not yet resolved the contradictions 
in their own vision between economic and social advance on the 
one hand and political reform on the other. In 1998, in the face of 
a newly prominent and illegal movement advocating free trade-
unions, the leaders have resorted to traditional forms of repression. 
Without some resolution at the highest levels of the leadership 
of how to make the transition to a more pluralist society in which 
power is genuinely shared with non-Party groups on a formalised 
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basis, then the prospect must be for greater social unrest, not 
less. The following sections sketch some elements of the leadership's 
response to its crisis of legitimacy. 
The dynamics of power without ideology: defining a 
new social contract 
The significance of the changes to the Constitution of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) approved at its 15th Congress in 199757 
was unambiguous. Communism is not officially dead in China, but 
it might as well be. The new Party Constitution contained new 
theses about Communism. It saw the time-scale in which 
communism could be achieved as so distant that for all practical 
purposes it was admitting that communism was simply not 
achievable. The document said that it might even take I 00 years 
to see socialism, which would be an early transition stage to 
communism, in China. 58 The leadership has justified its shake-up of 
the government structure not by reference to ideology so much 
as by reference to pragmatism and the spirit of the times. They 
said the former government administration system was simply no 
longer appropriate, having been developed under a command 
economy and under an incomplete legal system. It was also simply 
so big that it cost far more than it was worth to maintain. 59 
Communist ideology was, in essence, buried and, according to the 
new Party Constitution, the three criteria by which any policy 
should be judged had now become its contribution to increasing 
the country's productive forces, increasing national strength, and 
satisfying the material and cultural needs of the citizenry. 
By the end of the 1990s, China's system of government and 
ideology was more liberal than those of predecessor 'authoritarian 
statists', such as Benito Mussolini and the Italian fascists. Italian 
fascist theorists saw the state as supreme, as the director and 
controller of all things.60The state had a heroic and historic mission, 
and democracy of any sort was rejected. Italian fascism also rejected 
the concept of individual material benefit independent of the state 
interest. The trend in Chinese politics since 1980, however fitful 
and in spite of leadership discomfort, has been to the reduction 
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of the power of the state in favour of a pluralistic vision, both in 
economic management and social policy. Pluralism in politics has 
not been as strongly supported in the leadership of the Communist 
Party, but it did emerge between I 985 and 1989 and, despite 
sustained repressive measures from the government, had by the 
mid 1990s resurfaced unmistakably, slowly gathering strength by 
1999. The government continued to arrest dissidents but the level 
of Party tolerance of political dissent was much higher than in 
most of the 1990s.Within the constraints outlined in the previous 
paragraph, in almost all domains of policy, even military policy, 
authors could discuss almost any idea in public media without fear 
of state retribution. Party members were generally free to raise 
orally within closed party meetings any idea, as long as it was not 
disseminated further without Party approval. 
In the years since the Party Congress in 1997, even more ambitious 
plans for economic and social reform had emerged, to the 
accompaniment of yet further redefinitions of the essence of 
communism-or what was more commonly called socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. The essence of communism and the CCP 
was redefined to mean protecting the cause of China's 'advanced 
social productive forces', preserving 'China's advanced culture and 
'representing the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of 
the Chinese people'.This formula, attributed to Jiang Zemin,is called 
the 'the three represents'.61 The enhancement of the people's living 
standards is the 'fundamental point of departure' for the I O'h Five 
Year Plan, and the goal of increasing incomes for the peasants is 
included in this. These strategies have been identified in public by 
Chinese leaders as the way of ensuring continued power for the 
CCP. Another new thread of CCP ideology to emerge firmly by 
the turn of the century was the idea of 'ruling the country with 
virtue'.62 This slogan formed part of the CCP's urgent crackdown 
on corruption, also identified by the leadership as essential if the 
Party was not to be overthrown. Zhu Rongji has echoed these 
lines of policy in less doctrinaire terms. He has identified the need 
to 'take into full consideration the general public's capacity to 
tolerate the changes and not shift costs formerly borne by the 
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government onto the general public'.63 He talked of the need to 
avoid 'coercion and commands' when pursuing the restructuring 
of agriculture. He said that there was a need to continue guarantees 
of financial assistance to laid-off workers in the cities. 
The state structure: reorganised for new coercion 
After the sudden emergence of Falun Gong as a politically active 
force in 1998, a very important new exception to tolerated activities 
became participation in, or support for, such religious or quasi-
religious groups. But two observations might be made about the 
crackdown on Falun Gong. First, the crackdown is a sign of the 
CCP's insecurity in the face of all of the threats to internal order 
mentioned above. Second, and as a consequence, the severity of 
the crackdown can be attributed to a perceived need to root out 
any form of opposition lest it be seen as a spur or example of 
success to others making a fundamental challenge to CCP authority, 
such as those in Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, the China Democracy Party, 
the embryonic free trade-union movement, or illegal religious 
groups (Catholics and Muslims). There appears to be a broad 
consensus in the leadership on the need for the crackdown. Even 
Zhu Rongji seems at one with the coercive strategies of the state 
being used hand in glove with the new approach of emphasising 
popular support.64 He has warned of acts of sabotage inside China 
by hostile forces from outside the country. He said that the 
problem of strengthening social stability, national unity and border 
defence was urgent. 
The re-emergence of the PLC mentioned above, even when a 
new supervisory and Policy mechanism called the Commission for 
the Comprehensive Management of Public Order (CCMPO) had 
been created in the early 1990s, is a very strong sign of just how 
seriously the CCP leaders view the internal security threats. In 
February 200 I, a new cross-ministry and cross-commission 
permanent body responsible to the Politburo was created 
specifically to supervise an intensification of the crackdown on 
Falun Gong.65 The CCMPO and the PLC now hold joint meetings 
under the direction of Luo Gan. Luo has complained publicly about 
the low allocations of funds for the operation of subsidiary PLC's 
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throughout the country and called for constant increases.66 The 
priority tasks for the PLA were identified in March 200 I by Jiang 
Zemin with strong reference to the internal security mission as 
'safeguarding state security, promoting the unity of the motherland 
and maintaining social stability'.67 An increase of pay for PLA 
members (including the People's Armed Police) of 30 per cent in 
2000 (supposedly to keep pace with civil servants' pay increases) 
may be another reflection of concern about internal security.68 
Democratisation, Chinese style 
But the CCP leadership has learnt, as the new trends in ideological 
formulation indicate, that carrying a big stick is by itself a self-
defeating strategy. Even in calling for a harsh crack-down, Luo Gan 
calls for improvements in the fair administration of justice in order 
to keep the people's trust. The CCP has returned to the principle 
of expanding the democratisation of the country, albeit conceived 
in terms of dictatorship of the centre. This centralist democracy 
has two elements-the first, village elections, has been around 
now for a number of years; the second, also in an embryonic form 
has been visible for many years, but has gained a new prominence 
in ideology. This is the principle of 'popular supervision', not only 
through more vigorous investigations by local and regional people's 
congresses, but through a move that looks remarkably like the 
first steps of glasnost by Gorbachev-that of'opening government 
affairs to the public'.69 
A move toward grass-roots democratisation, involving contested 
popular elections of township (or village) heads and direct election 
to township and county level people's congresses, launched in 1988, 
survived the anti-democratic mood in the leadership after 1989.7° 
The legislation was amended in 1995, and, by 1998, some 600,000 
representatives in county level congresses across the country were 
chosen by secret ballot with universal adult suffrage in contests 
with more than one candidate per post, and in which any ten or 
more voters are able to nominate a candidate. The main non-
democratic feature of the process has been the intervention of 
candidate selection committees to reduce the number of 
candidates from all of those nominated to a select few. 
95 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese 
Higher level people's congresses, including the NPC, are still 
elected by indirect methods, and the CCP's tolerance of non-
communist membership of the congresses decreases the higher 
the level. In county congresses, many representatives are not 
Communist Party members, and party discipline is not an issue 
because local issues, on which more often than not there is no 
central Party line, dominate the agenda. At the NPC, nothing 
remotely like an opposition has been allowed to form, but there 
is considerable freedom of speech on most matters, except for 
those that go to the heart of Communist Party rule. This freedom 
of speech is heavily constrained though by a highly formalised and 
ritualistic schedule of speeches which allows little time for 
comment from the floor by members who do not get offered a 
speaking part by the Party leadership. No nomination for a state 
leadership post put forward by the Communist Party had been 
rejected by the NPC though there have been important protest 
votes. For example, in March 1998, ten per cent of deputies voted 
against the appointment of Li Peng, former Prime Minister, as 
chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, and the Executive Vice 
Chairman, Tian Jiyun, received fewer votes than any of the other 
Vice Chairmen. The main place where freedom of speech has 
significant impact is in the work of the committees of the NPC, 
where government ministers are often called to account and where 
some fairly vigorous inquiries and investigations have been 
conducted.71 
Conclusions 
Communism may be dead, but free-market capitalism and liberal 
democracy do not yet have firm roots in China. Since becoming 
Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji has led the battle to make the free 
market secure in China. He will leave the politically risky task of 
making a transition to liberal democracy to people like Tian Jiyun 
in the National People's Congress, to the leaders of a number of 
low-profile central organisations, like the Institute of Political 
Science,72 and to intellectuals working vigorously and with great 
subtlety throughout the country toward that end. The new leaders 
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of China want liberal democracy in China, but they understand 
this more as an economic event that liberates market forces and 
allows some sharing of the burden and blame of economic 
decisionmaking, rather than as one of philosophical disposition or 
democratic consent for 'responsible government'. Thus the very 
foundations of domestic governance, and therefore of China's 
international position, remain fragile. 
This judgment is reinforced when one considers the lack of 
arrangements for transition away from one-party rule to genuine 
pluralism. The Communist Party has withered on the vine, having 
effectively lost control of most of the lower level cells nation-
wide.While these still function as Party cells, they might as well be 
completely independent of the Party because they do nothing to 
propagate the Party line. They exist primarily as debating dubs, 
control over which brings with it the traditional perks of Party 
status. The leaders acknowledge this problem in private but they 
know that they have written the script for the collapse of ideology 
as a glue that binds the Party, and therefore the Party-state. Efforts 
to find a substitute for Communist ideology have been made, and 
public commentary within China on neo-authoritarianism or 
nationalism derive mainly from a need perceived in the Party to 
find a substitute. But the depth of these sentiments is hard to 
judge. Much of the discussion is from Communist Party members 
responding to what they see as signals from above. On this reading, 
the battle for the future of Chinese politics will be fought between 
more radical, more liberal minded reformers and less radical, less 
liberal reformers in the Communist Party and by their supporters 
in the armed forces and security services (such as the Ministries 
of State Security and Public Security). 
Yet the scale of disadvantage and disaffection in China is so great 
and growing so rapidly that major social and political turmoil seems 
inevitable. One new mass movement across China-Falun Gong-
has already arisen, and others are likely to emerge. It will be in the 
response to such outbreaks of disorder that the future of the 
Party-state and its policies will lie. If the more liberal reformist 
elements of the Party come to dominate these decisions, coercion 
will be avoided in favour of spreading democracy (and the blame) 
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and by patching up regional welfare problems on an ad hoc basis. 
If the less liberal though still reformist elements in the leadership 
dominate decisions, sustained resort to coercion and a 
deterioration of the social contract are inevitable. 
China is in the grip of a political revolution that was put on hold 
in 1989 and is now being pursued by more surreptitious methods, 
and which is being fuelled on a daily basis by rising discontent among 
the 'losers' and by the increasingly radical measures of the 'winners' 
seeking to defuse the growing discontent. The leadership of the 
Communist Party might well be able to keep 'riding the tiger' but 
the new business interests of key officials and the traditional 
Chinese social characteristic of 'law blindness'73 suggest that this 
battle will be won or lost according to the ability of the government 
or the society to placate the newly discontented constituencies, 
not in the niceties of political ideology. If this cannot be achieved 
more quickly and more effectively than it has been so far, the 
almost inevitable outcome will be resort to force and the 
fragmentation of society. 
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In 1997, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) celebrated its 70th 
birthday. Without the PLA, the People's Republic of China (PRC), 
which just marked its fiftieth anniversary, would not exist. Looking 
back, a lot of changes have taken place in both the PLA and the 
PRC. How can we summarise these changes in the PLA and its 
relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and its child, 
the PRC? This chapter describes this evolutionary process in the 
following characterisation: from protecting revolution to serving 
national interests. In a way, this 50-year process of evolution has 
seen a profound transition in the PLA. In its relations with the 
Party, the PLA has slowly moved beyond symbiosis. In its 
modernisation, the PLA has changed from being a semi-
revolutionary, semi-professional army into a true professional 
military. In terms of its overriding functions, it is gradually shifting 
its emphasis from domestic politics to external missions. This has 
inevitably re-shaped its behaviour in the foreign policy arena, and 
these changes will accelerate and become more visible as China 
moves into the post-Jiang era. 
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A new balance 
military leaders 
power between civilian and 
In modern societies there are two types of civil/military relations. 
In democracies, the military is under objective control based on 
the foundation of two pillars. First, objective control promotes 
professionalism as a distinct value judgment in the military. 
Professionalism regulates soldiers' political ambitions and purifies 
their behaviour. Second, objective control promotes an 
institutionalised process to restrict the actions of generals to within 
a legitimate range. Under objective control, the armed forces have 
a simple function-guarding the nation against external threat.' 
This liberal model makes the military more a client of the state 
than a tool of a political party or leader. 
In contrast, armed forces in authoritarian countries have a much 
wider range of missions. There, the emergence of independent 
nationhood parallels the rise of military power. The soldiers are 
motivated by revolutionary ambitions which are fuelled by 
ideological ferment and nationalist frenzy brought about by colonial 
suppression. This fosters a strong tendency for military intervention 
in domestic politics, because the military tries to ensure the nation 
is following the appropriate political course. Often the generals 
are under a different kind of civilian control-the subjective control 
under which the military displays its loyalty to one particular political 
leader. Revolutionary goals, political/ideological preferences and 
national interests become blurred in the minds of generals who 
see their duties as ranging from domestic politics to international 
pursuits.2 
China's civil/military relations fall largely in the second category, 
largely because of historical factors. The Party founded the army 
and established effective control mechanisms within it to ensure 
that soldiers stayed loyal to the CCP and the revolution. The PLA 
has not disappointed the Party in this regard. During the 28 years 
of armed struggle for survival and national power, the CCP and 
PLA fought side by side, forging a symbiotic relationship-the 
demise of one would signal the demise of the other.3 The PLA has 
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come to the rescue of the Party several times since the founding 
of the PRC, the latest occasion being the clampdown of the 
Tiananmen rebellion in 1989, which drew a sharp contrast with 
the Red Army in the USSR in 1991. 
On the other hand, there have been clear signs that this symbiotic 
relationship is losing its power on both sides. After all, survival was 
no longer a pressing issue once the PRC came into being. As the 
new state consolidated and adapted to a peaceful environment, 
the soldiers' revolutionary zeal was gradually replaced by 
professional concerns. The civil-military relations characterised as 
war-time symbiosis underwent qualitative change and are now 
centred around shared interests. In peacetime, the closeness of 
CCP-PLA relations is based on a common interest in preserving 
their privileged position in the nation's politics. This may provide 
the basis for long-standing partnership. Eventually, however, the 
military may decide that protecting a deeply corrupt political party 
is a liability in protecting its own interests and adopt a more 
independent position. This process of divorce between the civilian 
and military authorities happened in almost all Chinese dynasties 
in their last days. It has also happened in most transforming 
communist societies. The likely outcome of this development would 
see the military surviving the decay of the Party and remaining the 
most important institution of power in the new political system. 
Taiwan's recent experience has demonstrated the possibility of 
this development on the mainland. In Taiwan, the Nationalist military 
(Guojun) continues to serve the new government as a key political 
player while its founder has lost power.4 
Yet the PLA is no longer the only key interest group in the 
political system, even though it remains the most powerful one. 
Other power groups have emerged and become entrenched. For 
instance, the state bureaucracy now wields enormous power in 
state affairs. Under this new power structure, the PLA's corporate 
identity is highlighted rather than reduced. With irreplaceable 
functions to perform in society, the space for the PLA to improve 
its professionalism is constantly growing. Today, modernisation and 
regularisation have become the primary concern of the officers 
and soldiers, although this is still decorated in the rhetoric of 
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revolution. The PLA has never before been driven so strongly by 
the same forces as Western militaries-the ideal of professionalism, 
defined by 'expertise, responsibility and corporateness'. What 
exactly has actually happened in CCP-PLA relations during the 
fifty year life of the PRC? Comparison of different eras is the best 
indicator. 
Transition from strongman control to 
institutionalised leadership 
One clear indication of the PLA's deepening professionalisation 
has been the disappearance of personal control by the strongmen. 
The historical legacy of the CCP and the PLA meant that the 
military came under personal control in the Mao and Deng eras. 
The object of loyalty of the armed forces was not the nation, the 
state or even the Party, but one particular individual. Personal 
control is a particular type of civil-military relations in which one 
political leader is able to impose his own preferences on the 
military without consultation with the high command. In China, 
this resulted in the bitter lessons of the Cultural Revolution when 
Mao forced factional politics into the PLA.5 Indeed, when politics 
enters the military, the military becomes politicised and fragmented, 
which gravely undermines national security. 
Deng Xiaoping believed that personal control may be a necessary 
evil when an overriding authority is needed to push through 
controversial reforms. This can best be seen from his incitement 
to Yang Baibing in 1992 to raise a slogan of'baojia huhang' (meaning 
that the PLA had a mission to protect Deng's reforms), in order 
to intimidate the first line party leaders who were thought to 
deviate from Deng's politicalline.This was the most serious military 
interference in Chinese domestic politics in the reform era, and 
in a way was not that different to when Mao drew the PLA into 
party factional infighting in 1966.6 
Deng, however, also realised the danger of this personal control 
to the nation's political stability and the PLA's professionalisation. 
He was keenly aware that he was the only person left in the Party 
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capable of exercising personal control over the PLA. He realised 
that there would be a vacuum of civilian control over the military 
after his death unless measures were taken while he was still alive. 
He saw personal control as an unhealthy form of civil-military 
relations that had to be eliminated. Consciously or unconsciously, 
he actually campaigned for a kind of objective control in his last 
years and tried to establish institutionalised civilian authority over 
the PLA. To this end, Deng dismissed the Yang brothers, despite 
the fact they were his closest personal friends, largely because 
they represented a group of politically ambitious officers that could 
potentially form a second power centre vis-c'J-Vis Jiang Zemin, 
chairman of the CMC (the Central Military Commission). In this 
way, Deng placed national interests above his personal feelings-a 
great historical service to long-term stability in the PRC. More 
importantly, he tried to enhance the institutional authority of the 
CMC chair in the hands of a civilian leader. First, he retained for 
his successor all the institutional powers he held.Among these is 
the power of final veto over personnel appointments and ultimate 
control of the nuclear button. Second, he promoted a number of 
professionally-minded generals to key posts in the military. These 
generals had no political ambition and were not interested in 
ideological dispute. Third, Deng endorsed the CMC's new idea of 
shifting the PLA's national defence strategy from his own notion 
of 'fighting a people's war under modern conditions' to 'fighting a 
regional war under high-tech conditions', a move which helped 
unify the strategic thinking of the whole PLA.7 
In the meantime, Jiang, with Deng's backing, strengthened the 
management process over the PLA. The most important measure 
in this regard was to establish clearer lines of power and 
responsibility with the chair of the CMC as commander-in-chief. 
The decisions that the chair can make personally and what he has 
to discuss in the meetings of the CMC and in the meetings of the 
Politburo Standing Committee are now defined clearly. Meetings 
of this standing committee are important in that the guiding 
of decisionmaking there is collective leadership. This 
institutionalises civilian authority over the generals and prevents 
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another strongman emerging to take over the military. Clear 
provisions are now in place which establish how policy powers 
are divided between the military and civilian leaderships.8 
Progress in institutionalising civil-military relations in the post-
Deng era can be attributed to the efforts of both Party and PLA 
leaders to establish regulations governing the bilateral interactions. 
First, regulations have been introduced to prevent civilian and 
military leaders from involving themselves in areas outside their 
responsibilities-a phenomenon which, in the past, has been the 
catalyst for the formation of party factions and political-military 
alliances. In the last decade, there have been no signs of party 
leaders trying to infiltrate and influence the military with their 
own power manoeuvring, and vice-versa.As the military is effectively 
insulated from civilian politics, the PLA high command is able to 
maintain a high level of autonomy. As a result, unity in the military 
leadership has reached a level unseen since the late 1950s. 
Second, both Party and military leaders cooperate to prevent 
general intra-party policy debate escalating into factional strife.A 
series of codes of conduct have been implemented for consensus 
building, including extensive consultation, debate in Party/PLA fora 
and decisionmaking that takes all affected interests into 
consideration. Efforts are made to limit the scope for disputes 
between civilian and military leaders to intensify and get out of 
control. Specifically, there is stricter division of power in relation 
to policy formulation regarding civil and military matters. Basically, 
PLA leaders distance themselves from interfering with non-military 
decisions and civilian leaders are forbidden from interfering in 
military administration. On issues of national security, the Politburo, 
with the participation of top PLA commanders, is the locus of 
decisionmaking power. In addition, stronger channels of 
communication have been developed between relevant government 
departments in the fields of foreign affairs and defence. Various 
inter-departmental leadership groups composed of both civilian 
and military leaders have been set up to coordinate China's 
international pursuits.9 
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The changing role of the military in Chinese 
politics 
As pointed out by Harry Harding, the military's role in national 
politics has been characterised by an intriguing paradox. On the 
one hand, the PLA possesses an impressive array of resources 
with which to influence national policy. On the other hand, the 
PLA has never seriously challenged the civilian leadership on any 
major policies, even on those related to national defence. 10 On 
the contrary, it has been ordered to do things which are in direct 
conflict with its own interests. One typical example was the Party's 
deliberate policy to reduce the military budget throughout the 
1980s. Deng asked the military to exercise patience with, and 
tolerance to, this policy even though it gravely undermined the 
PLA's modernisation efforts. 11 Similarly, the PLA was ordered to 
give up the bulk of its industrial and commercial interests in 1998. 
This eliminated a substantial proportion of the PLA's extra-budgetary 
income, adversely affecting the living standards of a large number of 
service men and women. Generally speaking, the civilian authorities 
have maintained an impressive balance between providing the PLA 
a privileged position in the country's governing process and placing 
constraints on the PLA's exercise of political influence. 
Three factors may offer an explanation of this paradox. The first 
is historical, but may no longer be valid. 12 For a long time the PLA 
was fragmented because it was made up of a number of relatively 
independent field armies. This prevented it from developing a 
complete corporate identity. Civilian leaders also often adopted a 
divide and rule strategy, pitting one group of senior officers against 
another in Party politics. Therefore, individual generals from 
different service origins were constantly involved in the Party 
power strugglesY Without a concerted voice in talking to civilian 
leaders, the potential influence of the PLA was greatly curtailed 
The second factor limiting the PLA's political influence is 
institutional. The ultimate sign of the Party's effective control over 
the military is the appointment of a civilian as commander-in-chief. 
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The military may have some influence over the choice of candidate 
but does not have veto power over this vital issue. From the 
outset, the Party established a complete set of controlling 
institutions within the military-the network of party committees 
and political departments which are charged with missions of 
personnel management, discipline reinforcement, ideological 
indoctrination, internal security, welfare and recreational activities. 
Party functionaries are active officers with military rank equal to 
the commanders. This is the foundation of the 'double commander-
in-chief system' (shuangzhangzhi) in the PLA.This web of institutional 
controls has been quite effective, providing a means for Party 
leaders to interfere in PLA affairs. 
The third factor is cultural. Throughout Chinese history, civilian 
control over the military has been the rule, while military 
intervention has always been strongly denounced.Aithough military 
involvement in politics has occurred from time to time, this was 
mostly when the central government was on the verge of collapse 
or when no effective civilian government existed at all. Since ancient 
times, the military has always been subject to a powerful cultural 
pressure to obey orders from the civilian leadership, particularly 
the emperors. 14 In the nineteenth century, the army took advantage 
of national chaos to become the most powerful institution in 
China.As peace and stability gradually returned and China embarked 
on a path of deradicalisation in the late 1970s, this cultural tradition 
of civilian supremacy over soldiers was restored. This is one of the 
reasons why Jiang Zemin, a civilian with no military experience 
whatsoever, has been able to command the PLA with relative ease. 
Despite all these constraints, the PLA is still the dominant political 
institution in the PRC. And it pursues its political and corporate 
interest powerfully. It draws its strength and influence from many 
sources. First, it is a large and disciplined organisation that controls 
lethal weapons. Its internal structure is far more cohesive than 
that of any other political and social organisation in the country. 
As in other countries, the numerical, organisational, economic, 
and coercive weight of the military easily makes it a force nobody 
can safely ignore. 15 
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The second source of PLA power is its legitimacy among the 
majority of the population. The PLA was long viewed by the 
population as the best army China had ever seen. It helped restore 
order in the country after over a century of chaos. It lifted China's 
international status as a great power by fighting to a stalemate 
with the United States in Korea. It actively participated in the 
domestic economic construction and has contributed to natural 
disaster relief at a scale no other social organisation could hope 
to match. Mao's call to 'learn from the PLA' was genuinely answered 
by the people in the 1960s. 
The Cultural Revolution gravely tarnished the PLA's image, when 
it was involved in Party factional infighting and was used as an 
instrument of class struggle. The PLA worked hard to repair the 
damage during the Deng era but suffered another major setback 
in 1989. For a while, the notion that the PLA was a people's army 
seemed far from reality. 
After more than a decade, however, the PLA's public image and 
standing has reached a new high. During the 1990s, the PLA was 
involved in numerous disaster relief efforts. Its fight against the 
massive flooding across the country in 1998 moved many TV 
viewers, as they saw over one hundred PLA generals and more 
than 500,000 soldiers working on the river banks day and night to 
save the lives of a large number of ordinary people. Certainly the 
population resent the level of corruption amongst PLA personnel 
and the privileges attached to the organisation. On balance, the 
PLA is still respected, especially in rural areas. It is regarded as 
indispensable for maintaining social order. This public support gives 
the PLA an advantage in its interactions with other political 
institutions in China. 
The third source of PLA power is institutional and rests on the 
politically independent status of the CMC.The CMC wields power 
with a high level of autonomy. Officially, it occupies the same level 
in the Party hierarchy as the State Council and the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress. Theoretically, it is 
under the Politburo in the hierarchy, but in reality it largely 
operates outside the Politburo's reach. This is because Mao 
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deliberately separated the government and military systems under 
the formula of 'zhengzhijiu yi zheng, junwei yi jun'-the Politburo's 
realm is state affairs and the CMC's is military affairs. Deng inherited 
this tradition.The CMC reported its affairs only to him throughout 
the 1980s. Following his two predecessors, Jiang has made efforts 
to prevent his Politburo colleagues from becoming involved in 
CMC affairs. The CMC has created its own autonomous power 
centre and enjoys the final say on many things ranging from 
personnel to legal, commercial and cultural matters. Reflecting 
the notion that political power comes from the barrel of a gun, 
whoever controls the CMC becomes the ultimate ruler of the 
nation. Jiang's rise in the Party is due largely to the fact that he has 
been accepted by the PLA as undisputed chair of the CMC.As a 
result, the Party and the PLA are jointly coordinated under Jiang 
as party boss and commander-in-chief. 
These changes show the PLA transforming gradually from a 
revolutionary army driven by ideological ferment to a professional, 
increasingly depoliticised military, conscious more of the national 
security issues and inclined less to get involved in intra-party 
factional activities. The PLA has acquired a cohesive corporate 
identity. Its corporate interest is best protected when there are 
no destructive outside intrusions. As the symbiotic relationship 
weakens, the PLA's new identity will affect its relations with the 
Party. This can be further seen from an analysis of the PLA's efforts 
at professionalisation. 
professionalism corporate 
The PLA has been a professional military all along, even though it 
has taken many other missions regarded as non-military by Western 
standards. It is unlikely that a non-professional military could fight 
to a stalemate with the powerful US army as the PLA did in the 
Korean War. The PLA has long been called a revolutionary 
professional army, similar to the nature of the Israeli armed forces. 
In the last two decades, however, the Chinese military has lost its 
revolutionary nature but is increasingly showing signs of becoming 
a fully professional organisation. 
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One major aspect of CCP-PLA relations before the Dengist 
reforms was the strong ideological current in the armed forces. 
Ideological control was an integral part of Party control over the 
PLA Therefore, the PLA became class-based and an ideological 
model for the rest of society. Since the 1980s, the ideological 
foundation of the PRC has gradually shifted towards nationalism. 16 
This has had a profound impact on civil-military relations. First, 
ideology is seen as being too abstract to serve as a basis for the 
modernisation efforts of the PLA-an ideologically inclined military 
would reject professionalism as a primary goal of the armed forces. 
Second, it is easier for the Party and the PLA to find common 
ground in nationalism, specifically defined as national sovereignty, 
national reunification, territorial integrity, vital economic interests 
and national prestige in world affairs. As the PLA is no longer 
required to serve the narrow purposes of the working class, it is 
able to embrace a wider definition of national interests, and is 
thus more readily accepted by the population, which has been 
growing increasingly cynical about communist ideology. Third, as 
Party-military relations are guided by common national goals rather 
than ideological correctness, there is less need for the Party to 
indoctrinate the soldiers forcefully-soldiers pick up patriotism 
themselves. Bilateral relations consequently become easier to 
maintain. 
new strategic guidelines 
One key measure of a professional military is its defence strategy. 
Since 1949, the PLA has altered its defence strategy several times, 
shifting from following Mao's people's war doctrine to adoption 
of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as the guide for 
modernisation. With this evolutionary process the PLA has 
gradually shifted from being a tool of revolution required by the 
people's war principle to the guardian of national security with an 
emphasis on external missions. Indeed, the RMA type of war cannot 
be targeted against domestic enemies. The PLA's adoption of RMA 
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has provided a timely guideline for improvements in its national 
defence strategy, both in theory and in practice. PLA generals are 
now trying to translate the RMA concepts into their professional 
war preparation-they are now more convinced than ever that 
winning a hi-tech war requires hardware superiority, sound tactics, 
and a suitable force structure. In 1993, the CMC put forward a 
new national defence strategy as a guide for modernisation of the 
PLA.The current campaign of disseminating RMA ideas within the 
Chinese military will further improve this strategy and address its 
doctrinal defects. 17 First, the new strategy stresses the necessity 
of forward defence, recognising that in a high-tech war the enemy 
can launch precision strikes from long distance. 18 While expanding 
defence depth may not stop long-range attacks, if the enemy can 
be effectively engaged in the outer defence line, the PLA may at 
least inflict greater human losses on the enemy and secure precious 
early warning for further defensive mobilisation. 
Second, the high-tech strategy is largely an offensive oriented 
strategy, reflecting the shift in emphasis from the 'defensive' 
towards the 'active' side of war preparation. Following the Gulf 
War, the PLA quickly realised that high-tech wars will not be fought 
along fixed defence lines. Trench warfare will rarely occur. 
Accordingly, China's military approach has changed from yifang 
weizhu fangfan jiehe, or 'defence as overall posture, offence as the 
supplement', to linghuo fanying gong fang jiehe, or 'adroit response 
based on a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities'. 
Technological innovation has increasingly blurred the boundaries 
between offensive and defensive weaponry. Digital battlefield, 
electronic soft kill, and pinpoint elimination of the enemy's key 
targets all indicate that it is the offensive side that can seize the 
first initiative of the war and has the best chance of success. The 
offensive posture and pre-emptive strike are especially crucial 
for a weak military at the beginning of a high-tech war. 19 
Third, the strategy is forward-leaning. Its high-tech focus aims 
mainly at defence against strategic concerns, namely the major 
military powers. At the same time, the strategy is flexible in 
principle, catering to different scenarios, from major wars to small-
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scale border conflicts.This is the PLA's response to China's changing 
security environment in the post Cold War era. The new strategy 
is also forward-looking, geared to preparation for action in the 
new century. It prescribes concrete measures for weapons 
programs, force organisation, campaign tactics, and research 
priorities, which are not aimed at equipping the PLA in the next 
few years but at the frontiers of hi-tech breakthroughs some 
decades from now.20 
What is the significance of this new military thinking to the 
professionalisation of the PLA? Simply put, it has set a proper 
direction for development. Without a sound strategic theoretical 
framework, even if the PLA acquired sophisticated weaponry in 
the new century, this weaponry could not be used to its full 
potential.21 Proper guidelines, high-tech weaponry, and a foresighted 
vision for development form the basis of a much more open and 
pragmatic PLA. 
Creating an elite officer corps 
No more than ten people remain in the military leadership who 
joined the Party before the founding of the PRC.And they will all 
depart the scene in less than three years. Soon the revolutionary 
tradition will disappear from the PLA. This will certainly facilitate 
professionalisation.Aiready the majority of top office holders are 
highly-educated technocrats without personal experience in 
revolution. They are imbued with common sense and scientific 
knowledge, but they lack the spirit of radicalism that characterised 
earlier military leaders in China. The result is that they are less 
likely to form factions among themselves along political and 
ideological lines. This new tendency can be seen more dearly at 
the lower levels in the PLA. Now 600,000 officers (90 per cent of 
the whole officer corps) have higher education qualifications, 
20,000 officers have a Masters degree and over 4,000 officers 
have doctoral degrees. This new organisational make-up marks a 
dear break from the PLA's earlier tendencies.22 Sooner rather 
than later the PLA will become further depoliticised and de-
ideologised. 
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The fundamental change has gone much deeper than the 
organisational make-up of the officer corps. There are many other 
signs of professionalisation resulting from the change of guard. 
The PLA high command has substantially reformed military training 
and education. Officers have to go through an extended period 
of re-learning to meet the new requirements of fighting wars in 
the new era. Now, all military officers have to study new 
technologies, handle computers and get familiar with the targeted 
enemy forces. Promotion is closely tied to their study efforts. 
One of the assessment criteria is the extent and quality of their 
published material in both academic journals and internal policy 
debate. For instance, to be promoted into senior posts each officer 
must undertake a period of intensive study in the 'advanced class 
of generals' in the PLA National Defence University.23 It is said 
that the CMC chairman and vice-chairmen all read the students' 
graduation theses. In this way they are able to identify talented 
successors from this class. 
Wang Zhuxun's promotion serves as a telling example of the 
emerging elite nature of the PLA officers corps. He was 
commander-in-chief of the 14th Group Army when he joined the 
class for generals in the early 1990s. He wrote a graduation thesis 
entitled The Strategic Path of Yunnan, which argued that if there 
were a war on China's coast, China's strategic path through the 
Pacific would be blocked. This would seriously affect China's 
economy because more than two-thirds of China's exports and 
imports follow this route. Then he suggested that China should 
prepare an alternative strategic path that would, according to his 
opinion, run from Yunnan through Burma to the Indian Ocean. His 
thesis caught the attention of General Zhan Zhen, the third most 
senior military leader in China, who passed it onto Jiang Zemin. 
Jiang also praised the thesis highly, claiming that Wang Zhuxun was 
exactly the kind of person needed for the military modernisation, 
a person who had broad strategic vision.Wang was later promoted 
to the post of commander-in-chief of military region. More 
generally, almost all the current top office holders have an 
impressive list of publications. This has lifted the PLA's level of 
professionalism. 
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Wars and responsibilities 
How does China's international behaviour fulfil its responsibilities 
as a major world power? This is a tricky question. People can hold 
different interpretations of what is responsible. One nation can 
perceive its behaviour on the world stage to be quite reasonable 
but other states may think just the opposite. Despite the increased 
strength of liberalism and the democratic peace thesis in the post 
Cold War era, the world is in reality still dominated by nation-
states pursuing national interest above everything else. The best 
example of this is the US efforts to build NMD regardless of the 
opinions of the world community, including western countries. 
Serving national interests as the top mission 
In the history of the PRC, the PLA has been involved in nine wars 
and armed conflicts. These can be roughly divided into two 
groups-wars fought for ideological reasons and wars fought for 
the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
The first group includes the Korean War with the United States in 
the 1950s, the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet border 
conflict in 1969, the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 and the Sino-
Vietnamese border clash in the first half of the 1980s. The second 
group is comprised of the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962, 
extension of the civil war with the Guomindang (GMD) in the 
1950s and 1960s, the suppression of the Tibetan Revolt in 1959, 
the recovery of Xisha Island in 1974, and the maritime clash with 
Vietnam in 1988. Some cases in the second category were not 
without ideological motivation. 
The number of wars that China initiated or was forced to launch 
has been declining. Most of the actions were taken in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and no war involving China took place in the 1990s. 
This downward trend has underscored two important facts. First, 
after China gave up treating other nations with any ideological 
prejudice, the reason for war was significantly reduced. Second, 
even though China has always adopted a non-negotiable approach 
towards sovereignty and territorial issues, it realised in the 1980s 
that as a responsible international player it should always place 
peaceful settlement of disputes above military threat.24 Professor 
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lain Johnston of Harvard University found that China's involvement 
in militarised disputes diminished over the period 1949-92 and 
found that this correlated with a reduction in border controversies 
and an increased sense of status internationally. And this was 
correlated with China's greater economic interdependence with 
the world economic system.25 
This fundamental change has been behind the abandonment of 
Mao's slogan of 'liberating' Taiwan in 1979. Deng's proposal to 
settle Hong Kong and Taiwan problems with a formula of 'one 
country, two systems' was the best offer China could make for a 
matter concerning national sovereignty. At the same time, China 
also proposed to other countries that territorial disputes should 
be resolved through dialogue and mutually acceptable terms. 
Under this guideline, China has successfully reached border 
agreements with Russia, Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Burma, 
Pakistan and Vietnam. Its land border negotiation with India is 
progressing well at this moment. All this has shown that China 
sincerely holds the principle of peaceful reunification of the lost 
territories. Indeed, China has made more concessions than its 
counterparts in all these negotiations. Contrary to the claim that 
China has an expansionist agenda, we can see that the Chinese map 
is smaller now than at any time in the last century.And its presence 
in the South China Sea is the smallest among all the claimants.26 
Removing the ideological basis for war and emphasising peaceful 
settlement of territorial disputes represented major progress 
toward China becoming a responsible member of the international 
community. This is derived from China's overriding national goal 
of economic development. Objectively speaking, the PLA has never 
been opposed to dropping military threat as the foundation of 
foreign and defence policy. It was the primary victim in various 
wars fought along these lines. It paid a heavy price in achieving a 
stalemate with the United States in the Korean War and it almost 
suffered a nuclear surgical strike from the USSR in the 1969. China's 
peace-centred foreign initiative in the post-Mao era has given the 
PLA an opportunity to tackle its major problem-backward 
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equipment. As a professional army and a key component of the 
Party-state, however, the PLA has never wavered in carrying out 
orders of war from the civilian leadership. As a tool of revolution 
in the past it viewed the United States as an imperialist power and 
the USSR as a revisionist enemy. In settling territorial disputes, it 
crossed the border to attack several of its neighbours. In the 
absence of revolutionary zeal, the PLA will have to forge a new 
identity and a new mission. If this new role is to serve as guardian 
of national interests, to what extent will this affect its external 
behaviour? Does this role promote modernisation efforts? These 
are crucial questions that may cause disagreement between the 
civilian and military leaders. So far there has not been any major 
conflict but tension is always beneath the surface, since an 
economics-in-command political line may delay many key arms 
upgrading programs, owing to the relatively low priority allocated 
to developing the military. 
It is necessary to define how PLA generals see the concept of 
national interests. First, the PLA's role in the national interest is 
to secure the PRC from the external threat. Second, national 
interests entail efforts to guarantee the integrity of national 
territories, including efforts to recover territories lost due to 
China's historical weakness.Aithough it is very unlikely that China 
will be invaded, it suffers constant intimidation from Western 
powers-the 1989 sanctions, the forced inspection of the Yin He 
shipment, the de facto containment and the continuing Cold War 
mentality of 'peaceful evolution'. The interventionist tendency in 
international relations worries the PLA and this has made its 
responsibility to recover lost territories an even heavier burden 
to shoulder. China does have human rights problems and ethnic 
conflicts at home-separatist movements are active in Tibet and 
Xinjiang and receive international support. Taiwan's ongoing drift 
away from the mainland poses an immediate challenge to the PLA. 
All this has convinced the PLA that it is living in a hostile world,27 
and the cruel truth is that it is far from being ready to face the 
challenge. 
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The war or peace discourse 
The reduced involvement of the PLA in the country's domestic 
politics has, as mentioned earlier, reduced the scope for 
disagreements between the civilian and military leaders over 
internal policy. This is especially true in the economic field. The 
PLA does not have any serious disagreement with the market-
oriented reforms, although it believes that they have created new 
challenges to the maintenance of its corporate cohesion.28 1n terms 
of politics, the PLA probably supported Jiang's surprisingly hard line 
response to Falun Gong in 1999-another example of Party and 
military sharing vital interests in the monopoly of power. In terms 
of military policies, the PLA has had a high level of autonomy in 
military administration and Party interference has been minimal 
since the early 1990s.The Party sometimes denies specific military 
demands for weapons development, such as when it vetoed the 
PLA's request to build an aircraft carrier. On the whole, however, 
the CCP tries to meet the military's hardware upgrading needs. It 
does this partly because it recognises that continued relations are 
founded on give and take, but also because a powerful army helps 
the Party consolidate its power. 
In the area of foreign and defence policy, however, discord is 
discernible between the two, mostly related to how to respond 
to events in Sino-US and cross-Strait relations. The mainstream 
civilian leadership is now composed of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, 
both of whom are more pro-West than their predecessors and 
possibly even their successors. They were trained in the Western-
style universities in the 1940s. Although strong nationalism 
propelled them to join the revolution then, they all had an 
unfulfilled dream of studying in the United States. And their world 
outlook is wider than those who will form the core of the fourth 
generation leadership which received communist education in the 
1950s and 1960s.They know that China now has its best chance in 
many centuries to become economically rich and militarily 
powerful. The military threat to China is minimal, except for foreign 
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involvement in the Taiwan Strait. The world situation is mostly 
peaceful and will remain so for a long time. The domestic situation 
is fairly stable, thanks to both political restrictions and economic 
growth. So China's security should be enhanced through promoting 
world peace.29 The only thing that could hinder the rise of China is 
war with Taiwan. 
This is the reason why the civilian leaders have decided that 
China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era should be non-
confrontational towards the West. The bottom line of this policy 
guideline is to handle the Western challenge cleverly in order to 
create a stable international environment for China's economic 
take-off.This is the key principle Deng laid down for his successors.30 
Following this principle, Jiang always takes a long-term perspective 
in handling acute conflicts with the West. Even if the quarrels 
involve matters of Chinese sovereignty-for example, US arms 
sales to Taiwan-Jiang tries to leave room for compromise later 
for the sake of maintaining at least a workable economic 
relationship. The exception to this was China's policy towards 
NATO's Kosovo war. 31 
At times this may present a problem for the military. But the 
PLA has so far not challenged Jiang's soft foreign policy tone. As 
mentioned earlier, the PLA has become increasingly externally-
oriented and non-interventionist towards intra-party politics. This 
makes the job of the civilian control over the armed forces a lot 
easier for the post-Deng leaders, quite contrary to many analysts' 
predictions. No one dismisses the fact that the PLA still wields 
enormous political influence, especially at times of succession. Yet 
the PLA chooses to use that influence prudently and selectively. 
On the whole, its weight has been most clearly felt in areas of 
foreign and defence policies. This is a key political role played by 
the PLA, but it does not fall outside range of activities considered 
legitimate by western countries. 
The PLA has for some time been prevented from taking tough 
attitudes towards international politics. It tolerated the suppression 
of its budget increase for a decade in the 1980s. Reacting to the 
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civilian request, the military pledged not to use force to resolve 
the South China Sea dispute in 1993 when other claimants 
continued to occupy islets in dispute. It voiced its support for 
Jiang's peace initiative towards Taiwan, embodied in his 
pronouncement that 'Chinese do not fight Chinese' in 1995, despite 
its full awareness that the move would not work.When its program 
of upgrading land and sea-based long-range nuclear missiles was at 
a crucial stage of development, the PLA accepted the civilian leaders' 
1997 decision that China should stop nuclear tests. Moreover, it 
let go of its vast economic and commercial machine in 1998 at the 
order of the Party. Of course all this was not done without a level 
of disgruntlement on the part of the PLA Yet, the fact that the 
PLA has accepted what was imposed upon it indicates that it is 
conscious of the international trend towards peace and is trying 
to adapt to the new circumstances. Another major factor is the 
current transitional difficulties in the PLA's weapons R & D. Large 
numbers of new high-tech weapons designs have just passed the 
laboratory test and it will take many more years for them to 
become deployable. The top commanders know that this is not 
time to take action and are taking advantage of the West's 
engagement strategy toward China to further the country's 
defence modernisation. 32 
The post-Deng civilian leadership does not disagree with the 
PLA's perception of external threat to China's national interests. 
Discord arises in deciding how to handle the threat. This concerns 
the timing for a major counter-offensive, its intensity, and the way 
of retreating from a clash. Generally speaking, the military would 
like to see a hardline reaction to challenges to China's sovereignty, 
including the threat of military force. In contrast, the civilian 
leadership would have more to consider in a crisis-the economic 
consequences, international outcry, and the long-term effects on 
national interests. This discord is still more technical than 
fundamental at this stage. Civilian leaders have been successful in 
convincing PLA generals that if the Chinese military is not ready 
for a major action, it is in the PLA's best interests not to be dragged 
into a war prematurely. The question is how long the PLA will 
continue to accept this argument if it does not receive a firm 
124 
The formulation of Chinese defence and foreign policy 
commitment from civilian leaders to address the problem of 
military backwardness. The debate between a soft vs. hardline 
response to Western threat may escalate to the point where the 
overall direction of national development is altered. Recent world 
events, such as the enhanced US-Japan military alliance, Lee 
Tenghui's 'two-state' thesis, NATO's bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, and Chen Shuibian's election victory in Taiwan, 
have placed the civilian and military leadership at a crossroads. 
The PLA will not always take whatever is imposed upon it by 
civilian leaders at any cost.As guardian of national interests it will 
have to raise its voice when it believes the civilian leadership has 
compromised too much. This is most vividly reflected in the PLA's 
attitudes towards Taiwan. The PLA missile launches in 1995-96 
carried a clear message for the Taiwanese leadership: do not force 
our hand. Yet at the time, Jiang was still under illusions that the 
two sides could work out something peacefully.After Lee Tenghui's 
US visit in May 1995,Jiang was under pressure from PLA generals 
and state security personnel to revise the 'one centre, two basic-
points' guiding principle set by Deng for China's modernisation. 
The military sought to add to Deng's 'one centre' (the economics 
in command) another centre, namely safeguarding national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, which may mean a major 
military build-up. Indeed, Deng once told PLA leaders that the 
PLA should see protection of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as the state's primary task.33 This provided PLA generals 
with a powerful weapon to demand a high level of preparedness. 
The Politburo's Beidaihe conference in August 1995 put an end 
to the debate, for a while, and upheld Deng's non-confrontational 
diplomatic principle, after Jiang persuaded the participants that it 
was not time to confront the West. 34 The same Beidaihe 
conference in 1999, however, came to the new conclusion that 
NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy exposed the bottom 
line of the West's policy toward China. Choice between peace 
and war was no longer in Beijing's hands. The civilian leaders, as 
pointed out by senior PLA officers, decided in a timely and resolute 
manner to enhance the intensity of military modernisation. The 
Party centre promised that the PLA would acquire the capacity 
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to win a high-tech war with a major military power as quickly as 
possible. Obviously this would require a substantial increase in the 
national defence budget. Although promoting economic 
development is still the Party's central task, the civilian leaders' 
position in handling the contradiction between economic 
construction and military modernisation has tilted toward what 
the PLA has argued for all along.35 The consequences of such a 
policy direction are profound. The Chinese leaders have now 
dropped Deng's assertion that major wars could be avoided. Their 
current assessment of the world order has been most pessimistic 
since the beginning of the 1980s. The bombing of the Chinese 
embassy has imposed great urgency on China's defence 
modernisation. In late 1999, Jiang issued orders on behalf of the 
Politburo to the participants of the PLA chief-of-staff conference 
that the PLA should accelerate military readiness for war.36 While 
economics is still in command, more national resources will be 
devoted to military build-up.37 
Yet it is interesting to note that, despite his supportive remarks 
on a quickened military build-up, Jiang has been reluctant to move 
China in a direction that can be interpreted as militarist.Whenever 
there are major international events damaging China's national 
interests he stresses the hard side of the policy. Whenever the 
tension eases, however, he retreats from his commitment to 
immediate war preparation. The same is true of Zhu Rongji. His 
tough talk in theApri12000 news conference, in which he addressed 
the question of Taiwan's presidential election, should be seen in 
the same light. Taiwan is a likely area where China's civilian and 
military leadership may differ in their policy emphasis for a long 
time to come. 
Conclusion 
There has been a change in relations between the Party and the 
PLAin China. The passing of the first and second generation party 
and military leaders has reduced the scope of the intervention of 
the military in domestic politics. The PLA is increasingly presenting 
itself as a separate identity with distinctive corporate spirit and 
interests. Professionalism, as embodied in the slogan of winning 
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the next major high-tech war; has been set as the ultimate goal 
for military modernisation. All this has made it possible for the 
PLAto transform itself from the tool of revolution to the guardian 
of national security. On the other hand, the PLA has no quarrel 
with the Party's command over the gun. Party control is seen as 
legitimate because the Party is the founder of the PLA in the first 
place. More importantly, the military sees benefits in protecting 
the Party, with which it shares vital vested interests. This has given 
rise to a relationship of give and take. If we observe this relationship 
in the longer term, however, we may see cracks in the relationship. 
As a highly professionalised organisation, the military will very likely 
outlive the CCP as a political party in power, which may either 
collapse if it cannot curtail its internal decay due to corruption or 
lose office to another new political party if fundamental political 
reform is introduced. Therefore the current Party-military 
relationship is undergoing transitory change, although this period 
of transition will necessarily be long. 
The interaction between the military and the Party's third 
generation leadership is particularly indicative of the shared ties 
of give and take. In the last decade the military finally rid itself of 
the strongmen's personal control. As a result it has achieved a 
much higher level of autonomy. This is actually the most important 
reason for the PLA to accept Jiang Zemin, a political player who 
has never posed any threat to the PLA's vital interests. As far as 
civilian leaders are concerned, they will have to rely more on 
institutional power rather than personal authority to influence 
the military. The rules of the game are clearer than before. As a 
result relations between the Party and the PLA are easier to 
manage, but in the long run of time this trend will facilitate the 
divorce between the Party and the military in the form of a 
depoliticised and state-run military. 
This progress does not preclude the possibility of the military 
taking hard line attitudes towards matters of national security. The 
efforts of professionalisation may focus the eyes of officers and 
men away from domestic concerns. The top mission of securing 
national interests may cause the PLA's external functions to be 
perceived as aggressive. Especially when the PLA is eager to fight 
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for national territorial integrity, it may be viewed as sabre rattling. 
This is exactly the case with the Taiwan problem. The PLA will not 
initiate any action across the Strait without a reason because this 
does not serve the interests of China and the PLA. Particularly 
with the question ofTaiwan, the choice between peace and war is 
no longer in the hands of the CCP leadership. Here the PLA may 
differ with its civilian commanders over an estimate of the 
geostrategic situation. Both of them may agree that more efforts 
must be made to empower the military and both of them may 
even agree that war may be inevitable, but, whereas the civilian 
leadership sees the possibility of prolonging the peace and the 
benefits of placing economic ahead of military needs, the military 
calculates its capability according to a worst case scenario and 
thus demands more inputs. So far there has not been a serious 
rift but that situation could easily change in a crisis. Eventually the 
civilian leadership will have to go along with the military, probably 
with the fourth generation of the Party core, because it dares not 
carry the blame of betraying national interests. We may see a 
Chinese military that will in the future become more assertive in 
assuming external missions. 
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China's growing participation in international organisations 
provides a source and mark of its expanding power, and a measure 
of its increased global commitments and responsibilities. 1 Its 
effective entry into the global community occurred thirty years 
ago when, on 26 October 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 2758 to transfer the seat of China in the United Nations 
from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the People's 
Republic of China (PRC).2 following as it did a sustained period of 
Chinese isolationism and revolutionary paranoia, this development 
was universally hailed with relief, tinged with some lingering anxiety. 
Any initial concern within the international community about the 
potential problems associated with China's entry was, however, 
soon dispelled by the continuing domestic turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution, then by the enticing prospects of China's market 
reforms and by China's modest, self-assigned role as a learner in 
global affairs. Despite its sudden international prominence, China 
was slow to participate in most of the UN's affiliated agencies-it 
did not join the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) or fully 
participate in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) until 
well after Mao's death in September 1976. 
By the mid 1990s, only twenty years later, the scene had shifted. 
China was emerging as a great power, economically, politically and 
militarily, and one which was highly influential in international 
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organisations. In terms of its increasing impact on international 
and regional politics and its influence in global issue areas of security, 
the environment, the international political economy and human 
rights, it even enjoyed the ascribed role of a superpower. As the 
international community began to feel the impact of China's 
burgeoning economic growth and its increased international 
assertiveness, scholars and statesmen alike began worrying about 
its place and role in a rapidly globalising world. Increasingly, they 
questioned the degree to which its domestic and international 
policies reflected an ability to co-exist peacefully and cooperatively 
with the international community.3 
By 2000, China had become a member of over 50 inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) and I ,275 international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs). This contrasted with the 
situation in 1966, when it was a member of only one 
intergovernmental organisation and 58 international non-
governmental organisations.4 In terms of numbers of IGOs, by 
2000 China ranked seventh in the Asia Pacific region behind Japan, 
India, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Malaysia. In terms of 
its membership of INGOs, China was placed sixth in the region 
behind Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand and South Korea.5 
It goes without saying that, for China, membership of 
international organisations is critical.6 It is also critical for the global 
community, not only because of its implications for global power 
distribution but because, apart from their many other functions, 
international organisations are seen to contribute significantly to 
the international socialisation of participating states. International 
organisations and their treaty regimes not only ensure 
transparency, cut transaction costs, build capacity, and enhance 
dispute settlement, but also, through a process of 'jawboning', 
persuade parties to 'explore, redefine and sometimes discover' 
their own, and mutual, interests. 7 In this sense, they may be 
understood broadly as the institutional representations of 
interdependence, constituting a 'collective organising response to 
a multiplicity of 'traffic' control problems in a world of 
contradictory trends'.8 Yet, for the same reason, they represent a 
challenge to the state. Participation in international organisations 
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both confirms sovereignty and constrains it. Management of the 
problem of sovereignty is thus a highly complex matter. For each 
state it is a question of steering between the benefits for 
sovereignty that membership of international organisations and 
regimes entails, and the potential threat to sovereignty that it 
implies. 9 The power conferred on states by international 
organisational participation is balanced by the increased 
responsibility such participation entails. 
The following overview of the goals underlying China's active 
engagement in international organisations, and of the means by 
which it pursues them, sheds light on its practical understanding of 




While China's leaders appreciate that membership of international 
organisations enhances China's power and status and is essential 
to participation in globalisation and modernisation, they are also 
alive to the problems posed by international citizenship. President 
Jiang Zemin has both welcomed interdependence and warned of 
the threats posed by economic interdependence for North-South 
relations, the centrifugal and centripetal pressures that it exerts 
on the economy, the social and environmental ills that it entails, 
and the possible impact on China's economic growth rate. Yet he 
has also acknowledged the responsibility that interdependence 
places on China to broaden its understanding of the world. 10 Indeed, 
the extent of China's shift in this respect was reflected in Jiang's 
speech at a Royal Banquet in the United Kingdom (UK) on 19 
October 1999, which expressed his pride and confidence in China's 
status as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council and revealed China's new readiness to view the United 
Kingdom, historically perceived as one of its oppressors, as one of 
its partners in international responsibility. 11 
However, other more defensive reactions within China stress 
the way in which international cooperation and interdependence 
protect and promote US hegemonic interests. 12 These reactions 
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mirror the general ambivalence about globalisation (quanqihua) 
which, unlike the concept of modernisation (xiandaihua), is seen 
to place China at serious risk of losing control over its own 
polkies. 13 This ambivalence explains China's insistence that 
interdependence and globalisation must not undermine state 
sovereignty. While formally recognising international organisations 
as subjects of international law, it has denied that they are 
'supranational' or political entities in the same sense as sovereign 
states. On the one hand, it looks to international organisations to 
confer international prestige, status and domestic legitimacy 14 and 
to solve the problems inherent in globalisation. On the other 
hand, it prefers to use bilateral mechanisms for the resolution of 
interstate or intrastate conflict and views international relations 
from a realist, or, as some would have it, cultural realist, rather 
than liberal, perspective. 15 
China difference? 
Samuel Kim has characterised China's attitude to international 
organisations as moving from a 'system-transforming' approach 
during the exclusion period of 1949-70 to a 'system-reforming' 
approach in the 1970s, to the 'system-maintaining and system-
exploiting' approach of the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, he has argued 
that China's international organisational behaviour is characterised 
by a 'maxi-mini approach', that is, a strategy of maximising the 
benefits of organisational participation through 'state-enhancing' 
rather than 'state-diminishing' functionalism and minimising 
normative costs and costs such as dependency and loss of 
sovereignty. 16 
Yet, is this behaviour an indication of a 'China difference'? It is 
important not to exaggerate the degree to which it is peculiar to 
China. A maxi-mini approach is adopted by most states, although 
most do not share the same history of attempting to transform 
the international system. Some scholars even appear to conclude 
that China has a negative attitude to interdependence simply 
because of its apparently self-interested motivation in acceding to 
treaties and joining international organisations. Yet most states 
ratify treaties and join international organisations for reasons of 
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self-interest, or, conversely, do not, as instanced by the failure of 
the US Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) in October 1999 and by US rejection of an increasing 
number of international treaties in 200 I. Moreover, the United 
States in particular claims special consideration and treatment in 
international organisations by virtue of its superior power and 
status. 17 
Nevertheless, the PRC's relative inexperience in the world of 
international organisations has meant that the last thirty years 
have involved a steep learning curve, mediated by its own ambitions, 
changing perceptions and unique perspectives. Its interaction has 
changed over the years, from the aloof posture of an outsider 
looking in and sizing up the game, to active participation and a 
lively, astute promotion of its national interests. China's complex 
identity as an incipient superpower, a permanent member of the 
Security Council wielding a veto, a member of the exclusive PS 
(Permanent Five) nuclear club, a developing state which is the 
chief beneficiary ofWorld Bank loans, and a socialist state previously 
exploited by imperialist powers, has given rise to conflicting 
concerns and idiosyncratic behaviour. Its Marxist principles and 
political culture continue to shape its particular motivations and 
perceptions, as well as its responses to international organisations. 
In particular, the doctrine of self-reliance and a fierce defence of 
sovereignty, if less egregious than in the Maoist years, remain 
constant influences underlying policy responses. Marxism coexists 
in the Chinese mindset with the more recent ideology of the 
laissez-faire market system-it has not been replaced. 18 Which 
particular reference point China invokes to justify its policy 
decisions depends very much on the context in which those 
decisions are made, on domestic political considerations and on 
the receptivity of the international community. 
Tactics 
Reflecting this unique character, China adopts a number of 
historically effective tactics in international organisations. One of them 
is its self-constructed identity as a 'Club of One'.As Tian Jiyun has 
pointed out, '[i]n international relations, China adheres to non-
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alignment and does not engage in formation of military blocs, arms 
race and military expansion. China upholds an independent foreign 
policy of peace and a defensive national defence policy'. 19 Within 
this separateness, China creates a space for itself to bend, according 
to circumstance or need, towards either the developing or the 
developed world. The flexibility of its tactics mirrors the flexibility 
of its ideology. Separateness and ambiguity enhance China's power, 
despite Gerald Segal's claims to the contrary in his controversial 
thesis querying whether China 'matters'.2° For instance, as Barry 
O'Neill has argued, of all the permanent members of the Security 
Council, China is the most powerful precisely because it stands 
alone with a veto at an extreme policy position.Thus, 'it is constantly 
using its veto or, rather, the threat to veto (actually or only 
implicitly), and so it is constantly making a difference'.21 In contrast, 
the United States is also at an extreme point, but it is arguably less 
powerful than China because other Western veto members adopt 
similar policy positions. 
China also has a tendency to free-ride where possible and to 
exploit its developing nation status. 22 Thus, for instance, although a 
member of the permanent five, China's contribution rate to the 
United Nation's regular budget is below I per cent.This rate, which 
in 1979 was reduced, at China's request, from 5.5 per cent to 0.79 
per cent, 23 compares with the 25 per cent paid by the United 
States and the 19.9 per cent paid by Japan, a country which is not 
even a member of the permanent five. China, however, insists on 
adhering to the 'principles on contributions that we must follow'. 24 
The United States is now attempting to increase China's 
contribution so that its own share may be reduced. 
Principles 
Numerous China scholars have noted the importance of moral 
principles in China's international organisational behaviour.25 These 
principles, which contrast with, but also buttress, pragmatic foreign 
policy goals, include the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
and the rights to national self-determination and independence. 
Within the context of international organisations, the most 
important of the Five Principles is sovereignty, which China defines 
solely in terms of state power. 
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China always maintains that all countries, regardless of 
their size, strength, and wealth, should be equal members 
of the international community. Peoples of various 
countries have the right to choose their social systems 
and development roads commensurate with their 
national conditions and should be able to decide the 
affairs of their own countries. All countries in the world 
must uphold the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.26 
For this reason, China places heavier emphasis on Article 2, 
paragraphs 4 and 7, of the UN Charter, which emphasise state 
sovereignty, including in particular the requirement that 'nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state' (Article 2.7), than on Articles 
56 and 55, wherein 'all Members pledge to take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the Organisation' to promote, inter 
alia, 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion' (Art. SSe). The Chinese formula is therefore 
far from the restrictive concept of sovereignty articulated by the 
UN Secretary-General. 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being 
redefined by the forces of globalisation and international 
cooperation. The state is now widely understood to be 
the servant of its people, and not vice versa. At the same 
time, individual sovereignty-and by this I mean the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and 
every individual as enshrined in the Charter-has been 
enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of 
every individual to control his or her destinyY 
In contrast to its moral principles, China's pragmatic goals are 
basically to preserve an external environment conducive to its 
own internal development and to enhance its international status. 
Yet, the relationship between moral principles and pragmatic 
policies is also a symbiotic one. China's moral stance disguises its 
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pragmatic goals and blurs the degree to which it is actually prepared 
to negotiate its sovereignty. Moral, particularly Marxist, principles 
also provide a bolt hole to which to return when domestic pressures 
and interests require a more assertive foreign policy stance. 
China's emphasis on sovereignty is in part a product of the fact 
that its past is never very far from its present and future. Its 
perception of itself as the victim of the imperialist powers, even 
though it was never completely colonised, means that its foreign 
policy is strongly oriented towards, and motivated by, past 
grievances in a way that few other states' policies are. Over the 
decades, and in spite of growing international power, its sense of 
historical grievance has become a vehicle of the nationalism which 
sporadically erupts, primarily as a response to domestic pressures. 
Emphasis on sovereignty is, moreover, a reflection of the extent 
to which China's international interaction carries with it 
considerable domestic, normative costs. For liberal democracies, 
cooperative behaviour and acceptance of interdependence is not 
as costly because such behaviour normally coheres with 
domestically observed standards and goals. In China's case, 
international cooperation and interdependence often conflict with 
the perceived needs of domestic stability, with the authority of 
Party leaders and with the norms of domestic culture. This explains 
the extreme sensitivity of China's international policies to the 
exigencies of domestic political pressures, whether they be disputes 
among political factions or manifestations of social instability. Even 
the most outward-looking of China's political leaders, like Premier 
Zhu Rongji, are alert to any signs that foreign or trade policies 
might have a negative domestic impact, and will change those 
policies accordingly. Needless to say, such sensitivity alters existing 
patterns of compliance, and, in particular, is likely to present 
problems after China's WTO accession. While routine activities in 
international organisations help stabilise the nature of China's 
participation, international bodies of a more political character 
often reflect the volatility of its policy shifts. 
China's attitude to the international rule of law and its behaviour 
within international organisations is heavily influenced by its attitude 
to the domestic rule of law and to its political culture. The reliance 
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of its domestic political culture on ethics rather than law, moral 
consensus rather than judicial procedure, and benevolent 
government rather than on checks and balances, has its resonances 
in China's international behaviour.28 So too have domestic notions 
of hierarchy, power and personal relationships (guanxi). As in its 
domestic law, moreover, the force of precedent in its practice of 
international law is weak. Although China criticises other states 
for not following precedent, or for establishing an unacceptable 
precedent, in its own international organisational behaviour it often 
does not invoke the same standards of consistency. 
Finally, while exercising increasing power and influence, and 
despite the gradual erosion of its Marxist convictions, China is still 
inclined to stress the North-South divide and to lament undue 
Western influence on the international system. Thus, in its 
participation in international organisations, it is not only motivated 
by a system-maintaining and system-exploiting approach, but also, 
paradoxically, as it has become more powerful and more confident, 
has effected a partial return to a system-reforming approach, which 
in its view redresses the imbalances and injustices of the past. It is 
also concerned to make a shift from the current unipolar 
concentration of global power to a multipolar world. International 
organisations have become one vehicle for this reform agenda. 
The following sections of this chapter comprise an analysis of the 
state enhancing/protecting and global reforming aspects of China's 
participation in international organisations and, as evidence of the 
complex mix of power and responsibility in its global behaviour, a 
brief discussion of the process of its accession to the WTO. 
State enhancement/protection via 
international organisations 
Protecting and extending China's sovereignty 
Membership of international organisations helps resolve issues of 
China's disputed sovereignty. Despite the universally recognised 
principle of self-determination, China's sovereignty over Tibet and 
Xinjiang is protected by the positions it takes in international 
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organisations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and through its 
veto power in the UN Security Council, on issues of self-
determination and humanitarian intervention. The close connection 
between China's participation in international organisations and 
its reaffirmation of sovereignty over Taiwan has been well 
documented by Gerald Chan29 and is illustrated in Taiwan's eighth 
failed attempt to enter the United Nations in August 2000, and its 
fourth failed bid to enter the World Health Organisation in May 
2000. Equally, China's pressure on the United Nations in 1999 to 
restate its one-China policy was part of its push for sovereignty 
over Taiwan, as was its call in July 2000 for the inclusion of the 
'One China' concept in a key text on its entry to the WTO. UN 
consciousness of PRC sensitivities has permeated all aspects of 
foreign policy, including the critical issue of humanitarian assistance 
for the Taiwan earthquake in September 1999. UN relief experts 
were even obliged to obtain China's formal prior approval before 
Taiwan's request for assistance could be met.30 The only international 
organisations in which China has been prepared to adjust its 
stringent refusal to allow Taiwan joint membership have been Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Development 
Bank and the WT0.31 In the finance and trade regimes, in other 
words, China is not as insistent on sovereignty as it is in the human 
rights, environmental and security regimes. 
China's sovereignty is also protected by its participation in the 
negotiation of treaties or decisions with which it is not in 
agreement. For instance, one of the reasons given for its application 
to join the WTO was that it would enable China to 'take a direct 
part in formulating trade regulations and rid itself of the 
disadvantageous position of passive participation'.32 Again, China 
chose to be closely involved in drafting the draft Optional Protocol 
to the Convention Against Torture, rather than simply failing to 
accede to it once it was formally adopted. Its strict position on 
sovereignty remained a barrier to drafting progress, since, together 
with Cuba, it insisted that the work of any investigatory UN mission 
to prisons and prisoners should be subject to nationallaws.33 China 
was also closely involved in drafting the ILO's 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights atWork,despite its objections 
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that the Declaration obliged members that had not ratified the 
relevant ILO Conventions to undertake the same obligations as 
those that had. After obtaining an assurance from the ILO that 
support for the Declaration would not mean that its standards 
immediately became applicable, China voted for it.34 
China's preoccupation with protecting its sovereignty is also 
reflected in its use of international organisations to enhance the 
international legitimacy of domestic policies. For instance, both 
the World Bank and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) have publicly endorsed a number of official Chinese 
economic and social programs which have been both internationally 
and domestically controversiai.Aithough the Bank later withdrew 
its proffered loan to resettle Han Chinese in traditional Tibetan 
lands in Qinghai province, the program was initially supported by 
the World Bank despite international protest, while the 
domestically controversial privatisation of housing was defended 
by Klaus Topfer, Executive Director of UNEP and acting executive 
director of Habitat.35 
Projecting enhancing international status 
International organisations have promoted China's international 
status in various ways-through its chairmanship of UN 
conferences, and its hosting of international conferences, such as 
the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing held in 
September 1995, and the forthcoming APEC Leaders' Forum, to 
be held in Shanghai in 200 I.As demonstrated in the recent election 
of Shi Jiuyong as Vice-President of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), Chinese officials have even been appointed into senior 
positions of organisations whose jurisdiction they do not accept.36 
China's superior status has also been reflected in its seniority and 
extensive voting rights in the World Bank and IMF. 37 At the same 
time, its aspirations for senior organisational positions within 
leading international organisations have had a constraining effect, 
leading it to modify its more extreme behaviour and to exhibit 
compliance in the interests of maintaining or obtaining 
organisational status. For instance, China's ambitions for executive 
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status in the ILO have had a socialising impact on its participation 
in the ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association 
(CFA), increasing its readiness to accept core labour standards.38 
Maintaining China's strategic independence 
China participates fully in the main international and regional nuclear 
non-proliferation and arms control organisations, the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD), the UN First Committee, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF).In the CD, it exercises its dual role as a member of the five 
official Nuclear Weapons States and as supporter of the Non-
Nuclear Weapons States. This enhances its ability to negotiate 
particular issues of concern, such as the prevention of an arms 
race in outer space, and, more recently, to oppose amendment of 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.39 lt has also used theASEAN Regional 
Forum to attack the US-proposed theatre missile defence system 
(TMD) for Asia and the national missile defence system (NMD) 
for the continental United States.40 As evidence of its internalisation 
of the norms of the security regime, it has invoked the authority 
of international law and international treaties, particularly theABM 
treaty, to critique the US proposal.41 
Through its position as one of the permanent five of the UN 
Security Council, China also exercises its influence on major global 
issues of weapons proliferation, humanitarian intervention and 
peacekeeping. Of the 26 resolutions on which China abstained in 
the Security Council between 1990-95, 17 were explicitly 
enforcement measures taken by the Council under the authority 
vested in it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Three related 
to Iraq, three to the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, six concerned 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, two Libya, one Haiti and two Rwanda.42 In 
this arena, its policies have been more self-protective than 
proactive. As Nigel Thalakada observes, 
[t]he pattern that emerges thus far with regard to China's 
abstentions on Chapter VII resolutions is one of Chinese 
reluctance to condone the use of the Security Council's 
enforcement authority to undertake military action 
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against a member state (as in the case of Iraq), apply 
sanctions against a member state (as in the cases of 
Libya and Yugoslavia), undertake peace enforcement and 
peacebuilding (as in the case of Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda) 
and establish an international tribunal to prosecute 
widespread human rights abuses (as in the case of 
Rwanda). 43 
China's position on humanitarian intervention, which is primarily 
related to the protection of its own sovereignty, is of particular 
importance in the new era of concern about human rights in 
situations of domestic ethnic conflict or separatist movements. 
Its stance was crucial in the 1999 Security Council deliberations 
on East Timor. Although it finally voted in the Security Council in 
support of the INTERFET role in East Timor, had Indonesia refused 
to accept the entry of international peacekeepers into East Timor, 
the likelihood of China's veto of a Security Council resolution to 
introduce troops without Jakarta's permission may well have 
prevented any international assistance to the territory. 
Therefore, the UN Secretary-General's path-breaking address 
on the challenges of humanitarian intervention to the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) on 20 September 1999 represented a distinct 
challenge to China's concept of absolute sovereignty.44 Reacting 
swiftly, China's Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, pointed out that the 
'new interventionism of the so-called 'human rights over state 
sovereignty" constituted 'hegemonism in essence'.45 His response 
reflected China's increasing sensitivity about the possibility, in a 
new age of technological warfare in which war is 'fightable and 
easily winnable' without excessive casualties, of Western 
humanitarian intervention in China, particularly in the Chinese 
controlled regions of Tibet and Xinjiang and in Taiwan.46 China 
subsequently opposed, if unsuccessfully, the resolution to set up a 
UN inquiry into violations of human rights in East Timor.47 The 
recommendations in the Inquiry's report that the United Nations 
should set up a war crimes tribunal for East Timor were not 
endorsed by the Secretary-General, reportedly because Russia 
and China would be certain to exercise their veto rights.48 True to 
expectations, on I February 2000, Chinese Foreign Ministry 
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establishment of the UN tribunal.49 This was despite the fact that 
the question of China's cooperation with the United Nations on 
matters of humanitarian intervention was one of the main topics 
addressed during the Secretary-General's visit to China in 
September 1999. 
Preserving an external environment conducive to 
own internal development goals 
China has long argued that a peaceful external environment is 
essential to the realisation of its economic modernisation. This 
instrumental use of international norms is also reflected in China's 
support for the value of 'cooperation', as opposed to 
'confrontation', in international human rights organisations. The 
need for 'cooperation', for instance, has proved a useful rallying 
cry to deflect a resolution critical of China's human rights in the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, and has challenged the normal 
adversarial procedures accepted within the United Nations.Aiong 
with like-minded developing states, China also uses the concept 
of consensus, with its potential for stalemate, in international 
organisations to further its interests.50 
investment, trade, technology 
transfer, developmental assistance. 
The main forums meeting these needs are the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB),Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). As will be seen, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is a less reliable forum for promoting its 
interests, because of the perceived risks its promotion of free 
trade entails for China's domestic stability. 
China has been the World Bank's most acclaimed and successful 
client. It is regarded as a responsible, cooperative member and is 
presented as a model for other developing countries. 51 Since 1992, 
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it has been the Bank's largest borrower of investment finance. 
Conversely, the Bank is China's largest source of long-term foreign 
capital. Its projects have supported China's economic reform 
process, targeting poverty alleviation, infrastructure development 
and human resources development. Cumulative lending to China 
by the World Bank Group between 1981 and 30 June 1999 is 
about US$33.2 billion, of which US$23.3 billion is from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and US$9.9 billion is from the International Development 
Association (IDA). This amounts to a substantial proportion of 
the total of US$400 billion lent to members (currently 180) since 
the Bank's establishment. The Bank has supported over 220 
development projects in China, involving all major sectors of the 
economy and most Chinese regions. On the other hand, this 
amounts to only US$2.50 per person in China, representing the 
'lowest proportion of lending per capita in the entire East Asia 
region'. 52 
China's loss of eligibility for International Development 
Assistance (IDA) loans, involving a drop in lending of about 25 per 
cent, has slightly modified this comfortable picture.53 Reliance on 
IBRD loans will make it more difficult for poorer provinces to 
repay since the IBRD charges interest for loans, demands a shorter 
amortisation period, and has no policy for debt rescheduling. 
Despite this, the World Bank expects to lend China between US$5-
7 billion in the next three years, of which at least US$1 billion will 
go to poor inland provinces. 54 In the new century, both the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank plan to intensify their 
cooperation with China in the area of poverty reduction and the 
environment.55 The World Bank remains highly dependent on 
China's success as a role model for developing countries, and as a 
model client. 
Since 1979, when China first accepted assistance from UNDP, 
that body has assisted China in 840 projects at a cost of US$500 
million. The UN Children's Fund has cooperated on a total of ISO 
projects costing $300 million.56 Moreover, despite the fact that 
China is not a member of Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), that organisation has described China 
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as its 'most important cooperative partner'. The two sides have 
collaborated to study enterprise reform, train workers in the 
Chinese tax departments and analyse statistics, as well as cooperating 
in areas of agriculture, education, environment and investment. 
China also exerts inter-organisational pressures to extend its 
economic power, exploiting any rivalries or functional overlap 
between organisations. Speaking at the United Nations General 
Assembly, the Chinese Foreign Minister called on the United 
Nations to hold a special conference on economic globalisation 
because 'the developing countries have the right to equal 
participation in world economic decision-making and formulation 
of relevant rules. In the new round of negotiations that will soon 
begin in the World Trade Organization, the reasonable demands 
of developing countries should be fully reflected'.57The overlapping 
jurisdictions of the World Bank and the ADB also allow China 
freedom to negotiate the terms and nature of the loan projects 
it selects from the ADB. 
Finally, China benefits from (often conflicting) advice, information, 
technology transfer and research provided by international 
organisations. For instance, UNCTAD's advice on WTO was that 
China should resist opening its markets to any further international 
competition until it had undertaken further economic reforms.58 
The ADB supported China's entry, but argued its case on the basis 
that China's cautious approach to liberalisation of capital controls 
had insulated it from the worst of the Asian financial crisis.59 It 
thereby differentiated its position from that of the 1Mf.6° 
International organisations are also sources of pressure for 
change. For instance, in September 1999, the IMF policy-setting 
interim committee asked India and China, as well as other 
developing nations, to accelerate 'key structural reforms' in 
taxation, banking and corporate sectors, establish an effective legal 
system, protect property rights and ensure 'greater transparency' 
and accountability in government activities.61 In some cases, as its 
support for the WTO indicates, China has even looked to 
international organisations to impose the necessary external 
regulatory authority legitimising wholesale domestic reforms, which 
the Chinese leadership would be incapable of achieving through 
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its own efforts alone.62 Its readiness to import international norms 
and procedures and, by implication, to renegotiate the boundaries 
of state sovereignty, is more evident in the international political 
economy regime than, for instance, in the human rights regime. 
The search for power can thus lead to widely varied outcomes. 
On the one hand, it can create obstacles to interdependence, and, 
on the other, it can give states a stake in the international system 
and create pressures for socialisation. Equally, sovereignty concerns 
can have an integrating effect, as well as constitute the source of 
non-cooperation. In China's case, however, power is not sought 
through conventional channels only. 
Global reform via international organisations 
Because of China's increasing orientation to the market economy, 
its growing military and commercial power and its concomitant 
tendency to link its fortunes with the developed world and other 
major powers, China scholars have tended in recent years to 
downplay its earlier revolutionary aspirations, ascribing instances 
of non-cooperation with the international community to 
nationalistic rather than ideological wellsprings.Yet there are strong 
reasons to argue the continuing relevance of the Maoist heritage. 
China's leaders still appeal to Maoist principles of international 
law and still invoke its traditional, if now modified, identification 
with the interests of the developing world. 
Impacting on international law 
China recognises the universal applicability of generally recognised 
international law, even if it underplays the importance of customary 
international law.63 Yet, it still upholds Maoist principles which are 
seen not only to complement generally recognised international 
law, but even to be constitutive of international law. In a clear 
enunciation of China's policy on international organisations as it 
affected international law, former Chairman of the China 
International Law Society, Huan Xiang, pointed out in 1983 that, 
since 'Third World countries' were now in the majority, 'they have 
an important place in shaping and developing the principles, rules 
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and regulations of international law'. 64 Participation in international 
organisations was seen as one way of ensuring this impact 
If the resolutions of international organisations, especially 
those of the UN General Assembly, are regarded as 
sources of international law, the position of the Third 
World countries as participants in the international law-
making process is even more prominent, because they 
constitute a majority in international organisations and 
are playing increasingly important roles in the UN 
General Assembly. In fact, the resolutions containing legal 
documents of the General Assembly have all been 
initiated by Third World countries and approved with 
their support. Their backing has obviously given such 
documents greater legal significance and thus promoted 
the development of international law. The Third World 
countries have become new creators of international 
law both in name and in reality. As L. Henkin puts it, the 
new states are now both the new subjects of international 
law and its new masters.65 
Huan saw the Third World as having impacted on international 
law in a number of ways. The most outstanding contribution of 
the Third World was seen to be the affirmation of national self-
determination as a legal principle. The second contribution was 
the formulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as 
'fundamental principles of international law'.66 Moreover, the Third 
World had 'strengthened and developed' the principle of 
sovereignty, including the principle of economic sovereignty, or 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Apart from such fundamental principles, it had precipitated changes 
on the question of state responsibility and on the idea that the 
giving of economic aid is a 'legal responsibility' rather than a 
'dispensation of favour'. It had emphasised the importance of 
'territorial integrity' and had played a role in 'substituting a new 
law of the sea for the old' by developing 'the idea about the right 
over 200 nautical miles of sea areas'. It had opposed the unequal 
treaties imposed on them by colonial powers and had made 
contributions to the laws of war.67 
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These principles continue to animate Chinese international 
organisational policy and its attitude to international law. The 
Chairman of the National People's Congress, Li Peng, has argued 
the importance of a mastery of international law for a developing 
socialist state like China.68 Contemporary scholars like Wan Xia 
and Lu Song, however, still claim not only that China adheres to, 
follows and applies international law, but also that it develops it. 
They argue that, because of the anomalies within international 
law and the development of new situations and problems, new 
'rational' models of international law need to be established. The 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are still viewed as one of 
China's central contributions to international law. So too is Deng 
Xiaoping's notion of a new politico-economic international order 
(NIEO), based on state sovereignty, self-reliance, anti-hegemon ism, 
equality, cooperation and the peaceful resolution of disputes.69 
Thus, President Jiang Zemin has insisted that the Five Principles 
should constitute the basis of the new international order and has 
reiterated support for Deng Xiaoping's goals.70 
Representing redistributing 
international power, promoting a 
order and reorienting 
norms 
As a 'Club of One' in the United Nations, China is not the leader 
or spokesman of a group of developing states. Rather, it achieves 
a balance between promoting its own fundamental interests and 
representing those of the Third World. It does this by promoting 
Third World perspectives in the United Nations on issues in which 
it has a national interest-issues such as security, human rights, 
development and the environment. In the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD), for instance, it sees itself as supporting the 
NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) states through its non-first use 
policy, and through its identity as the only nuclear weapons state 
standing for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear 
weapons-a position it believes the Permanent 4 are now beginning 
to accept themselves. On the other hand, according to China, the 
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NAM states oppose possession of any nuclear weapons, a position 
China cannot accept. In addition, some NAM states fail to distinguish 
between the policies of the different states in the Permanent Five 
(PS), and propose a time-bound nuclear disarmament program 
which, China says, is 'not realistic? 1 The NAM states have also 
been useful to China in advocating positions with which it agrees 
but which it does not wish to espouse openly. In the early years of 
its participation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), for 
instance, it resorted to free-riding, falling in behind states like India 
and the Soviet Union. By contrast, its more recent disarmament 
diplomacy has been described as 'relatively open', involving frequent 
interventions in CD debates.72 
Where China's interests do not cohere with those of the Third 
World, on the other hand, it remains silent. While it has vigorously 
supported Third World candidates for the secretary-generalship 
of the United Nations, for instance, it is not so outspoken about 
the formula for the reform of the Security Council, supporting 
the idea of greater Third World representation but not of an 
extension of access to the veto.73 A Chinese diplomat at the United 
Nations has stated that only when developed and developing states 
have a 'more balanced representation' in the Security Council will 
the candidacy of Japan and Germany be resolved.l4 
Yet, withal their often divergent interests, the developing states 
represent an important power base for China in its effort to shift 
the current locus of global power from the United States to a 
more differentiated, multipolar world. For this reason, China has 
used its membership of multilateral financial and development 
institutions to attempt to redistribute international power in the 
interests of the developing world. For instance, Dai Xianglong, 
Governor of the People's Bank, has urged the IMF to take account 
in its reforms of the voices of developing countries.75 China has 
also been attracted to regional solutions, partly with a view to 
securing its own backyard. For instance, it has been willing to 
consider Japan's proposal to establish an East Asia Monetary Fund, 
and has called for greater regional cooperation in trade, financial, 
investment, scientific and technological areas. At China's initiative, 
a Dialogue of Finance and Central Bank Deputies involvingASEAN, 
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China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was launched in 
March 1999 under the auspices of ASEAN.76 On I 0 April 2000, 
China formally acceded to the Bangkok Agreement-Asia's only 
preferent'1al tariff arrangement-thereby marking its debut in 
regional trading agreements. 
China has likewise insisted on the responsibility of the developed 
states, as the chief agents and beneficiaries of environmental 
degradation, to assume the major burden of expenditure for the 
rehabilitation of the global environment. It has not, however, 
refused to contribute to the costs. Rather, it has disputed the 
amount and terms of its contributions, as well as arguing for the 
rights of developing states generally.77 
In international human rights organisations, China has sought to 
promote the values of developing states and to question the 
universal applicability of international human rights norms. This is 
particularly the case in public and political forums like the UN 
Human Rights Commission, which not only provide a platform for 
China's projection of its moral principles, but which also have the 
potential to publicly threaten its sovereignty. At the normative 
level, in the 1993 UN World Human Rights Conference in Vienna, 
and yearly sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission and its 
Sub-Commission, China has stressed the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference, and the cultural relativist idea 
that each state has a right to its own interpretation of human 
rights. It has also emphasised the rights to subsistence and to 
development. Although the latter rights are important, China has 
seen them as prior rights, which must be satisfied before the 
realisation of civil and political rights. This conflicts with the UN 
principle, entrenched in numerous international instruments, of 
the indivisibility, interdependence and universality of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
For a number of reasons, China has not been successful in its 
efforts to establish a new priority of rights. At the procedural 
level, however, through resort to the no-action motion to avoid 
resolutions against China in the Human Rights Commission and 
Sub-Commission, through its attack on non-governmental 
organisation (NGOs) and country situation resolutions, and its 
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success in 1997 in bilateralising the multilateral Human Rights 
Commission process, China has helped undermine the principles 
of the non-selectivity and universality of the application of human 
rights norms.78 Its sensitivity on issues of sovereignty has also made 
it reluctant in this regime, as in others, to allow international bodies 
to monitor conditions on Chinese soil.79 
The complexity of China's mix of responsibility within the 
international community and its simultaneous concern to project 
its power, interests and national values, to maintain its independence, 
represent the interests of developing states and safeguard its 
domestic stability is no better exemplified than in the process of 
its accession to the WTO. The significance of its entry will not lie 
solely in its impact on the WTO and on the globalisation project 
generally. It represents China's most calculated gamble in the history 
of its entry into international organisations and its most unqualified 
leap into economic interdependence. Not only has China made 
sweeping concessions to the international community during its 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations, it has taken unprecedented 
steps to renegotiate the terms of its own sovereignty. 
Why has China sought to join the WTO? Status, trading 
opportunities, the pressures of globalisation and the desire to 
deepen restructuring within China are all motives. The WTO is 
seen as an 'important carrier of globalisation', which will allow 
China to 'become a respectable member in the open international 
economic system' and enable it to enjoy equal trading treatment 
and take part in formulating trade regulations. The WTO will 
have the crucial function of opening up China's services industry. 
It will link China with the global economy, 'bring about rational 
allocation of resources', allow more Chinese enterprises out of 
the country and facilitate foreign investment in China.80 Moreover, 
since China is not a member of any regional trading bloc, it will 
rely on the WTO to maintain its own competitiveness. Finally, 
China dearly hopes accession might facilitate better relations with 
Taiwan.81 
153 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
In the interests of attaining these goals, however, China has had 
to, and will continue to, bear considerable costs. President Jiang 
Zemin has insisted, through his spokesman, that 'we absolutely will 
not sacrifice our national interests just for the sake of membership 
of the WTO'. 82 For this reason, throughout the fifteen years of 
accession negotiations, China has persisted in its request to receive 
the benefits due to a developing country in an incremental manner. 
Nevertheless, China's accession to WTO will subject it to the WTO 
Agreement, requiring it to enforce the WTO Understanding. China 
will become vulnerable to the WTO dispute system and to the 
courts. WTO membership will introduce enhanced competition 
within China and will further erode central control over 
commercial policy. It will require numerous policy changes, including 
significant reductions in tariffs, removal of nontariff barriers and 
quotas, the opening up of China's service sector, further protection 
of intellectual property rights and the elimination of many barriers 
to trade in agricultural products.83 It will therefore create severe 
social strains and exacerbate the already existing unemployment 
problems. It will require increased legal transparency, and greater 
political openness and accountability. Moreover, under the bilateral 
agreement negotiated in November I 999 with the United States, 
China made asymmetrical concessions in favour of the United 
States.84 In particular, the unparalleled, extensive and prolonged 
safeguards and anti-dumping provisions that the United States 
negotiated will be available to other WTO members under the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. 
Chinese economist Gao Shangquan has identified four challenges 
that WTO membership poses for China. It will constitute a 
challenge to the competitiveness of some Chinese industries and 
companies on the world market, a challenge to China's 
administrative system, a challenge to China's industrial structure, 
and a challenge to the Chinese government's macroeconomic 
control.85 China's accession will bring challenges not only for China, 
but for the whole WTO system. In the process of implementing 
the rules, numerous obstacles will be met. These include problems 
of the insufficiency of WTO regulations to accommodate a non-
market economy, including the inadequacy of existing surveillance 
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machinery; problems of cultural mismatch between China and 
other WTO members, leading to differences in the interpretation 
of rules; the inadequacy of Chinese domestic financial and legal 
institutions; interference from, and non-compliance of, China's sub-
national authorities; general problems of domestic implementation; 
and the danger that Western WTO members will initially engage 
in excessive dispute resolution with China.86 The main variable 
throughout will be China's domestic stability. This is now a critical 
source of concern, in view of Zhu Rongji's failure to create a 
social welfare system funded through investments in capital markets 
to protect the unemployed and other groups rendered vulnerable 
by accession.87 If during the process WTO members place too 
much pressure on China, if its economic restructuring is pushed 
too fast and social stability is imperilled, domestic turmoil will result. 
If, on the other hand, in the interests of domestic stability, China 
does not fully implement the reforms it has promised within the 
accepted timetable, it is liable to end up in constant dispute with 
other WTO members, and globalisation will be the loser.88 
Conclusion 
In its participation in international organisations, China, like most 
states, seeks to maximise its power and interests. Again, like most 
states, it demonstrates some preparedness to accept the costs as 
well as the benefits of participation and to assume some 
responsibility within the international system. While its theoretical 
position on sovereignty may be absolute, in practice its approach 
to sovereignty is more flexible, except where debate concerns 
the right of the international community to enforce collective 
rights like self-determination. When national interest and the 
principle of absolute sovereignty are seen to coincide, China makes 
a theoretical statement about the absolute nature of sovereignty. 
But, in general its power is enhanced by its preparedness to 
negotiate its sovereignty, rather than to impose blanket vetos. 
For this reason, since 1981 it has preferred not to use its veto in 
the Security Council, but obtains numerous advantages from hinting 
it might do so. 
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China's need for moral stature and a good international 
reputation thus helps tone down the realism of its foreign policy, 
both in appearance and reality. In many cases, this does not mean 
that it has internalised international norms, but that it is prepared 
to be more pragmatic about its interests than its statements of 
principle would suggest. To that extent, it has been influenced by 
the rigorous process of participation in international organisations. 
Despite the costs it incurs, it continues to support international 
organisations and multilateralism and has acknowledged the 
inevitability of global interdependence, accepting that, just as the 
world needs China, China needs the world. 
At the same time, China's readiness to accept the costs and 
responsibility of participation must be balanced against major 
problems it has experienced in implementing its obligations under 
international treaty and organisational rules. The first is its abiding 
concern with sovereignty, a problem permeating most of its 
decisions relating to organisational cooperation and causing 
intransigence in cases of alleged 'interference', such as proposals 
by international organisations to monitor Chinese conditions in 
situ. This is a particular problem in the human rights and security 
regimes. The second is its difficulty implementing in practice the 
domestic legislation which it introduces in compliance with its 
international obligations. This is a notable problem in the human 
rights and environmental regimes, and may well prove a problem 
in its relations with the WTO. Third is its tendency to free-ride 
where possible, using elements of its complex identity, such as its 
status as a developing nation, to plead special treatment. 
However, the main obstacle to international cooperation, apart 
from an enduring preoccupation with domestic stability, lies in 
China's complex perception of its global responsibilities. While it 
is now tending to link its fortunes much more with the developed 
world and with other powerful states, it still recognises an 
obligation to act and speak on behalf of developing states. This is 
because identification with the interests of the developing world 
remains a constituent element of its own power. In other words, 
precisely because of considerations of power, China's sense of 
responsibility to the international community is double-edged. 
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While clearly committed to participation in international 
organisations and to being seen as a cooperative member, it still 
conceives a continuing responsibility to defend developing states, 
to forge new international norms, rules and procedures and to 
oversee the redistribution of power in the international system. 
The balance China achieves between power and responsibility is 
therefore unstable and dependent on time, issue area, foreign 
policy environment and domestic political pressures. Given the 
complexities of its motivations, reflecting a mix of self-interest, 
conformity and dissent, given the increasing dissonance between 
its international power and its domestic volatility, and in view of 
its deep-rooted political culture and the still essentially 
introspective focus of its foreign policy, the unpredictability that 
has characterised China's international organisational policies and 
behaviour over the last three decades is likely to persist. 
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C ina's diplomacy in 
North and Northeast 
Asia: norms and 
practice 
Stuart Harris 
Over the last decade or so, western discussion about the major 
powers in Northeast Asia has tended to take two different 
approaches. Drawing on lessons from the history of the rise of 
Germany and Japan (but seemingly not of the United States), the 
first argues that the dramatic transformations of economics and 
power among the major states in the area, notably the rise of 
China (and the decline of the USSR), pose enhanced risks of conflict. 
This, realists argue, leads to power balancing by the major powers 
(building up militaries, leading to arms races in competitive attempts 
to dominate militarily or, for smaller powers, the formation of 
alliances). The second puts weight on the increasing evidence of 
cooperative approaches among the countries of the region as 
well as within a larger Asia Pacific cooperative framework. This 
implies some adherence to implicit if not explicit norms and rules 
of behaviour. 
In this chapter, I look at aspects of China's diplomacy in North 
and Northeast Asia within a general framework of how that 
diplomacy fits with the second approach--cooperative relationships 
in compliance with generally accepted international norms. Precisely 
what such compliance means is not always clear. Norms are 
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principles and standards of behaviour that may be explicitly 
specified-as in the UN Charter or in international agreements. 
They may, however, simply be generally understood and accepted 
standards defined less specifically in terms of what constitutes 
responsible international behaviour. 1 They are thus often imprecise 
and changing and capable of varying interpretations. 
For most countries, at present, they would include peaceful 
resolution of disputes, respect for sovereignty, non-interference 
in the internal affairs of a state, adherence to the underlying 
principles of international institutions such as those of the United 
Nations, and of specific institutions and agreements such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
and cooperative rather than confrontational participation in 
international affairs. China would put particular emphasis on 
sovereignty and other UN principles such as non-interference in 
the internal affairs of a state, would argue that it adheres to the 
peaceful resolution of disputes and that in general it complies 
with the other universally accepted norms and rules. It would add, 
however, the further norms of equality and mutual benefit. 
In North Asia, China borders Russia, Mongolia, North Korea 
and several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). It has anxieties about separatist influences in the autonomous 
region of Xinjiang, in part encouraged externally, and interests in 
economic exchanges with Russia and the CIS. In Northeast Asia, as 
well as its interests across the Taiwan Strait, China also interacts 
with the two other major powers-the United States and Japan-
and with the two Koreas.The size and strategic importance of the 
countries in these areas is considerable. Most have large military 
capacities, three are nuclear powers and the fourth Uapan) could 
become one without much difficulty. Three are permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council, and three (not 
including China) are in the G8. Our interest in those relationships 
comes primarily from the capacity they have to disturb substantially 
168 
China's diplomacy in North and Northeast Asia 
the economic viability and/or the strategic stability of the region. 
Moreover, relations with the three powers, Japan, Russia and the 
United States, can be seen as the focus of China's identity.2 How 
China interacts with them is central to regional analyses but, more 
importantly, to an understanding of the likely nature of China's 
future diplomacy. 
In the West, notably in the United States, attention tends to be 
directed to China's growing relationship with Russia, which from 
1996 has been termed a 'strategic partnership'.An exaggerated if 
not singular US commentary suggested 'The alliance is all but 
signed'.3 China has specific concerns over developments in the 
US-Japan relationship. Japan would not welcome too close a 
relationship between Russia and China, and worries when relations 
between China and the United States appear too close but also 
when too cool. Where the Koreas (separate or unified) fit is also 
a matter of economic as well as strategic interest. Yet, whatever 
the concerns experienced in the North Pacific, they do not seem 
to have stimulated significantly changed policies leading to power 
balancing, arms races or to significant alliance formation. Rather 
than a build up of military capabilities in the border areas there 
have in fact been quantitative reductions (although at times 
accompanied by qualitative modernisations) not only among the 
four major powers but also in South Korea. Apart from the 
strengthened US-Japan alliance, whether there are alliances or 
even substantial alignments is also in question, although frequent 
shifts are discernible from time to time among the major players 
as they see benefits from reordering their interests among the 
bilateral relationships involved. 
Broader economic issues also arise beyond the growing trade 
and investment interrelationships. Demand for energy in particular 
is growing in the region.Various estimates of future regional energy 
requirements point to large increased needs. In the midst of the 
Asian economic crisis, when earlier optimistic economic forecasts 
had been revised downwards, a Shell spokesperson said, 
nevertheless, that in the next 20 years Asia Pacific oil demand 
would double and gas demand quadruple.4 One estimate of China's 
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imports of oil is for an increase from some 40 million tonnes in 
1999 to 390 million tonnes in 2020.5 Such projections and the 
implications for energy security are exercising policy thinking in 
the various regional states, as well as stimulating some alarmist 
conclusions in the West.6 
China's diplomacy in North and Northeast Asia has a range of 
objectives. The argument of this chapter is that its priority 
objectives are concerned with power relationships with neighbours. 
Other objectives, such as its economic objectives, are important 
but secondary to, or supportive of, its priority objectives although 
China's access to Russian military equipment and technology has 
grown in importance. Its global objectives, concerned with global 
power relationships, are high on the agenda from time to time as 
external circumstances require but do not dominate as a major 
continuing factor. 
To understand China's links with the major powers we need to 
look briefly at the bases of China's relationship with each of the 
major powers. 
China-Russia 
The PRC's history of relations with Moscow is of ideological links 
that soured in the 1960s.That souring, and an exhaustion of China's 
willingness to play a subsidiary role, led to consequent ideological 
conflicts, major border disputes, threats and substantial military 
build ups on both sides of the very long (7000 or so kilometres) 
China-USSR border. This ultimately resulted in military 
confrontations on a small scale, and fears of armed confrontation 
on a large scale. From this emerged China's shift towards the 
United States in the 1970s and what some saw as an implicit alliance 
with the United States against the USSR into the 1980s. This close 
relationship fell away as the Cold War and the US need for an 
alignment against the USSR wound down, and then as a result of 
the Tiananmen Square repression.With Gorbachev's 'new thinking' 
from 1986 on and ultimately the 1991 break up of the USSR, 
Washington's relations with Moscow improved considerably. China 
came to feel isolated, however, as Russia gradually moved towards 
Europe and became, for a while, part of the Wester-led international 
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community. This, and the gradual increase in economic exchanges 
between Russia and China, were reinforcing but not key factors 
in Beijing's move to seek rapprochement with Moscow. 
In looking at what did bring about the warming of China's 
relations with Russia, it is useful to consider what motivates China 
and what motivates Russia. Given its domestic priority of economic 
development, China was concerned to negotiate solutions to its 
long-standing border disputes with neighbours. In addition, with 
Russia in particular, it wanted to reduce military threats and tensions 
through reducing troop emplacements and to enter into 
confidence building measures (CBMs), especially on border military 
activities. Gorbachev's glasnost and the 1989 normalisation of 
bilateral relations made this possible to contemplate. Since China's 
hesitant acceptance of CBMs went with a view that they would 
only work if there were a broad based relationship, attempts to 
establish confidence across a broader range of economic, political 
and strategic issues were regarded as important. The break up of 
the USSR also raised new questions about the respective interests 
of Russia and China in the CIS states. 
After 1986, and particularly following Gorbachev's visit to Beijing 
in 1989, the previously tense bilateral relations improved and made 
possible bilateral meetings between leaders of the two countries 
in most years from 1991 onwards.A series of bilateral agreements, 
joint statements and understandings resulted, that led to the 
withdrawal of military forces, development of military CBMs, 
border negotiations and trade, with the relationship being 
institutionalised through annual leaders' meetings and in other 
functional ways. The agreements also reaffirmed Russia's support 
for the Chinese position on Taiwan. These led subsequently both 
to the adoption of the terminology of 'strategic partnership of 
cooperation97 and to the initiation of meetings of the Shanghai 
Five-China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
The main Chinese interest in these broader meetings was border 
management, military cooperation on the border and cooperation 
against cross border secessionists, religious extremist activity, 
terrorism and drugs. From these meetings, the first in 1996, came 
two broader agreements. The first was the Shanghai Agreement 
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signed in 1996. This provided for non-aggression, non-use of force, 
de-targeting of nuclear weapons, notifications preceding military 
exercises and manoeuvres, and limits on the types of exercises 
permitted within the I 00 kilometre zone on both sides of the 
border. The second was the Moscow Agreement signed in May 
1997 dealing with troop reductions within I 00 kilometres on both 
sides of the border.8 In a further bilateral agreement in April 1999, 
China and Russia completed the negotiations of a common border.9 
As well as settling border disputes and achieving force reductions, 
China's access to Russia's advanced military technology has been 
important given that, following the 1989 events, alternative sources, 
notably the United States, have been unavailable to it. Thus there 
have been substantial sales of advanced military equipment both 
of aircraft (SU 27s and SU 30s) and naval craft (nuclear submarines 
and destroyers). Russia was originally concerned not to provide 
the latest technologies but this seems to have relaxed somewhat 
with the sale of SU 30s, 10 although criticism of the arms relationship 
remains in Russia. How far sales of more sophisticated equipment 
reflected a Russian strategic decision, rather than a need for foreign 
exchange (and the need to keep the Sukhoi company afloat), is 
unclear. Claims have been common that military cooperation has 
greatly expanded, notably since Kosovo and following General 
ZhangWannian's visit to Moscow in June 1999. 11 Despite talk of a 
prospective 'defence' accord, 12 however, outside of defence 
procurement, the training that goes with such sales, and limited 
naval exchanges, the extent of such cooperation has been limited. 
The other major functional links are concerned with Xinjiang, 
which is dealt with under CIS states below, and with economic 
exchanges. Russia, in particular, initially expected economic 
exchanges to be a major functional benefit of the bilateral 
relationship. Results have fallen far short of expectations despite 
efforts to stimulate trade and, to a degree, investment. Total two-
way trade in 2000, some US$8 billion, was the highest since 1993, 
but well below the target of US$20 billion. In 1999, in particular, 
major efforts have been made on both sides to improve the 
economic exchanges and to give an added stimulus to energy 
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cooperation. China currently imports some 60,000 tonnes of oil 
a year from Russia and an increasing concern for energy security 
in China provided an added motive. Moreover, for China, a further 
stimulus was the belief that the political links needed to be 
buttressed by significant economic exchanges. 
These bilateral factors were the main drivers behind the Chinese 
interest in closer links. As the internal Russian economic picture 
started to seem less promising, blamed in part on pressures from 
the West, support in Russia for its closeness to the West fell away. 
More generally, China and Russia came to share a common 
worldview, reflecting the international imbalance that had emerged 
from the end of the Cold War. Specific factors that led to closer 
relations include 'a perceived threat of Eurasian encirclement' from 
the enlargement of NATO in the West and the United States and 
its alliances in the east, 13 US unilateralism, NATO's involvement in 
Kosovo, and the US development of Theatre Missile Defence 
(TMD) and National Missile Defence (NMD) with the likely 
abrogation of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. 
Although, since 1996 in particular, global factors have led to an 
added interest in joint cooperation, the level of coordination has 
not always been good, as Russian commentators have noted. For 
example, although Yeltsin and Jiang agreed in principle their general 
position on Iraq, in practice, at the time of the December 1998 
crisis, China, unlike Russia, did not put its troops on alert, withdraw 
its US and UK ambassadors, or withdraw citizens from Iraq. While 
the Russian Duma moved to evade United Nations sanctions, China 
stressed that all members of the United Nations, particularly the 
United States and United Kingdom, should adhere strictly to the 
UN Charter. 14 Moscow's sensitivities over NATO's enlargement 
were partly alleviated by compensating memberships of the G8 
and APEC and a place at the NATO table. The West's approach to 
Iraq and then to Bosnia, however, raised concerns which created 
divisions within Russia between those more Western inclined, 
including Yeltsin, and an opposing group that included Primakov, 
notably when foreign minister and then as prime minister. The 
assault on Serbia brought these divisions out more clearly.VIadimir 
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Putin, the present president, has been variously portrayed as both 
more and less Western oriented than Yeltsin, although he has 
stressed a balanced approach that continues to place weight on 
the bilateral links with China and on Asia's importance generally. 
Were the United States and Russia to agree on amendment of 
the ABM treaty, this could test the relationship given China's 
concerns while China's only qualified opposition to missile defence 
worried some Russian observersY For both countries, however, 
the relationship with the United States is still the priority. There is 
a sense, nevertheless, in which the value of the bilateral relationship 
increases for each as it experiences particular difficulties with the 
United States. 
Yet, overall, Russia's positive response to China's interest in closer 
political links is not just to ensure the border security of the 
Russian Far East but also a way of reasserting itself as a Great 
Power, including as a Great Power in Asia. Russia's efforts to join 
APEC, its resentment at being excluded from the talks on the 
Korean peninsula, and its initiative for six-party talks on issues on 
the peninsula and in North Asia reflect this. 
While Kosovo raised particular anxieties for China, as Western 
military aid to a secessionist ethnic minority, it was a greater 
problem initially for Russia. Russia, attempting to cope with its fall 
from international leadership, was left out of the processes involved, 
with the UN Security Council bypassed explicitly as a way of 
sidelining Russia. Although initially unhelpful, the Russian 
involvement ultimately in brokering a Kosovo peace settlement, 
against the hard line position of Primakov and others in his 
ministerial team, was welcomed by China. The interests, however, 
could have diverged. Victor Chernomyrdin reportedly visited 
Beijing to ensure that China would not block the Russian-brokered 
UN agreement in the Security Council. 16 
The important bilateral issues have been addressed primarily in 
the meetings of the Shanghai Five, and in bilateral summits Jiang 
has had with Gorbachev,Yeltsin and Putin. Most important on the 
agenda has been resolving border differences and border 
management of fundamentalist and secessionist incursions.A major 
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added item, however, was economic and energy cooperation and 
Russia certainly sees energy projects as a key element of the 
relationship, as we note below. 
While China's global priority remains its relations with the United 
States, links with Russia provide a safeguard, if not a card to play, 
to discourage US unilateralism. Too much of a lean to Russia, 
however, would be unproductive and would be criticised 
domestically as contrary to Deng Xiaoping's 'independent foreign 
policy' . 17 Chinese leaders have been concerned about the 
management of Russia's economy, its large financial borrowings 
from international institutions and the elements of chaos and 
corruption in the Russian system, reflected in particular in the 
1998 economic deterioration. While Kosovo will have encouraged 
a shift back to Russian links, Russia's weakness and political instability 
is recognised in China as limiting their value. 
In the longer term, although it probably over estimates it, China 
is concerned at what it sees as incipient Russian nationalism. More 
importantly, China assumes that Russia at some stage is likely to 
recover its strength and grow in influence and will then be capable 
of actions adverse to China's interests. Chinese analysts see this, 
however, as a long-term factor. Jiang himself is reported as saying 
'Russia would not pose a political or strategic threat to China for 
the next 30 years at least'. 18 However accurate the citation, the 
substance has support from many Chinese analyses, and the need 
to engage with Russia to influence its long-term political 
development, in ways compatible with Chinese interests, is broadly 
accepted. 
According to one source, of some 1500 Chinese companies in 
Russia, 1200 (approximately US$200 billion of investment) are in 
the Russian Far East (RFE), concerned primarily with RFE's raw 
materials. 19 This poses potential for problems since there are 
already fears of an eventual Chinese absorption of the RFE. Local 
difficulties have already arisen over illegal migration and Beijing 
has cooperated with Moscow in regulating the border to contain 
and reduce the problems.20 Anti-Chinese rhetoric is not limited 
to the RFE but local politicians, greatly exaggerating the concerns 
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about illegal Chinese migration into the area, have used Russian 
nationalist arguments, fears of massive Chinese migration, and 
'yellow peril' xenophobia for local political purposes, mainly against 
Moscow. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the demographic 
imbalances pose potential bilateral problems for the two countries. 
These potential problems have been recognised by President Putin, 
who has observed that, without more effective domestic 
development of the RFE, even the indigenous Russian population 
of the region 'will soon speak mostly Japanese, Chinese or 
Korean'.21 Yet, development of the RFE's resources would require 
substantial amounts of labour, which would be difficult to get other 
than from China. 
The RFE has been the area where most difficulty has been 
experienced in resolving border disputes, including a rejection for 
some time by the local leadership of the agreement reached by 
Moscow on the eastern section of the border. There has also 
been vigorous opposition in the RFE to the idea of being simply a 
supplier of raw materials for China among others, an opposition 
expressed more widely by Russian nationalists. 
The bilateral relationship has been buttressed by a number of 
joint declarations and statements; and these have been 
incorporated in a formal Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighbourly 
Friendship and Cooperation is expected to be signed in 200 I .This 
is seen by China as an important development affirming more 
formally many of the border, force reduction and other bilateral 
agreements, and Russia also wants to formalise border and other 
agreements with China, notably with respect to the RFE.Aithough 
there are elements within the Russian elites who would support 
closer links with China, Russian and Chinese spokespersons have 
distanced themselves from the idea of an alliance.22 The bilateral 
relationship is not anti-Western. This does not mean, however, 
that taking common positions contrary to specific actions of the 
United States and its supporters in the United Nations and 
elsewhere will not continue from time to time. Nor does it rule 
out the possibility that, should China be in conflict, limited 
intelligence or other indirect assistance might be given by Russia. 
Among the common interests, particularly in the long term, would 
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be the aim to counterbalance Western influence over the energy 
resources of the CIS, although even that might depend upon where 
the large financial requirements might be sourced. 
Suggestions have also been made of the possibility of a three-
way linkage with China, Russia and India. This idea was first raised 
by Yeltsin during his visit to India in 1993 and again by Primakov 
when prime minister and subsequently by Putin.23 There would be 
difficulties to overcome were this to be pursued beyond rhetorical 
agreement to seek multi polarity in global relationships. A Russian 
correspondent in Beijing noted that this idea ignored the emerging 
nuclear capacity of India, 'an age old adversary of the PRC', and 
the massive deliveries to India of Russian aircraft superior to the 
SU 27s delivered by Russia to the PRC.24 China and India have 
improved their relations, despite China's continuing links with 
Pakistan, but India's positive response to the Bush administration 
on NMD poses a constraint and India's wish for closer links with 
the United States might limit its concerns over US unilateralism. 
Overall, therefore, and despite reservations, continuing elements 
of mistrust among important groups on both sides, and its 
limitations, China's diplomacy has sought to build up the substance 
of the bilateral relationship with Russia. In stimulating its desire to 
establish a substantial relationship, ideology has been replaced by 
a range of more practical interests. For China, its interest in the 
substance of the Shanghai and Moscow agreements, ultimately a 
formal treaty and also the Chinese belief that these need to be 
buttressed by a wider range of bilateral and multilateral 
relationships to build confidence, reflect more practical interests 
than geopolitical concerns with US attempts to press its own 
agenda on China. 
In the short to medium term, the relationship with Russia has 
direct and more substantive security and functional than 
geopolitical benefits for China despite the occasional coordination 
of positions in the UN Security Council and in other global 
contexts.Aithough China and Russia wish for a multipolar world, 
and see the long-term trend towards multipolarity as inevitable, 
there is a general acknowledgement that this is some decades 
away.25 Nor, despite its expressions of concern, is China's anxiety 
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strongly felt. Jiang, at the 1999 Bishkek meeting, said that since the 
end of the Cold War 'the international situation generally speaking 
has tended to become relaxed'.26 
Over the long term, China seems to have accepted that its 
interests tend to be best pursued through following international 
norms. Within a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings, over 
a long period from 1986 to 2000, China and Russia peacefully 
negotiated a common border, in a context where animosities have 
been intense for centuries. It covers southeast Siberia-territory 
disputed since the seventeenth century and fought over as late as 
1969-as well as disputed territory in Central Asia, also fought 
over in 1969. 
Although these developments reflect behaviour consistent with 
many of the norms and rules outlined earlier, its actions against 
rising separatist sentiment and religious extremism reflect 
considerations, for China as well as Russia, of the balance between 
reducing the threat of violent terrorism and supporting 
international human rights norms. China's handling of secessionist 
activities is harsh and conflicts with what would be widely seen as 
the appropriate norms. On the other hand, the West's new post-
Kosovo interventionist doctrine remains a greater concern for 
Beijing in Xinjiang than for Russia in Chechnya and Dagestan for 
several reasons, including the particular politicisation in the United 
States of China's human rights behaviour. Nevertheless, the 
cautionary note in the Bishkek meeting of the 'Shanghai Five' in 
1999 that human rights should not be a pretext for outside 
interference reflected a shared interestY 
CIS states 
For China, the border issues, already a major factor before the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991 became more so after that. The 
independence of the CIS nations, with regional unrest in southern 
Russia and with activists in the new CIS nations that threaten to 
undermine China's control of its western province, posed added 
potential problems. China, which promptly recognised the newly 
independent Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, soon sought to 
enter into border negotiations with them. 
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The border issue was not only important in itself but relations 
with the new CIS nations were crucial for controlling ethnic 
separatism and preventing inroads from Islamic fundamentalism, 
international terrorism, drugs and other international crime. These 
issues have become more crucial with the growing influence of 
the Tali ban in Afghanistan. China recognises that the potential exists 
to undermine its largely Muslim province of Xinjiang, and for Uighur 
separatist elements to challenge Beijing's control. That, like China, 
a number of CIS nations fear the influence of Islamic fundamentalism 
internally facilitates cooperation. In 2000, Uzbekistan was, for the 
first time, an observer in the meeting of the Shanghai Five, held in 
Dushanbe, the Tajik capital. It became a full member of the group 
in its more substantive form as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) in 200 I. 
Xinjiang was a source of dispute with the Soviet Union in the 
1960s when the USSR tried to foment secessionist activities and 
earlier, in the 1950s, when the CIA sought to destabilise the 
province. It is now important to China in terms of sovereignty as 
well as security and economic interests because of its location-
central to its links with Russia, the CIS nations and the Middle East. 
Although it has a potential role in meeting China's energy needs, 
either from its own apparently rich resources, or as a site for 
pipelines from other energy supply sources, instability poses 
problems for the security and continuity of oil and gas supplies 
through Xinjiang, notably from Kazakstan. To some extent the 
increased efforts by Beijing to ensure stability in Xinjiang have 
come from these interests. 
The CIS nations are torn between a sense of a Chinese 'threat', 
including the threat of a large Chinese migratory flow in Kazakstan 
and political influence applied by Russia. While most CIS nations 
are under Russian military protection in accord with their 
Collective Security Treaty, there is a fear of undue dominance by 
Russia. Kazakstan in particular seems to be fretting under Russian 
pressure. The CIS nations' interest in greater cooperation with 
China is therefore in part for its economic benefits but also as a 
balance against the pressure on their independence from Russia, 
which sees the CIS nations as within its area of influence. Although 
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irritations between the two countries may occasionally result from 
these conflicting pressures, both Russia and China have sufficient 
interests in stability in the CIS nations to be likely to manage 
adequately this potential for conflict. 
China and Japan 
China's relationship with Japan remains less than warm but is 
carefully managed by both sides. The economic relationship in 
particular continues to grow, with China moving gradually toward 
a generally non-discriminatory and liberal trade and investment 
regime and accepting the implications of economic 
interdependence with Japan. In 1999, during Prime Minister 
Obuchi's visit to Beijing, agreement was reached on the bilateral 
negotiations between Japan and China for China's accession to 
the WTO. Japan's aid to China became a political debating point 
within Japan after China's nuclear tests in 1996 and has remained 
so as Japan's economy has weakened. Zhu Rongji, in his visit to 
Japan in 2000, was careful to acknowledge the value to China of 
Japan's aid, thereby countering a major Japanese criticism that there 
was no gratitude from China for the help given by japan. 
China has also accepted changed Japanese aid priorities. These 
include greater emphasis on projects to limit the environmental 
effects of its economic growth on Japan, particularly of acid rain. 
This is also a factor in Japan's interests in China's energy policies. 
Beyond simply wanting to substitute gas for coal in China's energy 
use for its environmental benefits, however, Japan is concerned at 
the effect of growing Chinese demand on Asia Pacific oil and gas 
markets and, therefore, on japanese energy costs.28 Japan has 
demonstrated an interest, therefore, in a common energy strategy 
to increase energy production worldwide, without which 
competition among East Asian economies will lead to increased 
Japanese costs. Some commentators have seen this competition 
for energy supplies as leading to conflict between China and Japan,29 
but these conclusions did not seem probable then and seem even 
less so now, given China's efforts to integrate itself into the global 
energy market, and given the acceptance by China of the logic of 
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economic interdependence. It is also reflected explicitly to a degree 
in China's energy strategy, which looks for greater reliance on 
natural gas, one reason for which is to contain the sources of acid 
rain affecting China's neighbours, South Korea as well as Japan. 
There are many issues, mostly stemming from the history of 
the bilateral relationship or war settlements, that remain irritants 
in the relationship and surface from time to time. These include 
arguments about the degree of acknowledgment of war guilt, which 
continues to rise and fall in intensity. Zhu's visit to Japan in 2000, 
however, was clearly more successful than Jiang's the year before 
in taking some of the heat out of the issue.30The nationalist revision 
of Japanese school textbooks in 200 I, however, and Prime Minister 
Koizumi's proposed visit to the Yasukini Shrine put some of it back 
in. 
China and Japan are also in dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) 
Islands. During the 1978 peace treaty negotiations, a large 
demonstration of Chinese fishing boats in support of the Chinese 
position was regarded as an attempt to pressure Japan at a time 
when discussions had broken down. Eventually, China agreed to 
defer the issue of sovereignty over the islands 'to the following 
generation'. The question of sovereignty over the islands has 
recurred from time to time but more particularly between Japanese 
and Taiwanese authorities. In 1997, when Japanese nationalists sought 
to stir the issue, Beijing moved to prevent direct involvement 
from the mainland. 
Difficulties in negotiating on ocean border issues remain but 
are unlikely to cause major problems. This is in part because they 
are technically difficult and also because of caution on both sides 
since any resolution in one context sets precedents for other 
contexts and negotiations with other countries. They are 
additionally complex because of the unresolved issue of Taiwan 
and its claims over ocean borders. 31 
More broadly, japan can hardly feel threatened by China, although 
it does feel uncertain about China's military modernisation in the 
long term. Japanese public opinion reacted adversely in 1996, 
however, to China's missile exercises at the time of Taiwan's 
presidential election and again to China's delay in ceasing nuclear 
tests and acceding to the CTBT. 
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Nuclear issues have been a long-term and major factor in the 
relationship. They emerged in particular in the 1990s as Japanese 
opposition to China's nuclear testing grew in Japan, with proposals 
to cut Japanese aid to China as a consequence. In 1996, China 
announced the suspension of testing and foreshadowed its eventual 
signing of the CTBT. While public feelings ran high in Japan, both 
governments managed the issue with some care. China gave 
advanced notice of tests and tried to explain itself to the Japanese 
public. China also responded positively to Japan's decision to dispose 
of a large volume (700,000) of chemical artillery shells left in China 
by Japan after the Pacific War. The resolution of practical problems 
associated with the disposal suggests a cooperative approach on 
that issue by the two countries. China's accession to the CTBT, 
despite the US decision not to do so, also reduced the adverse 
Japanese reaction to China's nuclear testing. 
As problems have arisen in the relationship they have usually 
been resolved through diplomatic negotiations, often after top 
level Beijing-Tokyo discussion.Thus, in 2000,Japan reacted strongly 
to evidence of Chinese research vessels entering the Japanese 
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) without prior notice. Although 
formally legal, China and Japan agreed peaceably in February 200 I 
on how the issue should be handled in the future. 32 Although some 
breaches still seem to occur, the problem appears generally to 
have been handled satisfactorily. 
For China, the question of Taiwan, rather than the fear of a 
resurgence of Japanese militarism, has again become a central issue 
in the relationship. While that fear is not absent, China is mostly 
concerned by developments in Japan's role as a partner for the 
United States in containing China. Central to this is Japan's closer 
alliance with the United States, notably the passage of legislation 
for a revised set of defence guidelines and Japan's agreement to 
participate in the development of a US theatre missile defence system. 
In the past, the US-Japan defence treaty has sometimes been an 
issue, but only occasionally a major one for China-Japan relations. 
China's hostility has emerged with the development of new 
guidelines for Japan-US defence cooperation, which came into 
law in 1999, as they conceivably envisage Japanese support for the 
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United States in any clash that might occur with China over Taiwan. 
It may be argued that just for that reason, Japan is likely to be 
more cautious and urge that increased caution on the United 
States in any crisis over Taiwan. It was uncharacteristically prompt 
in responding adversely to President Lee's 'state to state' statement 
in July 1999.Japan's participation in TMD has similarly been strongly 
criticised by China because of the implications for Taiwan, in this 
case seen as encouraging a sense of security for Taiwan that may 
lead it to pursue independence. 
More generally, despite their long history as enemies, despite 
the lack of mutual trust, but perhaps in part because of the past 
history of aggression, the principle of non-aggression seems likely 
to continue to have a powerful restraining effect on both 
countries. Japan has become more cautious about the Taiwan issue 
given what it sees as a more assertive US approach under President 
Bush because of the implications for Japan's possible involvement 
in a cross-strait conflict. 
China-United States 
It is not intended here to deal with China-US relations as a whole 
but merely with those aspects that relate to North and Northeast 
Asia and China's diplomacy in that context. Nevertheless, it is 
relevant, as background, that since 1999 the Cox Report, Kosovo, 
the US-Japan security guidelines and, most particularly, the Belgrade 
embassy bombing and the surveillance plane incident have damaged 
China-US relations. Continuing promotion of NMD has not made 
improvement easy subsequently, nor has the US shift towards 
Taiwan or China's treatment of Falun Gong adherents. My 
assumption is, however, that, short of a bad mistake by the United 
States, China or Taiwan, the general relationship will remain basically 
sound if subject to sizeable swings in warmth or coolness. It has 
yet to be seen what overall policy stance towards Northeast Asia 
will eventually emerge under the Bush administration but Secretary 
of State Powell has restated support for the 'one China' policy 
and for the three communiques that have been the basis of US-
China relations under previous administrations. 
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It is also relevant that US administration policies towards China 
have consistently given weight to a belief that increased economic 
interchange provides disincentives to military conflict and 
encourages internal reform. These principles, which are seemingly 
held by President Bush if not by all his supporting elites, had the 
advantage of gaining strong business support in the United States, 
and for the most part fit with China's current priorities. 
Nevertheless, China's priorities and policies are increasingly 
predicated on a belief that international competition among nations 
in the future will be based on economic and technological power 
rather than simply on military power and that economic 
modernisation has to remain the priority. The inability of Russia to 
overcome its economic and political weakness is one factor that 
encourages China to work to maintain its links with the United 
States.Another is a lesson drawn by some Chinese analysts from 
the collapse of the USSR-that to be dragged into a Cold War 
with the United States would result in a similar Chinese collapse.33 
China's approach to the United States is based primarily, however, 
on the belief that good relations with the United States are 
necessary to enable the modernisation that will give China 
economic and technical power. For that reason, US-China relations 
are likely to remain its top priority. 
As with Russia, ideology has ceased playing a major role in China's 
relations with the United States. What remains relevant, apart 
from the vestigial remains of Cold War ideology in the US Congress, 
is what China sees as the US ideological concern to spread US 
'values' to China by way of'peaceful evolution'. 
In the North Pacific, the United States, while acknowledged as 
greatly superior to each of the other major powers, has not 
actively sought leadership beyond military security, as with the 
handling of the North Korean nuclear problem-to that extent 
the North Pacific is structurally multipolar. The US role has been 
essentially reactive and compartmentalised-whether over Taiwan 
or North Korea, or with respect to missile defence. It sees its 
Northeast Asia policy largely in bilateral terms based most 
particularly on its alliances with Japan and South Korea. It has a 
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particular interest in Chinese attitudes to developments in the area, 
including the potential changes on the Korean peninsula, such as 
China's attitudes towards a continuing US presence in Korea should 
reunification occur. China has not pronounced firmly on those 
possibilities and much would seem to depend on circumstances 
and the shape of China-US relations at the time. In their dealings 
with North Korea the Clinton administration, at least, seemed to 
have accepted that China had largely been constructive. 
It is possible, however, that China's pursuit of energy linkages in 
Russia and the CIS may be seen as competitive with, and potentially 
threatening to, US financial and energy interests.34 Given China's 
size, the rise of its economy and its increased participation in global 
markets, including the energy market, it will obviously challenge 
existing market participants. This should not be a surprise. The 
United States has been encouraging China to integrate itself into 
the international energy market-and encouraging investment and 
technology transfer to this end. In large part, as we note later, this 
seems to have worked. 
China-Korea 
China's prime interests on the Korean Peninsula are that it remain 
peaceful and stable and that its border with North Korea remain 
secure. It would seem to prefer continuation of a divided, but 
non-conflictual, peninsula but seems willing to accept moves 
towards peaceful reunification. It also wants to maintain its 
influence on the peninsula. In pursuing these interests, it has 
managed the changing circumstances on the peninsula and its 
relations with both Koreas with some care. It maintains its 
traditional links with the North, supporting its economy and 
encouraging peaceful reconciliation while developing vigorously 
its links with South Korea, initially in economic terms and then in 
political and strategic terms. It accepts that normalisation of North 
Korea's relations with the United States and Japan on balance is 
generally likely to be helpful in reducing its own commitments but 
is also likely to affect its own influence. 
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China has a sizeable border with North Korea and is concerned 
that instability within North Korea will lead, among other things, 
to outside interference and to large refugee flows into China. It is 
generally uneasy at the prospect of a nuclear North (or South). 
According to one report, China's foreign minister was to advise 
North Korea against its nuclear program on a foreshadowed visit.35 
China has aimed to maintain its relationship with North Korea 
for strategic reasons, to maintain its influence and to satisfy its 
domestic (mainly older PLA) constituencies. It has given support, 
however, to the broad elements of US policy towards North Korea, 
including the Agreed Framework although it has remained outside 
of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation 
(KEDO). It has reaffirmed that support in the uncertainty of the 
Bush administration's policy towards North Korea. It recognised 
belatedly that the first firing by North Korea of the Taepodong 
missile to launch a satellite certainly provided a basis for Japanese 
military developments, and for close US-Japanese military 
cooperation including TMD programs, about which South Korea 
seems ambivalent. Further North Korean missile tests would have 
a major impact on China's regional neighbours which would be 
adverse to its interests. 
From South Korea's perspective, a willingness had been evident 
to move closer to China for a number of reasons, including growing 
economic relations, but also the ability of China to play a mediating 
role between North and South Korea. China has participated in 
the various US discussions within the Four Party framework. 
Although there have been suggestions that China could do more 
to influence North Korea, it has generally been seen by South 
Korea as constructive in these discussions. President Kim recently 
noted that China had played a crucial role in dissuading North 
Korea from firing another missile, and encouraging the North to 
strike a deal with the United States on the missile issue.36 On the 
other hand, there are South Korean views against moving too 
close to China, and South Korea is managing its relations carefully 
to avoid leaning too far to one side or the other. Yet, although it 
has substantially improved its links with Japan, South Korea's feelings 
towards Japan and the continuing, if diminishing, fears of Japanese 
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militarism-not helped by its anger over the 200 I Japanese 
textbook issue-will mean that some leaning towards China is 
likely. 
Fishery competition has been a traditional area of dispute in the 
regional seas and, with Law of the Sea developments, disputes 
over territorial waters and offshore mineral and fishery rights 
have become increasingly important in the North Pacific. China 
and South Korea still have to define finally their EEZ borders arising 
from their ratification of the UN Law of the Sea. They have signed 
a fisheries agreement as an interim arrangement in the Yellow Sea 
until the zonal boundaries are settled. 37 This agreement seems to 
have been more readily achieved than South Korea's fishing 
arrangements with Japan. China, for its part, had signed a new 
agreement on fisheries with Japan in 1997, which similarly provided 
for a joint control zone in the central part of the East China Sea, 
carefully avoiding the issue of the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. 
Energy cooperation between China and South Korea is expected 
to grow as a consequence of the oil and gas developments within 
Russia and the CIS being discussed in North and Northeast Asia. 
South Korea is also to be involved in nuclear power plant 
development in China. 
ia 
Western analysts often question China's adherence to the norm 
of non-aggression. One motivation for China's aggression has been 
that of sovereignty-still threatened in the case of Taiwan and 
argued by some Western analysts, with some limited evidence, 
over China's activities in the Spratly Islands. For those that believe 
China wishes to restore the borders of its earlier imperial days, 
Mongolia provides something of a test. 
Certainly, among China's concerns over its territorial integrity 
and sovereignty is its Mongolian Autonomous Region (or Inner 
Mongolia). What was once Outer Mongolia, however, obtained its 
independence after the Soviet collapse and now has an elected 
government. It was previously a site for the positioning of large 
Soviet forces (now removed). Fears that China, when strong, would 
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seek to recover what had once been claimed as its territory, or at 
least to bring it under its dominant influence, seem not to have 
materialised nor to be likely. The example of a successful 
democratic and independent Mongolia dearly offers risks to China's 
control of its own Mongolian population. Generally, however, China 
appears to have come to terms with the situation. Sino-Mongolian 
relations are, for China at least, satisfactory though not without 
tensions, as there are some Mongolian fears of economic 
domination, since economic exchanges with China have growing 
substantially. Mongolia knows, however, that significant irredentist 
activity could risk less cooperative Chinese relations. 
Regional cooperation 
China regards the multilateral meetings of the Shanghai Five, now 
the SCO, as a particularly important element of its northern 
diplomacy, which to date has provided substantial benefits in terms 
of security and stability in the area. For others of the SCO this is 
similarly important although a desire to develop links with Europe 
is suggested by membership of the NATO's Partnership for Peace 
with Tajikistan finally joining Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia as a 
member. 
Apart from the multilateral processes of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, North and Northeast Asia is lacking in 
regional multilateral institutions. China has not been active in 
looking to develop regional institutional arrangements but neither 
has it sought to establish institutions to rival those of the 
international system. Nevertheless, many informal multilateral 
groupings have emerged in which China has participated, with 
official encouragement, seeking to deal with such things as security, 
economics, management of ocean resources, transport and the 
environment and, most especially, energy developments. 
Cooperation in the transport area, including on a Eurasian rail 
link, has been associated with the rapid growth of trade among 
the regional states that constitutes a major incentive for 
cooperative relations in NortheastAsia. This cooperation has often 
taken forms that reflect natural economic linkages rather than 
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political linkages, such as South Korea's emphasis on investment in 
China. There have been efforts by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to stimulate cooperation 
among China, North Korea and Russia along the Tum en River. These 
are actively supported by China's Jilin province in providing access 
to the Sea of Japan but, despite being originally a Chinese idea, the 
project has received a lower priority from Beijing, 38 and 
development is moving at best very slowly. 
In the security field, Russia has proposed from time to time a 
collective security arrangement among the six regional countries 
of the North Pacific. South Korea has proposed a six-party official 
dialogue process. China seems unenthusiastic about multilateral 
security cooperation at the official level, despite being pressed by 
Kim Dae-jung during his 1998 Beijing visit to support something 
like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). 39 China, although opposing any OSCE-type process as 
likely to intervene in domestic matters, has accepted that a semi-
official process could be acceptable. It is comfortable at present, 
however, with the Four Party talks dealing with the Korean 
Peninsula. Japan would no doubt go along with a broader 
multilateral arrangement but is at the moment also seemingly 
satisfied with the Four Party talks. It has also seen the ASEAN plus 
3 Oapan, China and South Korea) meetings as providing an 
opportunity for the principal Northeast Asian leaders to meet 
and discuss common interests. 
In the energy field, considerable dialogue has taken place. In this 
field, a number of cross-cutting issues come into play. China's interests 
in Central Asia's energy economy are substantial but so are Russia's 
interests in controlling that economy. While, in this respect, China's 
and Russia's interests are likely to be competitive, in both cases 
other motivations are important. In some respects these other 
motivations are compatible-both want to control religious 
extremism, terrorism and transborder crime. In others, Russia's 
objectives, whether for political, strategic and economic dominance 
or control of energy sources and transport may not always fit 
China's interests. In the short run, Russia's weakness will limit its 
capacity to dominate but in the long run the situation could change. 
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Given China's large potential future requirements for energy, 
the question has been raised of its strategy for meeting those 
needs. What that strategy will be and how it is prosecuted has 
important regional implications. The options posited are reliance 
on the market or territorial acquisition.40 It seems apparent that 
China will basically rely on the market, formulating strategies to 
compete actively in the market. In practice, therefore, China is 
becoming substantially integrated in the world energy market. Thus 
the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has been 
investing extensively in oil and natural gas fields and in energy related 
enterprises globally in order to provide for supply security and to 
reduce its dependence upon the Middle East. It is also a way of 
obtaining technology-but Chinese companies have also become 
joint venturers in providing services to the global oil and gas industry. 
For obvious reasons, however, it has a particular interest in Russia 
and the CIS as alternative energy suppliers to the Middle East. 
Russia and the CIS have larger proven gas reserves than the 
Middle East. The nature of the energy sector in Russia and the CIS, 
however, with very large investments required in development 
and in pipeline transport as well as passage rights commonly makes 
multilateral rather than bilateral cooperation inevitable. Much of 
the discussion of such cooperation has been at the company level 
(many of which have been government companies, as in China's 
case), but governments have increasingly become involved, 
particularly in the case of China and Russia. No multilateral forum 
has evolved, however, at the official level as distinct from the 
unofficial level. 
There are a variety of projects under consideration, some 
regional pipeline projects involving virtually all the regional states, 
the main objective being to bring Russian, Kazak and Turkmen oil 
and gas to China, Japan and South Korea. While much has still to 
be worked out, the attraction for China is the diversification and 
long-term security of supply and environmental benefits. China's 
CNPC has two development projects in Kazakstan, won in 
competition with US and Russian bidders. Plans for the development 
of Irkutsk's Kovyktinskoye gas field and construction of a pipeline 
by a consortium of countries including China, involving supply to 
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China, are at an advanced planning stage; progress has also been 
made on plans to pipe gas from western Siberia to Xinjiang and 
from Turkmenistan also to Xinjiang. 
In other areas, much of the discussion, and many of the 
announcements of deals signed or projected have not proceeded 
very far and when they have they are often conditional, as with 
China's oil investments in Iraq. Often the announcements or 
agreements are little more than symbolic. Decisionmaking is slow, 
technical problems are major and political differences arise, such 
as over where processing should take place, a factor not only 
important in the RFE but also between China's support for a 
processing industry in Xinjiang and the Kazak wish not simply to 
supply raw materials. But the joint Chinese-Russian gas exploration 
and pipeline project in Irkutsk in Eastern Siberia seems to have 
progressed further than this. 
For energy cooperation with China's north, a multilateral 
approach appears to be 'an inescapable necessity' .41 Given the large 
costs involved in energy development and transport, the economic 
viability of projects will normally require participation of other 
gas or oil consumers, notably Japan and South Korea. This will 
require the development of stronger cooperative ties between 
China and these countries. 
Despite China's efforts to reduce dependence upon the Middle 
East through its closer links with Russia and the CIS, it will remain 
heavily dependent upon the Middle East. While it will no doubt 
want to gain a particular edge in the competition for energy from 
that area, it also has an interest in stability in that region and 
energy interests will no doubt be an increasing influence in China's 
strategic policy. It also makes it evident that the concern at sea 
lane security that Japan and others have often expressed will be 
more likely a concern shared by China rather than China being 
seen as a possible threat. 
Conclusion 
It is a commonplace that China must play by the rules and norms 
of the international system if it is to be integrated into global 
society. China might reasonably ask who wrote the rules or 
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formulated the norms, and who judges compliance with norms? 
The evidence of its diplomacy in North and Northeast Asia does 
not suggest, however, that China rejects the general propositions 
nor the legitimacy of international norms that are genuinely 
international, and not simply the policy preferences of a relatively 
small, if powerful, group of countries. In the region at least, China 
has been following most of the universal norms and has benefited 
in security, stability and economic terms from their pursuit and, 
indeed, reaffirmation. 
Human rights is the obvious area where it still has a long way to 
go. While it is also argued that this is true of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, this is not a major issue in China's 
northern diplomacy and, in any case, it is increasingly difficult to 
substantiate evidence in what has become a highly politicised 
context. There have been signs, moreover, of its sharing 
international opinion and understanding of the interdependence 
of security as well as of its recognition of its own national interests 
in arms control. Support for the ABM treaty remains as strong in 
China as in its northern neighbours. 
We noted earlier that norms are changeable. China has argued 
that internationally accepted norms should be preserved-by which 
they mean that sovereignty should be respected and that 
intervention in the internal affairs of another country should only 
be within UN auspices. In the Shanghai Five context, it has 
reasserted its support for these norms. 
In North and Northeast Asia, some norms are more important 
than are others. Peaceful resolution of territorial and other 
disputes, non-interference in domestic affairs and cooperative 
handling of relations are most relevant and have been important 
in influencing China's North Pacific diplomacy. The related emphasis 
on confidence building has reinforced this approach. Although 
success in the economic field, seen as important in building 
confidence as well as on its own merits, has been limited, economic 
linkages among the North Pacific countries are likely to grow. 
China's efforts in the north are not primarily motivated by anti-
US sentiment as such. Although unilateralist US policies and the 
policies of NATO have added to areas of common interest in 
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arguing for a multipolar world, links with the West remain central 
for China and Russia in particular. Bilateral issues with China's 
northern neighbours are important enough, however, to need 
cooperative relationships. 
The scope for cooperation in the North and Northeast Asia 
region is large in regional security, economics, transport, energy 
supply and environmental management. That cooperation may fail 
or be slow for many reasons, including a lack of governmental 
capabilities among the major states involved. The evidence does 
not suggest that the barrier will be that China's intentions conflict 
with international norms. 
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's bid r 
China's power in international relations has been growing in the 
last two decades, particularly following the han dover of Hong Kong 
in 1997 and of Macau in 1999. Beijing's current political agenda is 
to unify Taiwan with China. A realist would argue that a Great 
Power like China can set its agenda for dialogue, that the idea of 
political equality is irrelevant in settling the Taiwan question, and 
that the United States will also cease its support ofTaiwan if China 
becomes more powerful in the next two decades.A realist would 
also be pleased to note that all major political parties in Taiwan 
except the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) went to Beijing 
in 2000 to express their'loyalty' in the face of the increasing military, 
political and economic power that China enjoys. All the above 
views share one key idea-it is power that matters, power that 
decides Taiwan's fate, and power that settles the Taiwan question. 
This chapter does not endorse this view of power politics, instead 
it argues for the politics of responsibility. 
The basic idea of the politics of responsibility is that the greater 
power a state has, the more responsibility it has to take. The 
international community now expects China to take greater 
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responsibility in international affairs in accordance with its increased 
power. China is expected to demonstrate responsibility not only 
for the interests of its own people, but also the interests of other 
states and peoples affected by China's policy. This is because, in an 
increasingly globalised world, the impact of domestic policy often 
extends beyond borders. Indeed, people in Southeast Asian 
countries-particularly Singapore-and in Australia are seriously 
concerned about China's Taiwan policies and their actual and 
potential impacts. Ignoring the impact domestic policy has beyond 
one's borders is a form of narrow collective egoism and is likely 
to invite protests and condemnation from the international 
community. As a result, responsibility is not only a moral issue, but 
a real political matter. Failing to take responsibility can damage a 
state's reputation and weaken its place in the international 
community. The key question for China is whether Beijing can 
develop a Taiwan policy that is not only responsible to the Chinese 
people on the mainland, but also to the people ofTaiwan, East Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and the international community as a whole. 
In recent years, China's foreign policies have generally been 
restrained and responsible. China has, for example, stopped its 
nuclear tests in response to international pressure. China has 
cooperated with the international community in pursuing a peaceful 
settlement in Cambodia and supporting international peace-
keeping efforts in East Timor. 
China's Taiwan policy has also been restrained and responsible 
recently, notwithstanding the military exercises it conducted in 
the Taiwan Straits in 1995-96. Chen Shuibian's policy has also been 
restrained. In his presidential address in May 2000, Chen pledged 
that he would not declare independence, change the national title, 
or push for the inclusion of the so-called 'state-to-state' 
description in the constitution. Chen further pledged that he would 
not promote a referendum on Taiwanese independence if the CCP 
regime had no intention of using military force against Taiwan. 
Although Beijing was dissatisfied with Chen's ambiguity about the 
one-China principle, it responded to Taiwan's goodwill in a positive 
way. In the politics of defining one-China, Beijing made a 
compromise-although Beijing insisted that Taiwan stick to the 
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one-China principle, it did not define China as the People's Republic 
of China and left open the question of what constitutes China. 1 
Apart from the absence of military conflict, three mini-links were 
established, and DPP officials were invited to visit China. 
Nevertheless, though pragmatic compromises are being made, 
substantial rethinking of the principle of sovereignty is still lacking. 
A responsible Taiwan policy must deal with the question of 
sovereignty. 
This chapter attempts to reexamine the fundamental question 
of sovereignty by examining China's policy toward Taiwan's bid for 
UN membership. It calls for the development and adoption of a 
new construct and practice of sovereignty that is acceptable to 
both sides. The chapter argues for a more flexible and responsible 
policy regardingTaiwan's UN ambitions. 
China's opposition to Taiwan's bid for UN 
membership 
The Republic of China (ROC) government launched its seventh 
bid to join the United Nations on 12 August 1999. Twenty nations 
supported its proposal to the UN steering committee. The number 
of countries that opposed Taiwan's bid, however, increased from 
40 to 48. In particular, the United States, United Kingdom and 
France, all of which had chosen to stay away from the issue in the 
past, stood against the ROC in I 999.2 The ROC launched its eighth 
bid to join the United Nations in August 2000. On 3 August 2000, 
only twelve UN members submitted a joint proposal to the UN 
Secretary-General requesting inclusion of the proposal to consider 
the ROC seat as a supplementary item in the agenda of the fifth 
plenary session of the General Assembly in September 2000. 
Of course, Beijing saw Taipei's bid as a separatist action and stood 
firm against the move. China's blockade of Taiwan's bid for UN 
membership is understandable given the general perception of 
the United Nations as an intergovernmental organisation of 
sovereign states. According to international norms, whoever joins 
the United Nations is regarded as an independent state. In other 
words, UN membership is an international criterion for 
independent statehood. 
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It is also easy to understand China's opposition to Taiwan's entry 
to the United Nations in the light of the deep-rooted Chinese 
ideal of Great Unity, which holds that there can be but one 
sovereignty, just as there is one sun. As far as China is concerned, 
there is only one China, and China can only speak with one voice 
and can only be represented by one seat in the United Nations.3 
There is another important reason why China is against Taiwan's 
UN membership. It might be thought of as a mentality, a centre-
province mentality. To China, Taiwan is but a province, and as such 
it cannot join the United Nations separately. This mentality, 
however, ignores the historical fact that Taiwan has been 
autonomous for fifty years. The PRC has to realise (however 
irritating it would be to admit it publicly) that Taiwan is politically, 
economically and militarily more independent of other powers 
than many nation-states whose populations and land areas are 
smaller than Taiwan's. 
Given the strength of Taiwan's political, military and economic 
power, it is not certain that China will be able to prevent Taiwan 
from joining the United Nations in the long term. Taiwan's UN 
membership will repeatedly present itself in this new century as a 
thorny political issue. So far, Taiwan has been recognised by 28 
countries. It has never stopped expanding its 'living space' by 
establishing flexible, substantive international relations. It is only 
logical that Taiwan will continue to push this agenda as its economic 
strength grows. Pressure from China can only result in a backlash 
in Taiwan-the stronger the pressure, the stronger the backlash. 
In trying to hurt the Taiwanese government politically and 
diplomatically, China hurts the feelings of ordinary Taiwanese 
people. As a result, the very notion of reunification is losing its 
appeal to many Taiwanese. 
Institutional innovation 
An alternative mode of thinking and search for an institutional 
innovation is now urgently required. A substantive issue is Taiwan's 
position in the world. Is it possible that China might stop trying to 
push Taiwan out of the international community and switch to 
mutually and multilaterally inclusive policies? Does a peaceful 
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unification policy require Beijing to renounce the use of force 
and agree to Taiwan's membership of the United Nations and 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
If Hong Kong enjoys international recognition and a special status 
in international organisations such as Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) , 
Taiwan should enjoy more international space and recognition than 
Hong Kong if a reunification takes place. There is every reason to 
explore flexible options that are sympathetic to the will of the 
Taiwanese people while at the same time laying an inclusive political 
foundation for reunification. A critical speculative question is 
whether it is possible for China to welcome Taiwan to the United 
Nations voluntarily. 
Importantly, it is possible for China to negotiate with the United 
Nations about the status of Taiwan. Taiwan may first become an 
observer in the United Nations, just as twenty other states or 
organisations (including Palestine) have done. Then, Taiwan may 
obtain associate membership. Ultimately, Taiwan may gain a seat 
in the United Nations under the name China-Taiwan, similar to 
the arrangement of China-Hong Kong in APEC. Even the name 
People's Republic of China is open to discussion and change. It 
should be stressed that China's support for Taiwan's UN 
membership would be conditional on Taiwan's commitment to an 
eventual union. If Beijing were to make such a move, a crucial 
precondition for the resolution of the Taiwan question would be 
some concession by Taiwan to its claim of sovereignty. 
Independence-related activities must take into consideration the 
interests of China and the feelings of the Chinese leadership and 
people. Taiwan and the PRC need to pool their sovereignty to 
form a loose federation and share their sovereignty in the United 
Nations. 
Territorial communities like Taiwan have come to enjoy 
considerable international status.As Michael Davis argues, 
Beijing should recognise that affording an autonomous 
constituent community a substantial degree of 
international participation would help to gain its trust 
in any agreed arrangement. For a confederal Taiwan, this 
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might even include participatory rights normally enjoyed 
by states. Taiwan's leaders will be reluctant to agree to 
anything less'.4 
The old idea that one sovereignty enjoys only one seat is 
counterproductive in dealing with the Taiwan question. The new 
idea, that one sovereignty can be represented by two asymmetric 
seats in the United Nations, is capable of satisfying both Taiwan's 
desire for international space and China's one-China policy. That 
is, Taiwan would be a part of China, while enjoying special status in 
the United Nations. This 'dialectic' politics would achieve 
reunification through supporting an 'independence' policy that 
welcomed Taiwan into the United Nations. 
The UN system does provide such institutional flexibility. As a 
sovereign state, San Marino is associated with Italy but controls its 
own foreign policy and has UN membership. Liechtenstein shares 
a number of powers with its dominant neighbour, Switzerland, 
but retains its status as a sovereign state. 
The proposal of UN membership as a possible solution to the 
Taiwan problem might sound 'unrealistic', but this is only because 
the current Chinese leadership is unlikely to accept the idea of 
democratic federalism, or the idea of a separate UN seat for 
Taiwan. The current Chinese leadership rejects such liberal or 
democratic lines of thought. Qian Qichen, for example, has said 
that any attempt to change the status of Taiwan through a 
referendum in Taiwan would pose a serious problem.5Tang Shubei, 
Vice-Chairperson of the Association for Relations across Taiwan 
Strait, has also asserted that democracy is not an essential question 
and that democratic reform should not constitute an obstacle to 
negotiations on the reunification question. He stressed that Taiwan 
should not impose democracy on China, nor should China impose 
socialism on Taiwan.6 
Nevertheless, such a proposal is certainly not far removed from 
reality.Top leaders in Beijing have reportedly considered recognising 
Taiwan as a political entity? In a new initiative, Beijing has promised 
that it would not appoint senior Taiwanese officials as it does those 
of Hong Kong and Macau, that Taipei could maintain some quasi-
diplomatic functions, and that the united country need not be 
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called the People's Republic of China.8The proposal becomes even 
more feasible if we take into account the international practice 
of dual seats in the United Nations, the costs and benefits of 
recognising Taiwan's seat, changes in Chinese practice of sovereignty, 
and the development of post-modern state sovereignty. 
Importantly, dissidents within the Party have already proposed 
new policies toward Taiwan. For example, Fang Jue writes that 
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China 
should have equal status under international law. Each 
has its own territory and citizens. In reality, neither entity 
has ever had legal and administrative jurisdiction over 
the other. The above statement should be the starting 
point for an understanding between people on both 
sides of the Taiwan Straits and for the international 
community. If mainland China and Taiwan conduct 
political negotiations, they should be carried out only 
on an equal basis between the government of the 
People's Republic of China and the government of the 
Republic of China.9 
Comparative lesson 
China's current opposition to Taiwan's UN bid is predicated on 
the assumption that UN membership means independence for 
Taiwan. This is not a well-grounded assumption. When there is a 
dispute over national identity, or the question of divided 
nationhood, the United Nations allows for dual representation. 
Let us look at this from a comparative perspective. The two 
Germanies were admitted to the United Nations in 1973 and 
unified in 1990.The Yemen Arab Republic joined the United Nations 
in 1947, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen became a 
UN member in 1967, and the two Yemens merged in 1990. It was 
proposed that UN membership be granted to the two Vietnams, 
but this did not occur due to the formal unification ofVietnam in 
1976. 10 The sovereignty of the Soviet Union was represented by 
the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Belarus. 11 Both the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea became UN 
members in 1991. As of the end of 1991, 153 countries had 
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established official diplomatic relations with the South and I 12 
with the North. Today, Korea-the cultural motherland of the 
Korean nation-is represented by both South Korea and North 
Korea. 
One of the most important things that these cases tell us is that 
state sovereignty is not necessarily represented by one seat in 
the United Nations. It is clear that Beijing's notion of 'one 
sovereignty-one seat' does not equate with the way in which 
sovereignty is construed in the cases of the two Yemens, the two 
Koreas, the two Germanies and the Soviet Union, Ukraine and 
Belarus. China's opposition to Taiwan's UN membership might be 
justified historically in the sense that Taipei and Washington 
successfully blocked Beijing's bid for UN membership in the 1950s, 
but it finds little support from comparative politics. 
In the context of dual seat arrangements, China's one seat policy 
seems to be the exception in international rule. If the two 
Germanies, the two Koreas, and the two Yemens were able to 
have dual seats in the United Nations, why is a similar arrangement 
denied to Taiwan? One explanation is the asymmetric power 
relations between China and Taiwan. As a greater power in East 
Asia, China is able to block Taiwan's bid to enter the United Nations, 
whereas North Korea was in no position to block the South's 
entry to the United Nations in spite of its initial objection to the 
idea of dual UN seats. Here, it is China's greater power that 
renders the idea of dual seats improbable. For this reason, it is 
imperative (as a precondition to the settlement of the Taiwan 
question) that China use its greater power wisely. It is this 
asymmetric power relation that necessitates the power of the 
United States as a balancing force to create power equilibrium 
and the current stability of the region. 
A cost-benefit analysis 
Now let us look at the potential benefits if China agrees to Taiwan's 
UN membership. First, it can ensure peace and break the cycle of 
tension and relaxation across the Strait, and reduce the possibility 
of military conflict. It will also reduce Taipei's motivation to buy 
defence hardware from the United States. 
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Second, the economic cost for both sides can be greatly reduced 
or saved as the need to compete for diplomatic recognition is 
removed. 12 It would be far more beneficial to the peoples ofTaiwan 
and the mainland if the money consumed in diplomatic wars were 
wisely used on cross-Strait relations. 
Third, Taiwanese UN membership might be helpful to 
reunification in the long run. If China welcomed Taiwan to the 
United Nations, the two could potentially create an economic 
union. This could in turn provide a foundation for political union. 
Let us now look at this issue from a comparative perspective. 
Dual seats did not prevent the final unification of the two 
Germanies (bear in mind that they had separate seats in the United 
Nations for 17 years) and the two Yemens. It is political 
arrangements based on mutual recognition, as in the case of the 
two Germanies, that actually promoted the final unification. In 
the case of the two Koreas, independence is a non-issue since 
both are members of the United Nations. For them, the only 
issue is reunification. 
One reason why independence is on Taiwan's agenda is that it is 
deprived of UN membership.lfTaiwan were to become a member 
of the United Nations, the independence problem would disappear. 
This would leave reunification as the only issue, and this could only 
improve cross-Strait relations. 
A lesson from the experience of the European Union is that 
member countries have conceded some of their national 
sovereignty for the sake of political and economic union so as to 
compete more effectively with Japan and the United States. If 
China and Taiwan are locked into the nineteenth century notion 
of national sovereignty, they are less likely to play a major role in 
global politics other than as a 'trouble spot' for the international 
community. 
To achieve unification, the sequence of action is important. The 
rigid view that any action cannot appear to move away from the 
goal of unification is unhelpful. It might be a better sequence to 
allow Taiwan to join the United Nations and be autonomous before 
pursuing reunification. Reunification, like a marriage, should be a 
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voluntary bond. Reunification is less likely if goodwill in Taiwan is 
damaged as a result of political pressure from the mainland. 
Moreover, as a result of China's threat towards Taiwan, Taiwan's 
unification advocates cannot speak out strongly. If Taiwan were 
admitted to the United Nations, however, they could develop into 
a more dynamic force for unification. 
A fourth benefit of China being more positive about Taiwan's 
UN membership is that a contradiction in cross-Strait relations 
could be resolved-the contradiction between cultural/economic 
convergence and political divergence manifested in political 
antagonism. While cultural/economic contact and exchange are 
increasing between Taiwan and the mainland, the two entities are 
drifting further apart politically. 
Fifth, recognition of Taiwan will enhance China's international 
status and demonstrate that China is a good international citizen. 
The idea that losingTaiwan will undermine China's status is myth. 
The idea that the CCP will collapse if it loses Taiwan is another 
myth. When China treats Taiwan unequally and violently, it invites 
international condemnation. If China respected Taiwan as an equal 
partner, it would also gain respect from the international 
community. 
What is the cost to Beijing of Taiwan becoming a member of the 
United Nations? The greatest cost is Taiwan's independence. Two 
seats for one sovereignty means a reduction of one party's claim 
of sovereignty over the other. Moreover, a substantial cost in the 
eyes of the Chinese military is that Taiwan's independence poses 
threats to China's sea power and to China's domestic politics in 
that it sends a signal to secessionists in Tibet and Xinjiang. Complete 
independence should, however, be distinguished from the form of 
'independence' implied in the proposal for a Taiwanese seat in the 
United Nations. As stated above, the recognition of Taiwan's UN 
seat is a special arrangement-it requires Taipei's commitment to 
unification in return. But recognising Taiwan would only mean 
'nominal' independence anyway because Taiwan has already gained 
its political autonomy. Moreover, what Beijing would like to have 
is only 'nominal' unification-it has promised that Taiwan would 
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retain its army, currency and government if unification went ahead. 
Beijing would not have the right to control Taiwan's people or 
land, nor could it impose taxation. If that is the case, China should 
not continue its rigid opposition to Taiwan's international move. 
The second cost for Beijing would be the loss of the legitimacy 
upon which their political authority relies. In Chinese nationalist 
thinking, the Taiwan question is a potential and actual source of 
legitimacy for the government. In reality, however, if the CCP 
could reduce the tension, save diplomatic costs, and benefit both 
the Taiwanese and mainlanders, this would greatly bolster its 
legitimacy. 
The third cost for Beijing is the reduction of China's privilege in 
the United Nations. The exclusion of Taiwan helps China maintain 
its status and privilege in the international community in that only 
Beijing represents China. 
Beijing must also consider the greatest potential cost of all-a 
war against Taiwan's independence.A war would seriously damage 
the domestic economy, evoke opposition from Asian countries 
and the West, and delay modernisation in China. The cost of war 
would far outweigh the cost of making concessions to Taiwan. Of 
course, there are other perceptions of costs and benefits. Some 
military officers in China may see great benefit in waging war against 
Taiwan. They imagine that a war would free China from the 
influence of Japan and the United States, and from the disintegrative 
forces associated with Taiwanese independence. 
The above analysis contains an economic rationalist account of 
the Chinese politics of membership. It stresses that membership 
is merely a political 'commodity'. China is on the supplying side. To 
allow Taiwan a seat in the United Nations would not cost China 
anything, but would return enormous benefits. Why not trade 
sovereignty for economic interests? A pragmatic approach would 
take such a trade-off seriously. Some countries sell membership 
or national licenses for economic interests. Conversely, Beijing 
uses economic incentives to secure China's 'integrity'. It allows 
some countries to access China's markets, but, in return, asks those 
countries to respect Beijing's one-China policy. Compellingly, 
however, China will not trade sovereignty for economic interest. 
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Can economic logic extend to the political sphere of sovereignty? 
As far as territorial sovereignty is concerned, Beijing has kept a 
rigid line, rejecting any compromise over Taiwan.This way of thinking 
is characterised by a move from principle to reality, rather than 
the other way around.This is an ideological obstacle to the peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question. For Beijing, unification is the 
goal. Rhetorically, Beijing insists that there can be no compromise 
on sovereignty; sovereignty is sacred. 
Adjusting, negotiating and 'trading' Chinese 
sovereignty 
The key issue here is sovereignty. In its Taiwan policy, the Chinese 
government consistently attempts to defend its sovereignty. 
The notion of sovereignty is complex and subject to different 
interpretations. Simply put, sovereignty denotes a state's entitlement 
to control the population within its national territories. It is 
reflected in border control, legal jurisdiction, representation in 
international organisations, the ability to set the agenda in 
policymaking, and the capacity to control exchange rates and tax 
policy. 
Several questions need to be considered. First, must sovereignty 
be exclusive? Can sovereignty be shared and inclusive? Has Chinese 
sovereignty remained intact or has it been diminished as a result 
of increasing globalisation? Is there a link between the nature of 
the political regime and the idea of sovereignty? Democracy entails 
popular sovereignty, thus respecting the people's consent over 
the boundary question, while authoritarian regimes rely on an 
absolute idea of sovereignty as a basis for their existence. Is there 
a linkage in China between the decentralisation of power and the 
dilution of its sovereignty? 
China has become integrated into the international community 
by participating in the world economy, joining international 
organisations, and signing and ratifying international treaties. 
Integration and the pressures of Great Power relations, the global 
economy and technological innovation are forcing China to adjust 
its conception and practice of sovereignty. The Chinese 
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government has tried hard to maintain what it considers a proper 
balance between state autonomy and integration into the world 
community. 
Where economic interests are involved, China is willing to make 
more concessions or place less emphasis on sovereignty.Yongnian 
Zheng's phrase 'perforated sovereignty' precisely describes the 
situation wherein the Chinese central government is no longer 
monolithic in all aspects of foreign affairs and provincial 
governments are increasingly becoming paradiplomatic actors in 
China's foreign trade. 13 It is imperative for China to attract foreign 
investment in the highly competitive international economy. To do 
this, China has gradually opened some economic sectors, such as 
banking and insurance. In doing this, it has given up some of its 
economic sovereign power by ratifying international treaties and 
making concessions to global economic forces. Beijing has given 
up more economic sovereignty in order to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). China allows foreign companies to bypass 
the Chinese judicial system for a fair trial if an economic dispute 
occurred. If economic interests outweigh the desire to retain 
national sovereignty, China may have to consider the option of 
sacrificing more of its sovereignty to the WT0. 14 
The human rights discourse in China has shifted from an emphasis 
on domestic issues to recognition of universal issues. Although 
the Chinese government insists that human rights cannot override 
sovereignty, many books and articles have been published in China 
advocating the predominance of universal human rights. One article 
discusses the tendency towards declining state sovereignty and 
the increasing internationalisation or globalisation of human rights, 
and elaborates the conditions under which international 
intervention on human rights is justifiable. 15 Importantly, a new 
conception of a fundamental basis for government legitimacy has 
emerged-a genuine protection of human rights. Any government 
that denies or violates human rights is regarded as illegitimate.As 
Zhang Chunjin put it, '[h]uman rights are the greatest politics. All 
activities of politics should take human rights as central, or be 
guided by the human rights principle.Without human rights, politics 
become hypocritical and cheating'. 16 
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In the battle over sovereignty and human rights, Beijing seems 
to be in a losing position in the sense that it has to make concessions 
under pressure while still insisting on the sacredness of sovereignty. 
In practice, China has signed international treaties on human rights, 
entered the international human rights regime, and has thereby 
accepted a derogation of national sovereignty (despite this, the 
question of whether and to what extent China subscribes to the 
international human rights regime remains). International 
protection of human rights implies that states do not have supreme 
authority over the way in which they treat people within their 
territory. On a fundamental level, the human rights discourse has 
made it immoral and impractical to view the world as consisting 
of territorial units each exerting supreme authority within their 
own borders. 
Significantly, a quiet change has taken place in China's policy toward 
international intervention. China objected to NATO's intervention 
in Kosovo, but supported the UN peacekeeping force in East Timor 
by sending some police. This implies that Beijing recognises that 
sovereignty is not sacrosanct and that international intervention 
can be allowed to override national sovereignty. That said, Beijing's 
approach certainly has a different emphasis. For example Beijing 
believed that the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was illegitimate 
because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had sovereign power 
over Kosovo, while UN intervention in East Timor was legitimate 
because it was invited by the Indonesian government and Indonesia 
did not have well-established sovereignty over East Timor. 
Nevertheless, China has changed its position, from a strong one 
that holds that no intervention is allowed as far as sovereignty is 
concerned, to a weak position that holds that international 
intervention may be allowed if injustice occurs and the intervention 
is under UN auspices. 
In other areas, the PRC has suppressed extreme nationalists 
and discouraged any debate on the sovereignty over Senkaku 
(Diaoyu) Islands. China's policy toward conflict in the South China 
Sea is also characterised by an emphasis on mutual benefit rather 
than sovereignty. In the early 1970s, the Chinese government 
opposed not only joint development of the East China Sea but 
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also the idea of putting aside the question of sovereignty. Beijing 
changed its policy in the 1980s. In 1988, Wang Yingfan, Chinese 
ambassador to Manila, suggested that Beijing had decided to 
temporarily shelve the question of sovereignty over the Spratly 
(Nansha) Islands. This, however, does not mean that China has 
given up its claim to sovereignty over these Islands. Chinese scholars 
also object to the Antarctic model being applied to the South 
China Sea. 17 
The notion of 'One country, two systems' in Hong Kong 
demonstrates the complexity of Chinese sovereignty over Hong 
Kong. On the one hand, China's sovereignty is symbolised by its 
military garrison in Hong Kong, the state's monopoly of violence, 
and the central appointment of the chief executive through a 
symbolic election process. The latter gives rise to tension between 
sovereignty and accountability: to whom are the elected politicians 
and the non-elected government officials accountable-Beijing or 
the citizens of Hong Kong? 18 On the other hand, China has shown 
great flexibility in aspects of its sovereignty over Hong Kong. For 
example, Beijing does not impose taxation-one key element in 
the traditional practice of sovereignty-on Hong Kong. The people 
of Hong Kong are allowed to have two or more different 
passports, implying tacit recognition of dual nationality by Beijing. 
This undermines the exdusivist notion of Chinese citizenship, which 
is a part of the Chinese practice of sovereignty. Border controls 
between China and Hong Kong prohibit ordinary Chinese from 
freely entering Hong Kong. Moreover, Hong Kong enjoys special 
status in some international organisations, such as APEC. 
Looking back, China has made a great deal of concessions over 
Hong Kong. Such compromise is now widely accepted in China. It 
should be emphasised that it was Deng Xiaoping's innovation and 
determination that convinced his fellows to make such a 
compromise with regard to sovereignty. Today, China needs a 
similarly innovative and capable leader to implement a deal with 
Taiwan. 
The Chinese government has considerable flexibility on some 
practical issues in Taiwan Straits relations. Beijing negotiated a treaty 
with Taipei to deal with PRC citizens who hijack aeroplanes in 
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order to reach Taiwan. The negotiation initially broke down on 
issues of sovereignty, such as whether Taiwan has the jurisdiction 
to decide if hijackers are to be sent back to mainland China. 
Eventually, Beijing compromised and ratified the basic agreement 
on hijackers. 19 Taiwan has already been a member of the Asian 
Development Bank and APE C. Thus, China's Taiwan policy already 
implies a divided notion of sovereignty. Although Chinese 
sovereignty would ideally be realised through formal unification 
of mainland China and Taiwan, Taiwan would keep its own army, 
police force, currency, and parliament. Under this arrangement, 
China's national sovereignty would be reflected by two different 
systems with separate armies, parliaments and currencies. 
right of 
Clearly, China is flexible enough to adjust its practice of sovereignty 
even though it often rhetorically insists on the sacredness of 
sovereignty. The issue is whether Beijing is flexible enough to allow 
Taiwan to have a seat in the United Nations, in effect allowing 
China's sovereignty to be represented by dual seats. 
Here, new political thinking is needed. The outdated assumption 
that sovereignty must be safeguarded by force must be abandoned. 
A modern marriage or union can be maintained only by mutual 
caring, not force. Also questionable is the tendency to regard 
territorial integrity as sacred and place it ahead of economic 
interests and culture. Sovereignty in the modern world is not 
sacred, but is a commodity that has an exchange value. Sovereignty 
can be used in bargaining. Compromises on sovereignty can be 
made for the sake of economic interests. Here, what is required 
is political pragmatism, and this can be found in Deng Xiaoping's 
policies with a functional emphasis. Thorough political pragmatism 
contains the notion that economic interests can override symbolic 
sovereignty. In other words, symbolic sovereignty can be traded 
as a commodity for economic benefits. In the South Pacific, for 
example, the earliest trade in 'tokens of sovereignty' was in postage 
stamps sold to overseas collectors (Pitcairn Island funds 20 per 
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cent of its budget in philatelic sales).Tonga licenses other countries 
to use the geostationary satellite slots it controls as a member of 
the International Frequency Registration Board and Tuvalu has 
leased out its internet domain code 'tv'.20 
Nevertheless, Chinese pragmatism contains some elements of 
symbolism, or seemingly 'irrational elements'. But this symbolism 
is functional in terms of providing moral justification and serving 
political aims.This is the contradictory function of Chinese political 
pragmatism. Failure to understand this amounts to failure to 
understand Chinese politics. 
It is now useful to hark back to Mencius, who said that 'the 
people are the most important element (in a state); the sprites of 
the land and grain are secondary; and the sovereign is the least'. 21 
In the context of China's foreign relations, if this ancient idea of 
people is combined with a democratic notion of popular 
sovereignty, it amounts to the principle that people should be 
given priority in cross-Strait bickering and that they should have a 
say. If the first priority is the interests of the people on either side 
of the Taiwan Strait, and if peace is in the best interests of the 
people, then territorial integrity and state sovereignty can be 
negotiated. Sovereignty cannot be detached from the interests of 
the people. The use of force is certainly not beneficial, whereas 
flexible policies in the spirit of magnanimity will better serve the 
interests of the people. 
The nationalist idea of absolute sovereignty must be rejected. 
The nationalist approach emphasises the power of the state to do 
whatever is necessary to preserve the integrity of national 
boundaries and endorses the use of force to defend the superiority 
of national interests and national territory. As Hertz remarks, 
[t]he idea of the national territory is an important element 
of every modern national ideology. Every nation regards 
its country as an inalienable sacred heritage, and its 
independence, integrity, and homogeneity appear bound 
up with national security, independence and honor. This 
territory is often described as the body of the national 
organism and the language as its soul.22 
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If the state regards its right of sovereignty as absolute and 
maintains it over dissident secessionist groups or nations, and if an 
independence group asserts an uncompromising right of secession 
on the part of any community that calls itself a nation, no solution 
is possible except the destruction of the state or the suppression 
of secession. 
The idea of absolutist national sovereignty cannot provide a 
solution to the Taiwan questionYThe Taiwan issue can be resolved 
only if national sovereignty is compromised, negotiated, traded 
and shared. Compromise should be made by both sides. While 
China needs to reconsider its conception of sovereignty, Taiwan's 
pro-independence groups must also make a compromise in their 
claim over sovereignty. Independence groups must not view the 
right to self-determination as absolute. It is unlikely that a 
compromise over Taiwan's UN seat can be reached if the DPP 
continues to stress Taiwanese sovereignty and the right of the 
people ofTaiwan to decide their future. 24 
Toward post-modern sovereignty? 
According to Cooper, pre-modern states, such as Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Liberia, are characterised by chaos and anarchy. 
Modern states are concerned with state sovereignty issues and its 
corollary-non-interference by one country in another's internal 
affairs.25 China, alongside Russia, Indonesia and Malaysia, best fits 
this description of a 'modern' state in defending territorial 
sovereignty. The Shanghai Five Agreement reflects the common 
ground that state boundaries are sacred and human rights should 
not be a pretext for outside intervention. On this matter; Segal 
has pointed out that 'East Asia is reminiscent of 19th-century 
Europe: its sovereign nations have strong ideas of self-interests 
but little idea of how to resolve these interests when they come 
into conflict with each other'.26 
Modern states value their sovereignty and feel threatened by 
post-modern intrusion. According to Cooper's theory, post-
modern states have 'largely shed their hang-ups about 
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sovereignty'Y Post-modern states are open to mutual inspection 
and interference as a means of building trust and confidence 
between states in order to deter fighting. As such, these states 
attach different values to sovereignty. As Cooper points out, 
[t]he post-modern system does not rely on balance; nor 
does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of 
domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union, for 
example, is a highly developed system for mutual 
interference in each other's domestic affairs, right down 
to beer and sausages.28 
It seems that national sovereignty has been eroded and reduced 
in post-modern states such as in the European Union. Sovereignty 
has declined with the introduction of one unified market and 
currency, the establishment of the European parliament and court, 
the emergence of European citizenship, and the absence of visa 
requirements for European citizens within the European Union. 
Moreover, supra-national organisations are required to deal with 
regional and/or global issues (global ecology, nuclear threats, 
international immigration) and conflicts among nations. Importantly, 
the idea of legitimate sovereignty has been developing. Sovereignty 
is not merely decided by a seat in the United Nations. States will 
be considered full members of international society only if they 
respect human rights and practice democracy.29 The place of 
sovereignty in global society and its way of operation have changed 
but sovereignty still exists. The exclusive practice of sovereignty, 
the sacredness of sovereignty, and the use of force to defend 
sovereignty all belong to a nineteenth-century notion of 
sovereignty. 
It is too early for China to accept the post-modern view of 
sovereignty. Yet, Jiang Zemin has shown his new thinking regarding 
security. Replying to a question regarding Canberra's military 
alliance with the United States, Jiang said, 'The ... concept of basing 
security on military alliance and strengthening security through 
military build-up, a concept that prevailed during the Cold War 
period, has become obsolete'.30 
214 
China's policy towards Taiwan's bid for a UN seat 
Since it took China a century or so (and at great cost) to learn 
Western notions and practices of sovereignty, it will be extremely 
difficult to persuade China to unlearn them and accept post-
modern notions and practices of sovereignty or the thesis of the 
end or erosion of sovereignty. China has finally come to grips 
with the original Western notion of sovereignty, only to find that 
the West has moved on to a new game with a new set of rules. 
There are three possible reactions to this new development. 
One response is that the doctrine of the end of sovereignty is a 
construct of neo-imperialism,and an intellectual design for Western 
domination. The second response is to defend the sovereignty 
principle. Indeed, Beijing is adopting just such an approach in 
international arenas at the moment, and would like to represent 
the South, the Third World, to maintain the existing boundaries. 
The third response calls for 'link up with the world'.This response 
argues that it is imperative that China learn a new set of 
international rules that regard sovereignty as questionable. It will 
take time for China to make adjustments to its understanding of 
post-modern sovereignty and adopt flexible policies. The 
adjustment seen in its Taiwan policy is evidence of the learning 
process. A major issue for China is the cost of learning. If China 
can adopt flexible policies toward Taiwan, the cost will be lower; 
refusal to adapt to the post-modern notion of sovereignty is likely 
to cost China dearly. It is also important for China to learn the 
new practice of sovereignty from the European Union rather 
than the United States, which lags behinds on this matter. 
Conclusion 
It is imperative for China, as an increasingly important power in 
the Asia Pacific, to develop responsible policies regarding Taiwan, 
one of which is to welcome Taiwan into the United Nations. The 
main obstacle comes from Chinese sensitivity to its national 
sovereignty, but China's rhetorical stress on the sacredness of 
sovereignty contrasts with its practical application of sovereignty-
China has actually been flexible in ceding some sovereignty. Will 
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Beijing accept the idea of'one-sovereignty, two-seats' in the United 
Nations? Can Chinese leaders take an innovative approach to 
overcome the structural limits of narrow nationalism and the 
absolute concept of sovereignty? Both the potential for conflict 
and the way out of a potential war are clear to us, but we do not 
know when and where a solution will be proposed, accepted and 
implemented. It will be a great tragedy if there is no political will 
to implement a responsible Taiwan policy. Must it really take a war 
to bring both sides to the negotiating table? 
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Any discussion of China's approach to arms control policy, in terms 
of whether or not it has acted responsibly, needs to be placed in 
context. And the proper context is Sino-US relations and US 
attitudes towards China as a great power. It is only the United 
States that has vigorously scrutinised China's arms control 
behaviour. It is only the United States that has accused China of 
not complying with its arms control commitments and it is only 
the United States that has the capacity to make life difficult for 
China on arms control issues. Looking at the material on China 
and arms control, most of it comes from the US government or 
The Washington Post. And indeed, it is only the United States, with 
its national technical means of intelligence (that is, high resolution 
satellites) and its intelligence network in China that has the ability 
to tick or cross the boxes on China's compliance with arms control 
regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Sometimes the United States gets it right and sometimes, relying 
on circumstantial evidence, it gets it wrong. 
As a general observation, it is safe to say that China has moved 
from a position of disinterest and opposition in the 1950s and 
1960s to a strong commitment to arms control and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the 1990s. 
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Why did China make this shift? The simple answer to the question, 
and I believe the best one, is that China wants a safer world, with 
a reduced risk of tension and conflict so that it can restrain its 
defence budget and concentrate scarce resources on domestic 
economic reform, reconstruction and modernisation. That goal 
requires global peace and stability. Of course, there may be a long-
term strategic imperative behind China's modernisation, with arms 
control merely an interim ploy pending China's attainment of 
superpower status. China, after all, is pressing ahead with the 
acquisition of modern Russian weapons and military technology at 
a quickening pace. 1 
But for the moment I am not inclined to the view that China's 
interest in arms control stems solely from concerns about 
realpolitik, defined in terms of a concern about China's global image 
and a desire to rein in the power of the United States and the 
former Soviet Union.2 
Michael Swaine and Alastair lain Johnston suggest that China is 
'acutely sensitive to its international image as a peaceful leader of 
less-developed countries and a strong advocate of completeWMD 
disarmament'. They canvass a possible shift by China towards 
acceptance of the value of a common security approach to arms 
control but conclude that China's approach is dictated by the 
realpolitik interests of a relatively weak state.3 There may be some 
truth in this but I think China was and is interested in the same 
common security values as the United States, and that means getting 
along with the United States. 
China therefore seeks to avoid the threat of sanctions and the 
embarrassment of adverse publicity about proliferation deals with 
states regarded by the United States as so-called rogue or outlaw 
states. It wants to avoid fuelling the already combustible anti-China 
lobby in the US Congress because that would mean a possible loss 
of US technology and cooperation. This would have seriously 
adverse consequences for China's survival, development and 
modernisation. China wants to preserve diplomatic and commercial 
relations with the United States at almost any cost (leaving aside 
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the question of Taiwan). That means restricting the export of 
strategic missile andWMD technologies to states not well-regarded 
by the United States and Israel, such as I ran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, Libya, North Korea and, more recently, Pakistan. 
Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation has acknowledged China's willingness to engage 
with the United States on nonproliferation 'frequently and at 
various levels'. He judged that China had become a leading 
participant in such forums as the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) and that the Chinese appreciated, like everybody else, that 
Beijing's national security interests were not served by the spread 
of dangerous military capabilities.4 
China's record 
Until 1964, China had no real policy on nuclear weapons and arms 
control. It was rather more concerned about building a credible 
nuclear capability. It considered attempts to limit testing and 
proliferation as discriminatory but, after its first atom bomb test 
on 16 October 1964, it did propose, and has proposed ever since, 
a no-first use treaty and support for regional nuclear weapons-
free zones.5 China started to participate actively in the global arms 
control process with the commencement in 1978 of an open door 
foreign policy and engagement with the rest of the world. China 
joined the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 1980. It stopped 
atmospheric tests in the same year. It joined the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. It put forward working 
papers and proposals on nuclear disarmament. In later years, China 
signed the Inhuman Weapons Convention, the Antarctic Treaty, 
the Outer Space Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC), the Seabed Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
the South Pacific and Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaties, 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All these treaties were 
related to controls on the use and deployment of nuclear weapons, 
nuclear proliferation and nuclear testing. 
221 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. fourteen years 
later in 1980, it was committed to the values of a nuclear arms 
control regime. It joined the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva. It announced on 21 March 1986 that it would cease 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere (although it actually stopped in 
October 1980). It participated in the negotiations for a CTBT 
from the beginning Uanuary 1994) and pursued a CTBT that was 
fair, reasonable and verifiable, with universal adherence and 
unlimited duration. China's representatives played an active role 
negotiating at the CTBT conference table. They presented many 
working papers and suggestions regarding the draft text and dealt 
with a series of critical issues in the Preamble, Basic Obligations, 
Organisations, Verification and Entry into force sections of the 
treaty.6 China announced a moratorium on all nuclear tests as of 
30 July 1996. It signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 despite 
reservations about the absence of provisions on no-first use of 
nuclear weapons, a timetable for Russia and the United States to 
dismantle their huge nuclear arsenals, unsatisfactory procedures 
relating to inspections and the need to permit tests for peaceful 
nuclear purposes.7 
China also claims that by signing the CTBT it paid the highest 
price because technically, with just 46 tests (compared to over 
I 000 conducted by the US, 800 by Russia and 200 by france), it 
had not completed all the tests it needed to ensure the reliability 
and safety of its arsenal. In other words, the technical gap between 
China and the other nuclear powers has been frozen by the CTBT, 
but even so, China was prepared to sign the CTBT in the interests 
of global arms control and its responsibilities as a nuclear power.8 
According to a PLA officer, China made 'the great sacrifice' in 
the interests of'preserving world peace' and eliminating the threat 
of nuclear war.9 That is, China claimed it was acting for reasons of 
what Alastair lain Johnston calls idealpolitik although, in his view, 
China actually signed up primarily for reasons of realpolitik-that 
is, its image as a responsible peace-loving global citizen. 10 
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Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
China ratified the NPT on 9 March 1992 and helped secure an 
indefinite extension to the Treaty in May 1995. China may have 
signed the NPT primarily for reasons of realpolitik just like the 
United States, Britain and the former Soviet Union but it signed it 
nonetheless, the fourth nuclear weapon state to do so, and five 
months ahead of France. Zachary Davis suggests that the reasons 
were to correct China's poor international standing after the 
Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, to access Western nuclear 
technology, to avoid the loss of MFN (Most Favoured Nation) 
treatment in the United States, to avoid being left out of the NPT 
club, and only lastly to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. 11 
In April 1996, China became the 18th country to ratify the IAEA's 
International Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
China's publicly stated position has consistently been that it does 
not engage in nuclear proliferation activities and will not advocate 
or encourage nuclear proliferation and does not engage in 
developing, or assisting other countries to develop, nuclear 
weapons. 
China claims that it has consistently approached the question of 
the transfer of sensitive materials and military equipment with 
the utmost gravity and that it supports the NPT goals of preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons and accelerating nuclear 
disarmament. Beijing claims that is has always stood for the 
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, 
pursuing a policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging in 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not assisting any other 
country in the development of such weapons. China, however, 
maintains that these aims should not prevent other countries, 
especially the developing ones, from being able to make peaceful 
use of nuclear energyY 
As a weapon state party to the NPT, China is prohibited from 
helping a non-weapon state develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, 
it must make any nuclear-related transfers to non-nuclear weapon 
states subject to the safeguards of the IAEA. 
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China has consistently denied that it has ever helped Pakistan 
develop nuclear weapons. Although an allegation was made in 1983 
that China had given Pakistan sufficient highly enriched uranium 
for two bombs, there is as yet no evidence that China supplied 
either plutonium or highly enriched plutonium to Pakistan or 
indeed to any other non-nuclear weapon state. 13 Pakistan has 
imported nuclear technology from China but has never acquired 
any nuclear weapons technology from China, according to the 
Pakistani Foreign Office. 14 
China claims it wants neither tension nor an arms race in South 
Asia. That is logical and sensible for China. It has pursued the same 
goals as the United States on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in South Asia. It condemned the May 1998 nuclear tests 
conducted by India and Pakistan and urged both states to stop 
their nuclear testing, to abandon plans to arm themselves with 
nuclear weapons, to sign the CTBT and the NPT unconditionally 
and accept the IAEA full-scope safeguards. 15 
China has worked closely with the United States to help defuse 
tension in South Asia. On 27 June 1998, Presidents Jiang Zemin 
and Bill Clinton issued a joint statement reaffirming that their 
common aim was to prevent the export of equipment, materials 
or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or 
Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of 
delivering such weapons. 16 According to US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Susan Shirk, China actually led the UN Security 
Council-with US help and support-to coordinate efforts within 
the Security Council to devise ways to prevent a nuclear arms 
race in South Asia_l? 
China has turned down requests from Libya for nuclear technology. 
China is alleged to have at least contributed to North Korea's 
nuclear weapons research program, but there is no evidence to 
support this claim. 18 China has a shared interest with the United 
States in ensuring the Korean peninsula, and by extension japan, 
remains non-nuclear. Indeed, Beijing put a lot of time and effort 
into urging North Korea to ratify the NPT's full-scope safeguards 
agreement in 1992.1n the last decade, moreover, China has resisted 
North Korean requests for military assistance and has played a 
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constructive role in finding solutions and restraining North Korea 
from pursuing the nuclear and missile option. China's key role in 
helping the United States convince North Korea to freeze and 
eventually dismantle its nuclear program has been acknowledged 
by senior US officials. 
China has attracted criticism from the United States because it 
supplied a nuclear reactor to Algeria and has since cooperated 
with Algeria on nuclear energy research. Both China and Algeria 
have denied any collaboration on nuclear weapons. But US 
intelligence experts alleged that the reactor was larger than would 
be required for routine nuclear research and US Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee Chairman Joseph Biden claimed it was 
evidence that China was becoming a rogue elephant. 19 It would 
appear, however, that what China is doing in Algeria complies with 
the inspection requirements of the IAEA-the project was 
approved by the IAEA and was subject to supervision and inspection 
by IAEA experts during its construction and test operation. 
Furthermore, China persuaded Algeria to place its nuclear facilities 
under IAEA safeguards in 1991 .20 
In the case of Iran, China argued that what it was doing was 
consistent with the NPT in that it was helping Iran safeguard a 
uranium conversion facility. The United States, however, was 
concerned that Iran could divert material from the conversion 
facility into a clandestine weapons-related centrifuge enrichment 
program with nuclear weapons potential.21 In the end, however, 
in October 1995, China withdrew authority for the sale of two 
300,000 kW nuclear reactors to Iran after talks between then US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and then Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen.22 China also cancelled the sale to Iran of a 
uranium conversion facility and turned down an Iranian request 
for a heavy water moderated research reactor. That is, China 
complied with US prodding to stop helping Iran with its nuclear 
program, notwithstanding China's energy-derived interest in 
building up goodwill in Tehran and elsewhere in the Middle East. 
Admittedly, the offset was billions of dollars of US nuclear reactors, 
equipment and technology for peaceful nuclear programs that 
China might not otherwise have been licensed to receive.23 
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Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
China ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in November 
1984 and there has been no suggestion of a breach, even by the 
US Congress, despite growing concerns expressed by the US 
Director of Central Intelligence for Nonproliferation.24 In 1998, 
China agreed to work with the United States to negotiate an 
enforcement protocol for the BWC.25 
landmines 
In 1982, China signed the 1980 United Nations (UN) Convention 
on the Prohibition of Certain Indiscriminate Conventional 
Weapons with its associated Protocol II on landmines. China 
took an active part in the amendment of the Landmine Protocol 
and, in 1996, signed a revised version of the Protocol prohibiting 
the transfer of landmines that are undetectable and that do not 
contain self-destructive devices. Like the United States, however, 
China is not in favour of a complete ban on landmines. Beijing 
regards them as indispensable defensive weapons for a country 
with long land borders and 'an uncertain security environment'. 
Thus, according to China's former Disarmament Ambassador in 
Geneva, Sha Zukang, China reserves the right to use landmines 
on its own territory until alternative means of defence are 
found.26 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
China signed the CWC in January 1993 and ratified it in December 
1996 despite reservations about provisions for challenge 
inspectionsY But China has a mature chemical warfare capability 
and has produced and weaponised a wide variety of agents according 
to the US Department of Defense.28 
China is alleged to have at least contributed to North Korea's 
chemical weapons research program. However, there is no public 
available evidence to support this claim or any firm evidence that 
China has breached its undertakings under the CWC. 
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In July 1993, there were accusations that China was supplying Iran 
with chemicals.Then, US intelligence sources accused China of selling 
Iran thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride-chemical precursors for making 
mustard and nerve gases. In August 1993, the US Navy-with the 
agreement of the Chinese government-searched the Yin He, a 
Chinese container ship in the Gulf of Hormuz only to find nothing 
to support the allegation. According to Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Department of 
State, US intelligence was good and the Chinese were just lucky not 
to be caught out. 29 Nonetheless, the US State Department 
expressed appreciation for China's cooperative and forthright 
assistance in resolving the dispute in the interests of nonproliferation 
of goods and technology that might be used in WMD.30 
In May 1997, the United States imposed sanctions on seven 
Chinese chemical companies for allegedly assisting Iran's chemical 
weapons program.31 
According to Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project 
on Nuclear Arms Control, US officials were of the view that China 
had been exporting poison gas ingredients, equipment and 
technology to Iran since at least 1992 and that such exports, 
including entire factories, were continuing. 32 However, the 
chemicals involved were dual use items with civilian applications, 
and China held up the supply of raw materials to an alleged chemical 
weapons factory.33 
Significantly, China subsequently agreed to strengthen controls 
over the export of dual-use chemicals and it expanded the list of 
chemical precursors that will be under those controls.34 But it is 
not easy for China to audit the thousands of enterprises and 
laboratories that might be engaged in the manufacture of dual-
use chemicals. 
According to the US State Department, citing the positive 
Chinese response to a proposed sale by a Chinese entity of a 
chemical-anhydrous hydrogen fluoride-to the Isfahan Nuclear 
Research Centre in Iran, 'the US is firmly of the view that there 
has been a sea-change in Chinese policies and practices on 
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nonproliferation and that China is moving towards the kind of 
relationship that advances and protects the security of the United 
States, its interests and its allies'. 35 
Strategic arms reduction 
On strategic arms reduction, China's position is fairly well known. 
According to China's White Paper, China: arms control and 
disarmament, the United States and Russia must take the lead in 
'drastically reducing their stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons 
and means of delivery' and commit themselves to a treaty of no-
first use, a formula that suits China's relatively weak strategic 
circumstances. Only after the United States and Russia reduced 
their stockpiles by 50 per cent, would China participate in 
discussions on strategic arms reductions.36 Given the overwhelming 
superiority of the US strategic arsenal ( 6000 to China's 200-300), 
it is difficult to argue that China's case does not have some merit. 
In the United States, however, this is regarded as 'free riding'-
that is, China prefers measures that advantage China's relatively 
weak position and gives least support to measures that impose 
constraints on China.37 In my view, this is simply a case of China 
practising some realpolitik. 
Missiles 
During the Iran-Iraq war in 1981-85, China sold both sides over 
US$4 billion worth of arms, such as tanks and tactical missiles such 
as the Silkworm, (a slow, old-fashioned anti-ship cruise missile). 
But China did not sell Scud missiles to Iran and Iraq, despite claims 
to the contrary (the Scuds came from the USSR). In 1987, China 
sold 36 now obsolete Dong Fang 3 or CSS-2 Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs, range 3000 km) to Saudi Arabia for US$3 
billion, a deal that may been the carrot for Saudi Arabia to switch 
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing in 1990. 
China may have helped North Korea reverse engineer Soviet 
Scud missiles in the late 1970s, but there is no evidence that 
China helped North Korea develop its Nodong or Taepodong 
missile.38 
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In I 989, China agreed to sell 48 M-9 missiles (range 600 km) to 
Syria.This deal was cancelled by China in January 1992 after lengthy 
negotiations with the United States involving the threat of 
commercial sanctions relating to computers and satellites and 
possibly offers of assistance from Israel to fill critical gaps in China's 
defence technology. 
In March 1992, China reached a bilateral agreement with the 
United States to abide by the guidelines and parameters of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established by the 
United States in 1987). MTCR, it should be noted is a voluntary 
agreement, has no international legal authority, and China is not a 
member. China also agreed to the five-power Arms Control in the 
Middle East (ACME) forum limiting arms sales to the Middle East. 
The MTCR was upgraded in July 1992 to deny the export of any 
system suspected of being used as a delivery system for WMD. 
Category II also requires case by case evaluations for exporting 
complete unmanned delivery systems that do not meet the 
Category I threshold (300 km) but which can fly more than 300 
km with a minimal payload (such as biological weapons), as well as 
dual use components, materials and other commodities. These 
expanded guidelines were designed to counter Chinese moves to 
operate on the fringe and circumvent the original MTCR guidelines 
through piecemeal technology transfer. In October 1994, China 
signed an agreement with the United States to comply with the 
1987 version of the MTCR, that is, to not export complete missiles 
that are inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 kilometres 
with a payload of 500 kilograms. 
There is no evidence that China has violated its pledge not to 
export such missiles. On 21 November 200 I, China declared that 
it would not assist other countries in any way to develop ballistic 
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, a move welcomed 
by the Australian government. 39 But so far China has· not agreed 
to stop exporting the missile technologies or shorter range 
systems armed with conventional warheads. MTCR, moreover, still 
leaves open the door for China to claim it has received assurances 
from the recipient that the equipment or technology supplied 
will not be used to develop a proscribed missile system. 
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China also interprets the MTCR differently to the United States. 
The United States claims the 'inherent capability' of a missile should 
be used to see if it is covered by MTCR guidelines. That is, regardless 
of its payload, the question is whether the missile can reach 300 
kilometres if its payload is adjusted. China's view is that if the missile 
is below the 300 kilometre threshold, it is not caught by MTCR 
guidelines. Thus, when China sold CSS-8 missiles (range ISO 
kilometres) to Iran it argued that they were not covered by the 
MTCR, and that China had signed the contract with Iran in 1988 
which was prior to its agreement to comply with the MTCR. 
A similar process took place with regard to US concerns about 
China selling some C-80 I and C-802 anti-ship missiles to Iran. The 
C-80 I has a range of 50 kilometre. The C-802 has a range of 120 
kilometre. Both are subsonic. They are not the kind of missile that 
ought to be covered by MTCR. Despite this, US Congressman 
Christopher Cox, Chairman of House Republican Policy 
Committee complained that US forces stationed in the Gulf-the 
15,000 men of the US Fifth Fleet-were within range of the 
Chinese missiles and that the United States therefore, should apply 
the Gore-McCain Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992. 
This Act requires the President to sanction nations that transfer 
'destabilizing numbers and types' of advanced weapons to outlaw 
nations like lran.40 
Even though China was not threatened with sanctions over the 
missiles, it nonetheless promised to stop supplying additional anti-
ship cruise missiles, including those under contract, or the technology 
to achieve over-the-horizon capability or indigenous production.41 
So far, China has stuck to its general MTCR Category I 
undertakings although many reports to the contrary have appeared 
in The Washington Post. 
The United States would like China to become a full member of 
MTCR and tighten its missile technology controls for example; with 
regard to Pakistan.42 I note however that Swaine and Johnston argue 
that the United States does not want China to become a member 
of MTCR because it would have to share sensitive intelligence 
information and membership would exempt China from sanctions.43 
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Pakistan 
Pakistan is something of a special case for China and is often 
mentioned as one of the exceptions to China's promises to abide 
by its arms control commitments. For China, Pakistan balances 
India's quest for hegemony in South Asia and, bearing in mind China's 
Muslim region of Xinjiang, Pakistan is a useful ally for China to 
have on side as insurance against Islamic fundamentalism in Central 
and Inner Asia. 
Pakistan has been one of the largest markets for Chinese 
conventional arms and equipment such as fighter aircraft and tanks. 
China is Pakistan's most reliable and extensive source of 
conventional arms.44 China therefore has a historical and strategic 
interest in helping Pakistan, an old friend and tacit ally since China's 
war with India in 1962. For China, a strong Pakistan presents a 
potential second front to India vis-a-vis the latter's rivalry with 
China. So, while China advocates nuclear and missile 
nonproliferation, it is under some obligation to help Pakistan if 
and when India appears to be getting the upper hand, for example, 
with the development of its Agni and Privthi missiles.45 
It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that China has 
been the source of Pakistan's missile technology even though China 
has not provided Pakistan with actual missiles. In 1988, China 
contracted to supply Pakistan with up to 40 M-1 I missiles, with 
delivery to commence in 1991.According to the Chinese, the 290 
kilometre range of the M-1 I meant it was not covered by the 
MTCR whereas the United States claims the M-1 I has a range of 
309 kilometres and is therefore caught by MTCR.46 
According to US intelligence sources, China shipped launchers 
and key components of the M-1 I missile to Pakistan in November 
1992. Following pressure from the United States, however, the 
deal either lapsed or another solution was found because there 
was and is no evidence that completed missiles were ever shipped 
to or even assembled in Pakistan, notwithstanding allegations that 
US satellite intelligence had spotted M-1 I missiles in crates at a 
Pakistani airbase at SargodhaY 
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There is an assumption that Pakistan used the M-1 I technology 
or components to build the Hatf-111 but it remains an assumption 
because nobody has seen a Hatf-111. Nor is there any conclusive 
evidence to support the allegation that China helped Pakistan build 
an M-1 I production facility in Rawalpindi.48 However, according 
to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Jesse Helms, 
the CIA's National Intelligence Estimate on Military Threats to the US 
was 'absolutely clear that there is zero doubt about China having 
transferred M-Il missiles to Pakistan'.49 
China reportedly refused to sell Medium Range Ballistic Missiles 
(MRBMs) to Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's Shaheen I 
Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) looks remarkably like China's 
M-9 or Dong Fang DF-15 (range 600 kilometres). It has the same 
nose shape, the same fins, the same length and diameter and no 
country makes a similar missile. Oddly, however, despite all the 
fuss about the M-1 I, the United States has not yet expressed 
complaints about the Shaheen I. 
Meanwhile, Pakistan has in fact been looking at North Korea's 
Nodong missile technology to build its Ghauri I or Hatf-V (range 
1500 kilometres) to match India's Agni SRBM (range 2000 
kilometres), possibly because China was not forthcoming with the 
technology or parts. 
China has also helped Pakistan build a complete 300,000 kW 
nuclear power station at Chashma, 260 kilometres from Islamabad 
under a 1992 agreement. China provided the assistance on the 
basis that it would be a use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. 
It claims that the transfer is subject to IAEA safeguards. Beijing 
claims that any suggestion that it is helping Pakistan develop nuclear 
weapons is groundless.50The equipment was made in Shanghai and 
included high and low pressure heaters, condensers, water tanks, 
and other non-nuclear devices.51 
China has also been helping Pakistan develop nuclear technology 
at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta. In 1995, the 
United States objected to China's sale of 5000 ring magnets to 
KRL (ring magnets are used to make enriched fuel for nuclear 
bombs as well as civilian-use fuel rods). The ring magnets were 
sold to Pakistan by a company in Shanghai, the China Nuclear 
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Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC). The Chinese government 
pleaded that it did not know about the sale until the United States 
raised the matter and that the ring magnets were not part of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group's trigger list, that they were not prohibited 
and, in any case, they had civilian uses. Since it upset the United 
States so much, however, the Chinese National Nuclear 
Corporation undertook to prevent any further exports to 
unsafeguarded facilities and introduced even stronger controls 
on the Nuclear Suppliers Group dual list as well as the Zangger 
Committee's trigger list. China also agreed to consult with the 
United States in future on other export control arrangements 
for nuclear related technologies. 
China accommodated the United States because, it has been 
argued that under a 1994 US law-the Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act-the United States can deny bank loans, credit 
and insurance to any country that wilfully aids states to acquire 
unsafeguarded nuclear material. If the United States decided that 
China had 'wilfully' helped Pakistan, companies like Westinghouse 
and Bechtel might suffer. But the truth of the matter is that the 
central government in Beijing probably had no idea that a Chinese 
company in Shanghai was selling ring magnets to nuclear facilities 
in Pakistan. 
Weak export controls in China 
In an effort to placate the United States, China claimed that it 
established a Military Sales Leading Group in 1989 to oversee arms 
exports, chaired by Army chief, General Liu Huaqing, with 
representatives from the General Staff Department (GSD), the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Foreign Ministry. In 
April 1992, it claimed to have created several monitoring groups, 
such as the State Military Exports Administration Commission, to 
stop unauthorised arms sales. 
If China did supply countries like Pakistan and Iran with missiles, 
components and technology, the problem may have arisen in part 
at least because China does not have an effective national control 
system. Thus, even when Beijing is willing to exercise restraint, its 
233 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
ability to do so is inadequate, especially in the area of chemical 
export controls.52 According to another observer, China had in 
effect two export control systems, one civilian and one military, 
with a gap between the two that sometimes allows unauthorised 
items to slip through.53 
In some cases, the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs may not know what a distant branch of China's huge 
military-industrial complex is doing or selling. In fact, it would appear 
that the US intelligence community has a better grip than China's 
central bureaucracy on what China's provincial industries are or 
are not exporting in terms of chemical precursors and nuclear 
and missile technology, or related bank account transactions. 
Generally, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the Chinese National 
Nuclear Corporation have made genuine efforts to implement a 
responsible WMD and missile-related export control system. They 
understand the broader principles of non-proliferation and have 
sought to ensure China's compliance with its arms control 
obligations. The Foreign Ministry recognises compliance is an 
important and sensitive issue in Sino-US relations and that 
preserving that relationship is more important than earning a small 
amount of cash, important as that might be to some chemical 
factory in Shenzhen or Shanghai. 
Bureaucrats in Beijing, however, do not have a list of every 
company producing dual-use technologies like ring magnets or 
dual-use WMD components in the chemical industry. There were 
until recently something like I 0,000 military-owned enterprises 
such as the China Poly Group and the China Precision Machinery 
Import and Export Corporation. They have an estimated turnover 
of US$1 0-18 billion and function more or less autonomously. 
Industries might sell equipment without consulting the central 
government. In the case of the ring magnets-very unsophisticated 
devices-they were treated under China's export control system 
as routine general commercial goods. 
In November 1995, China's State Council released a White Paper 
titled China: arms control and disarmament. It stated that arms 
exports must be used for the legitimate defence of recipients, 
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not for aggression, and must not harm regional peace and security. 
The White Paper stated that any corporation or individual who 
transferred weapons or military equipment without examination 
and approval by the government would be strictly dealt with 
according to law. 
As it turned out, the person responsible for the sale of the ring 
magnets to Pakistan was dismissed.54 Of course, it might not have 
been irrelevant that a company like China Great Wall Industrial 
Corporation, at the forefront of China's space industry, stood to 
lose billions of dollars in business and, more importantly, access to 
critical US technologies if sanctions were imposed, all for the sake 
of ring magnets worth a mere US$70,000.55 
On the other hand, some conservative PLA leaders might feel 
China needs to placate Pakistan and the oil-rich Muslim states in 
the Middle East and Central Asia. In the view of this constituency, 
if the United States misbehaves in areas of great sensitivity to 
China, such as selling F-16s and missile defence related military 
technology to Taiwan, despite a commitment (in Beijing's view) 
under the Taiwan Relations Act not to do so, they see no reason 
why China should not reciprocate in kind in areas of great sensitivity 
to the United States, that is, to Muslim states in the Middle East or 
old friends of China's like Pakistan.56 
This attitude-and I am speculating-might explain the CNEIC's 
subsequent sale and installation at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities 
in Pakistan of a special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic 
equipment 'with military applications' (the furnace could be a 
vacuum or skull furnace used to melt plutonium and uranium for 
nuclear bomb cores and titanium for missile nose cones and other 
critical missile parts).According to a top secret CIA memorandum 
dated 14 September 1996, paperwork had been falsified to disguise 
the final destination of the technology but senior Chinese leaders 
probably approved the illicit sale.57The US State Department made 
its concerns known to Beijing but, according to another report, 
US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated that he 
was 'absolutely confident' that China had not violated the 
commitment it had made on II May 1996.58 
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A similar problem arose in March 200 I after US allegations that 
Chinese firms were helping Iraq improve its air defences by installing 
fibre-optic cables, contrary to UN-imposed sanctions. China's 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan strenuously stated the allegations 
were unfounded. He claimed that the Chinese government was 
'very serious, very strict and always responsible in implementing 
UN resolutions on Iraq' and that Chinese businesses were 
prohibited from engaging in trade or other economic activities in 
Iraq that were contrary to UN Security Council resolutions.59 
The black view of China 
The suggestion of bureaucratic ineptitude as an explanation for 
China's problematic record is not accepted by many influential 
people in Washington. While it is generally true that some sales of 
Chinese technology and products associated with WMD to Iran 
and Pakistan were undertaken by semi-autonomous entities 
without Beijing's approval, there was 'convincing evidence' that 
other deals were negotiated and executed with Beijing's knowledge 
and tacit approval, according to Mitchel B. Wallerstein, a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy in 
the US Department of Defense.60 
In 1997, in testimony to the US Congress, Gary Milhollin, Director 
of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, alleged that 
China was not fulfilling its 1994 commitment to comply with MTCR 
and, citing US officials, he alleged that China was continuing to 
export missiles and missile technology to Pakistan, including 
assistance with an M-1 I missile production plant. He also alleged, 
citing US officials, that China had been exporting poison gas 
ingredients, equipment and technology to Iran since at least 1992 
and that such exports, including entire factories in 1996, were 
continuing.61 He claimed that the ring-magnet sale to Pakistan was 
no accident and represented China's ongoing support for Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons program, beginning in 1980. He claimed that, 
because the ring magnets were made specifically to go into 
centrifuges that make enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and 
because they were sold to Pakistan by the China National Nuclear 
Corporation, an arm of the Chinese government, it amounted to 
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a violation of the NPT. Milhollin made similar allegations with regard 
to China's nuclear assistance to Iran-Chinese inputs directly 
assisted Iran's nuclear weapons program. According to Milhollin, 
China was a rogue state and the United States would not be able 
'to stop a rogue state from being a rogue state by treating him 
like a non-rogue'.62 
Likewise, the Director of US Central Intelligence, George Tenet, 
said in his report to Congress in June 1997, that China was the 
most significant supplier ofWMD-related goods and technology 
to foreign countries. He alleged in January I 998, that 'there is no 
question that China has contributed to WMD advances in Pakistan 
and lran'.63 
In a similar vein, the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Jesse Helms, and Senate Intelligence Committee 
Chairman, Richard Shelby, alleged that China was and is an 
irresponsible Great Power and that it had a 'long record of 
proliferation of the most dangerous weapons technologies-
frequently in violation of earlier commitments and international 
norms and obligations-combined with a history of denial, 
deception, evasion and lying about these activities'.They cited the 
CIA's Non-Proliferation Centre as stating in June 1996 that China 
was 'the most significant supplier of weapons of mass destruction-
related goods and technology to foreign countries and the primary 
source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan 
and a key supplier to lran'.64 
The Cox Report, commissioned by the US Congress in June 
1998 (Select Committee on US National Security and Military/ 
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China) was 
released on 25 May 1999. Three hundred pages were regarded as 
too sensitive for release. The Cox Report capped a crescendo of 
allegations about China's record on arms control and alleged that 
China was one of the leading proliferators of complete ballistic 
missile systems and missile components in the world and had 
possibly proliferated the world's most sophisticated nuclear 
weapons technology to nations hostile to the United States. China, 
according to the report, had sold complete ballistic missiles to 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and components to a number of 
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countries, including Pakistan. The report alleged that China had 
proliferated military technology to Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, 
and that China had not accepted the revised MTCR guidelines. It 
alleged that China was providing assistance to the missile programs 
of Iran (guidance components, solid propellant missile technology, 
the CSS-8 surface-to-surface missile with a range of ISO kilometres, 
and the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 120 
kilometres), Pakistan (M-Il missile launchers and the facilities to 
produce M-1 I missiles, assistance with uranium enrichment, ring 
magnets and other technologies that could assist a nuclear weapons 
program), Saudi Arabia (CSS-2 missiles) and North Korea 
(unspecified weapons and military related programs) as well as 
other proliferation activities that could not be publicly disclosed.65 
us or no? 
There are obvious policy differences on China's proliferation 
record in the US Administration. On the one hand, there is the 
Cox Report, above, which US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, 
said read like 'a suspense novel' and tended to sensationalise what 
were mostly allegations, not proven facts. And, despite allegations 
about Chinese assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program, 
President Clinton certified on 12 January 1998 that he was 
completely convinced by China's assurances on nuclear 
nonproliferation, whereas just two weeks later George Tenet, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, testified to Congress that China's 
relations with some proliferant countries like Iran and Pakistan 
was longstanding and deep and that China had not promised to 
stop nuclear cooperation with either country.66 According to Gary 
Milhollin, US engagement with China on the nonproliferation of 
missile and chemicals had 'run out of gas' with the US State 
Department choosing not to apply sanctions to China and that, 
therefore, sanctions as a deterrent or punishment, as intended by 
the US Congress, were not working.67 
These differences are confusing for anybody trying to work out 
the extent to which China is being responsible or irresponsible 
on nonproliferation of WMD. 
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Clinton Administration report card 
Nonetheless, it is reasonably dear that China is fairly sensitive to 
US strategic sensitivities, at least whenever it is caught out. 
China wants to preserve access to US markets and technology 
and it is concerned about the anti-China mood in Congress. China's 
US policy is to seek common ground, find areas of cooperation 
and avoid confrontation. China has thus been increasingly willing 
to scrutinise and restrain nuclear exports and cooperation and to 
address US concerns promptly and seriously. 
One would expect the former US Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright to be well-informed by her Department. Speaking in 1997, 
she said it was 'evident in the last several years that China had 
'systematically joined a number of nonproliferation regimes-the 
NPT, the CTBT, the CWC and the Zangger Committee, and it was 
generally moving within the regime of control of weapons of mass 
destruction'. She said that the United States had received assurances 
that China would not engage in any new nuclear cooperation with 
Iran and that the existing cooperation-two projects in 
particular-would end.68 Specifically, China had 
" promulgated for the first time strict national regulations to 
control exports of nuclear material, equipment and 
technology 
" issued a State Council directive controlling export of dual 
use items with potential nuclear use 
• joined the Zangger Committee, an international group which 
coordinates international suppliers efforts to control nuclear 
exports 
• agreed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities, including through personnel and scientific exchanges 
• provided assurances addressing US concerns about nuclear 
cooperation with Iran 
" tightened controls over the export of chemicals that could 
be used in chemical weapons programs 
" agreed to take steps to address US concerns about the 
provision of advanced conventional weapons to Iran which 
threaten maritime activities and regional stability.69 
239 
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy 
The United States, which regards nonproliferation as one of its 
highest priorities, had the following goals in its engagement with 
China. 
" To terminate Chinese assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded 
nuclear facilities and nuclear explosive program. 
" To curtail Chinese cooperation with Iran's unsafeguarded 
nuclear program. 
'" To establish an effective Chinese nuclear and nuclear-related 
dual-use export control system. 
" To obtain Chinese participation in multilateral nuclear export 
control efforts. 
Significantly, in February 1998, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Nonproliferation, Robert Einhorn acknowledged positive 
progress by China in most of the sensitive areas mentioned above. 
He pointed out that 
" China had made a commitment on II May 1996 not to 
provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in 
Pakistan or anywhere else 
" China had agreed to phase out its cooperation with Iran 
" China is putting in place for the first time a comprehensive 
nationwide system of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use 
export controls 
" China had become a member of the NPT Exporters 
Committee (the Zangger Committee) in 16 October 1997, 
the first time China has joined a multilateral nonproliferation 
export control regime. 
There are expectations that China will in due course also join 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group set up to establish tighter controls 
over nuclear transfers than those specified in the NPT.70 
It might be argued that China has only become sensitive to US 
concerns because there are sanctions if it does not, such as 
withholding trade access and blocking exports of high-technology 
commercial goods, such as communication satellites. The United 
States can suspend exports of nuclear materials, facilities and 
components to China unless the President certifies that China 
has conformed to US nonproliferation policies in accordance with 
'Prerequisites for Implementation of the 1985 US-PRC Agreement 
for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation'. 
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Whatever the reasons may be for China's compliance, as US 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Robert 
Einhorn stated, the United States was seeing progress beyond mere 
words, with concrete action in terms of nuclear-related sales to 
third countries rejected or cancelled, detailed regulations and 
control lists adopted and publicised and active participation in 
international regimes initiated. 
Einhorn said, however, that the United States wanted to see 
China make more progress on non-nuclear non-proliferation 
issues-chemical, missile and advanced conventional arms-where 
the United States still had serious problems with China's policies 
and practices.71 
Conclusions 
In the past, China may have ignored arms control values and sold 
WMD-related technology for reasons including commercial and 
diplomatic, keeping Chinese industries in business, accessing 
technology swaps, gaining strategic advantage or obligations to an 
ally, as in the case of Pakistan, or it might have been a matter of 
influence building in zones of importance, such as the Middle East, 
in deals with Iran, Syria and Algeria.72 
But the recent record shows that, despite some lapses and a 
willingness to exploit grey areas, China has, on the whole, been 
willing and able to uphold its commitments to international arms 
control regimes. 
China wants peace and stability on its borders and in the world 
generally like any other country with global trading interests, 
domestic reconstruction priorities and a requirement for stable 
supplies of key raw materials, such as oil. In this regard, China has 
geopolitical interests in common with the United States. China 
also shares with the United States, and the Asia Pacific community, 
a common interest in stability in the Korean peninsula and avoidance 
of any excuse that might fuel a Japanese quest to become a 'normal' 
military power. China has been willing to accept arms control 
commitments even at some cost to its own narrower self-interest. 
For example, the freezing of the nuclear weapons technology gap 
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that followed China's signing of the CTBT and the loss of revenue 
and political influence that followed the suspension of missile sales 
to the Islamic states. 
Why? Because it wants to advance its own security through 
regional and global peace, and that means, by definition, good 
relations with the United States, the most important country in 
the world for China in terms of trade, technology, diplomacy and 
security. In this context, it is not surprising that China has avoided 
condemning the United States for breaches of the same rules it 
seeks to apply to China. For example, the United States has 
exported dual-use technologies to US friends and allies that are 
banned under MTCR Category I, such as submarine launched 
Trident ballistic missiles to the United Kingdom; provision of dual-
use technology in the equatorial satellite launches of Russia and 
Norway, and large solid propellant rocket boosters for Japan's 
space launch vehicle, the H-2A. 
China has had an eye on its public image as a credible, law-abiding 
member of the international community. But, in my view, that is 
only one consideration and not the primary one. China is driven 
by a desire to free itself from the distraction of international 
tension and the risk of conflict. It wants to follow the Japanese 
model of minimal defence expenditure and conversely it has learned 
a lesson from the Soviet mistake of over-expenditure on defence. 
It wants to focus on domestic economic, social and political 
reconstruction for 'a long period of time'. That entails an 
appreciation of the benefits of arms control mechanisms in China's 
near region and globally. 
China's behaviour in supporting arms control processes might 
be attributed to a concern about its global public relations image, 
realpolitik interests including a mix of commercial advantage, access 
to advanced technology, reining in the lead of the United States 
and Russia, securing stable supplies of raw materials, preserving a 
peaceful world in which to concentrate on its modernisation, and 
placating its biggest rival and potential enemy in the meantime. 
Whatever the reason, China's record on arms control is 
nonetheless primarily one of compliance and broadly shared 
interests with the United States. In the joint statement issued by 
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Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton in Washington on 29 
October 1997, China and the United States agreed that one of 
their common interests was to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
When one looks at China's record, it is dear, notwithstanding 
the views of people like Helms, Milhollin and others, that the 
Chinese government has been positive and responsive to US 
concerns and is interested in the same nonproliferation goals as 
the United States. 
Of course, China has problems with the US approach. It is 
unhappy with what it perceives to be 
., the discriminatory provisions in MTCR that do not take 
account of the concerns of third world countries 
., the need to promote the concept of cooperative security 
rather than unilateralism, confrontation, containment and 
deterrence 
"' the need to take steps under the NPT to eliminate WMD, 
including the US nuclear arsenal 
'" the need to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
by not launching into Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and 
National Missile Defence (NMD) systems that might lead to 
an arms race in outer space 
" the transfer of responsibility to the UN Security Council for 
preventing WMD proliferation issues 
Nonetheless, China has joined the game and, on the whole, it 
plays by the rules. 
The most telling statistic I came across in preparing this chapter 
was from Michael Swaine and Alastair lain Johnston. They point 
out that in the Maoist period China was negative and dismissive of 
arms control. In 1970, China had signed about I 0 per cent of all 
arms control agreements that it was eligible to sign. By 1996, this 
figure had jumped to 90 per cent.73 
These facts, it was stated in China's first Defence White Paper, 
demonstrate that 'China is a responsible big country' when it comes 
to arms control.74 
This sense of responsibility on China's part may not last long if 
the United States moves to develop anti-missile defences. China is 
not a party to the 1972 ABM Treaty but it regards the Treaty as a 
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cornerstone of the strategic arms limitation regime and therefore 
indispensable to maintaining global strategic stability, preventing 
an arms race in outer space and ensuring gradual nuclear 
disarmament. China therefore is aghast at the prospect of TMD 
and NMD systems, especially while the United States preserves its 
vastly superior strategic arsenal. It is particularly concerned that a 
US-designed TMD system will cover Taiwan, which China regards 
as part of 'one China'. 
The Clinton Administration has proposed missile defence systems 
with a capability of hitting warheads travelling at 5 km/second 
with a range of about 3000 kilometre. As 80 per cent of Chinese 
land-based missiles have a range of 3000 kilometre or less, they 
would be classified as theatre weapons under the US definition.75 
If a TMD system is located in Northeast Asia, China's modest nuclear 
deterrent and leverage vis-c'J-Vis Japan and the United States might 
be degraded. In China's view, Taiwan's instinct to strike out for 
independence will inevitably strengthen in such circumstances. 
In the absence of some sensitive pre-emptive arms control 
diplomacy by the United States and credible assurances to China 
about the aims and limitations of TMD and NMD, China's 
commitment to arms control processes could quickly evaporate, 
with increasing pressure on China to modernise and multiply its 
strategic weapons. This could contribute to a negative spiral in 
Sino-US relations, a missile and anti-missile arms race, perhaps a 
new Cold War, and, at the very least, strategic instability in East 
Asia and the wider Asia Pacific region. 
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The image of the People's Republic of China as an irresponsible 
power has been largely, though not exclusively, constructed by 
examinations and interpretations of what is purported to be China's 
security behaviour in regional and global international relations. 
The 'domino theory' associated closely with the threat from Red 
China in the 1950s and the 1960s and the 'China threat' debates in 
the last decade are just two primary examples. Issues and incidents 
such as China's participation in the Korean War, its support of 
Communist insurgents in Southeast Asia and involvement in the 
Vietnam War, its border wars with India, the former Soviet Union 
and Vietnam, its readiness to use force in territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea and its recalcitrance over the Taiwan issue, and its 
arms sale and export of nuclear technology to 'rogue' states such 
as Iran and Iraq, are among the evidence of China's irresponsible 
behaviour in world politics. This image has become etched in studies 
of China's international relations. 1 
It is not surprising, perhaps, that the existing literature on regional 
security in the Asia Pacific has focused on China as the central 
security concern of the region, particularly with the much 
trumpeted rise of China's power. What is disconcerting, though, is 
the severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as 
a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's security 
concerns in the current debate.2 In other words, China is regarded 
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as part of the regional security problematique, but China's security 
concerns have rarely been problematised. This is true historically 
and particularly in the post-Cold War discourse on Asia Pacific 
security, which is dominated largely by the Anglo-American 
international relations community.3 
A particularly noticeable void exists, therefore, even in the small 
cottage industry of the 'China threat' literature.4 Largely adopting 
an outside-in perspective, the existing studies have showed very 
little appreciation of the problems confronting China's security 
managers. Naturally, a large number of vital questions remain either 
unanswered or under-appreciated. How have China's conceptions 
of security, and by the same token, threat, changed over time?What 
do the Chinese elites perceive as the main problems for China's 
security and why? Where are China's security concerns generated, 
and what are generally perceived as China's legitimate security 
interests? How secure or insecure does China feel at any particular 
time and under certain circumstances, as for example when the 
structural changes of the international system take place? An 
appreciable gap between the security discourse within China and 
that outside China is therefore discernible.5While Chinese scholars 
find the 'China threat' claims perplexing and incomprehensible, many 
looking from outside-in find China's behaviour in regional 
international relations, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South 
China Sea, inexplicable if they are not expressions of China's desire 
for regional hegemony. Different policy prescriptions, ranging from 
containment, to constrainment and to engagement, are but a 
reflection of this perception. 
I propose to problematise China's security concerns in this 
chapter by looking from inside out through a sociological lens. By 
looking at three integral and transforming social processes in the 
PRC since 1949-revolution, war and reform-! argue that China's 
conceptualisation of security has been in constant flux. The irony 
is that in China revolution, war and reform as domestic political 
and social processes, which are meant either to guarantee or 
enhance China's security, have paradoxically accentuated the 
insecurity and vulnerability of the Chinese state and the regime 
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governing China. That is, an insecurity complex has been both 
generated and compounded in China by these pervading and 
penetrating social experiences. This is characteristic of China's 
security predicament.6 No Great Power in recent history has had 
anything approaching this kind of security predicament. 
This line of argument shares with realism and neo-realism one 
common starting point-security (defined more broadly in my 
discussion) as the central paradigm in understanding the 
international behaviour of states. It differs significantly, however, 
from both realism and neo-realism by arguing that it is neither 
China's national interest, defined in terms of power, nor structural 
features, such as the distribution of power in the anarchical 
international system that defines China's security problematique. 
It also goes beyond the liberalist perspective of internal politics in 
identifying important internal social processes-integral to China's 
transformation in the last fifty years-as independent variables that 
construct and reconstruct China's security conceptualisations and 
concerns. In a general vein, this is in agreement with claims made 
by Job and also to a lesser extentAiagappa that Third World states 
are faced with a particular and peculiar security/insecurity 
predicament, which emphasises the internal challenges to security 
and therefore to security conceptions of those states. 7 The 
difference is China's unparalleled experience in revolution, war and 
reform. Interacting in their own fashion and intensity with the same 
processes in the international system, they have resulted in a special 
social setting within which China's identities have been formed 
and transformed. As a result, China's security conceptions, and 
therefore behaviour, have been powerfully affected and sometimes 
determined by these forces. 
Revolution 
By revolution, I refer not just to the transfer of state power but, 
most importantly, to a political and social process that redefines 
the political community and remakes the social order. Revolutionary 
changes in the international system thus refer to a fundamental 
transformation that redefines the nature and structure of the 
international order. 
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It is now a truism to say that the Chinese revolution has 
profoundly affected the regional and global international order as 
it has evolved in the second half of the twentieth century. It is, 
however, still a useful starting point to look first at how the success 
of the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949 affected China's 
security. Stephen Walt argues that 'revolutions usually disrupt the 
international system in important ways' because of the ensuing 
uncertainty about the balance of power, which results in security 
competition.8 From the Chinese perspective, however, the 
responses of the dominant powers in the international system to 
the success of the Chinese Communist revolution were the 
determining factor in New China's security environment. The new 
regime felt threatened from the very beginning, not because of its 
weakness but because of the nature of the Chinese revolution and 
its professed ideological commitment to communism-the basis 
of New China's identity. Security competition, if any, was therefore 
defined more in terms of balance of threat than balance of power.9 
Mao clearly saw the Chinese revolution as part of a world revolution 
started by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Both before and after his 
proclamation of the PRC, Mao repeatedly warned of the distinct 
possibility of direct military intervention in the Chinese revolution 
by US imperialism . The 'lean-to-one-side' policy derived not so 
much from the weakness of the new regime as from New China's 
self-understanding of its identity in the Cold War international 
system as well as its perception of the Other. 10 China's entry into 
the Korean War was certainly not a step to redress the balance of 
power, particularly when it lacked explicit full military support from 
the Soviet Union. Mao's agonies over his decision in October 1950 
reflected his uncertainty over the intentions of the Other.'' 
It is commonly argued that the Korean War and its outcome 
helped spread the Cold War to Asia.'2 The central thrust of US 
policy towards China-denial of the international legitimacy of 
the PRC-clearly identified Communist China as the Other, the 
archenemy of the United States. The containment policy and the 
military alliances in the Asia Pacific which arose as a result, on the 
other hand, helped China define itself as a major revolutionary, 
anti-imperialist force in world politics. The denial of the international 
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legitimacy of the PRC, as embodied in the US policies of non-
recognition of the PRC and exclusion of the PRC from the United 
Nations and nearly all other inter-governmental organisations, 
solidified such mutual identification for many years. Symbolically, 
the politically correct reference to the PRC in the United States, 
and to a lesser extent in the West, was until 1970 'Red China'. Self-
understanding on both sides, Revolutionary China and the Other, 
therefore drew a dividing line of friend and foe in their respective 
international relations. 
The PRC's identity as a revolutionary state in its early years was 
therefore constructed and reproduced against the implacable 
hostility of the United States. China and the United States become, 
in Christensen's words, 'useful adversaries' to each other. At the 
same time, the survival of the Chinese revolution was threatened 
by internal subversion of'reactionaries' inspired and supported by 
Chiang Kai-shek's rival regime in Taiwan. Political campaigns such 
as 'three antis' and 'five antis' were waged against attempts to subvert 
the revolution from within. The coupling of external and internal 
threat to Revolutionary China's security was cemented by the 
United States' wholesale military, economic and political support 
of Chiang Kai-shek.The Chinese revolution was therefore insecure 
because it constantly faced possible foreign intervention and vicious 
internal subversion. 
China's credentials as an uncompromising revolutionary power 
were further enhanced by the Sino-Soviet split. To anti-imperialism 
(the victimisation of China in the hands of imperialism and social 
imperialism) was now added anti-revisionism (the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) as the only genuine defender of Marxism 
and Leninism). The threat construction by the Chinese leadership 
changed accordingly. Now imperialist intervention from without 
and reactionary subversion from within were not the only serious 
threat to the Chinese revolution, revisionism and its agents inside 
the CCP also threatened to undermine the essence of the Chinese 
revolution. The most dangerous threat to the Chinese revolution 
was the 'Khrushchevs sleeping beside us'-a rationale that Mao 
invoked to start the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In the 
1960s, Revolutionary China staged open confrontations with both 
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superpowers on several fronts. Many have noted the radicalisation 
of Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics after 1957. The 
causal question; namely, the extent to which China's deteriorating 
international environment contributed to the radicalisation of 
domestic politics in the PRC; is yet to be comprehensively 
addressed. 
Ironically, the most confrontational period of the PRC's 
international relations was also the period when the PRC was most 
vulnerable. Confrontations over the Taiwan Strait in 1955 and 1958 
and Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 elicited direct and explicit 
nuclear threats to China by both superpowers. The escalation of 
the Vietnam War after 1964, which again brought a large-scale war 
to the borders of the PRC, was justified by the rationale of 
containing the fanatic and dangerous Communist expansion from 
China. As the Sino-Soviet contentions intensified and the US 
containment policy hardened, the PRC, in Richard Nixon's catch 
phrase, 'lived in angry isolation'. 
The Chinese revolution violently transformed China's social order 
and redefined the political community in China. For this very 
purpose, many revolutions have taken place within the Chinese 
revolution. 13 None of them, however, has been as devastating and 
disastrous (nor, for that matter, as defining) as the Cultural 
Revolution. Whether the origins of the Cultural Revolution are to 
be found in Mao's megalomania/paranoia or are more deeply rooted 
in the CCP's political, economic and cultural experience is beyond 
the scope of our discussions here. 14 The Cultural Revolution 
introduced an ultra-revolutionary period in Chinese politics with 
the construction of a highly militarised state operating according 
to extremely radical and militant domestic and foreign policies. It 
destroyed the fragile state apparatus of the PRC, put into the 
question the legitimacy of the regime, and transmitted an image of 
a regime dominated by fanatics. 
Yet, Revolutionary China's identity was redefined during this 
period. Pivotal to this development is that, in 1971, on the eve of 
the breakthrough in Sino-American relations, the PRC was admitted 
into the United Nations, replacing Taiwan in both the General 
Assembly and the UN Security Council. The international legitimacy 
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of the PRC was widely recognised for the first time after 1949. 
Diplomatic recognition of the PRC by many states followed in 
quick succession. PRC membership in a number of inter-
governmental organisations was secured.A revealing indicator of 
the PRC's transformation from a revolutionary to a 'normal' state 
is the CCP's efforts throughout the 1970s to downgrade its Party-
to-Party relations in order to carry out normal state-to-state 
relations, particularly with Southeast Asian nations. 15 
The direct military and physical threat posed by the former Soviet 
Union to China's territorial integrity after the 1969 armed conflicts 
along the Sino-Soviet borders forced the Chinese leaders to 
reassess China's major strategic threat. China was forced to 
acknowledge that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding shared 
ideology, represented the greatest threat to China's interests. It 
was also compelled to accept that the United States provided a 
counterweight to that threat, despite its ideological hostility. This 
strategic shift was a critical turn in the Chinese leadership's security 
thinking. Security, and by the same token threat, are now 
conceptualised in terms of balance of power, not compatibility of 
ideology. The referent of security is shifting from the Chinese 
revolution as part of the world revolution to the PRC as a state in 
the international system. The convergence of US and Chinese 
strategic thinking at this particular point, the idea that ideological 
considerations should give way to geopolitical considerations, is 
not entirely coincidental. Modern China has always been jealously 
territorial. By redefining Revolutionary China's vital interests, the 
Sino-Soviet conflicts may have inadvertently helped the formation 
of the PRC's state identity. Martin Wight once remarked that 
'international revolution has never for long maintained itself against 
national interest. Doctrinal considerations have always within two 
generations been overridden by raison d'etat'. 16 It is clear that by 
1969 and within just one generation, raison d'etat for the Chinese 
state had prevailed over ideological considerations in the security 
calculus of the Chinese leadership. If the confrontational approaches 
to international relations adopted by Revolutionary China in the 
1950s and the 1960s often confounded realists and nee-realists 
256 
China's security problematique: critical reflections 
alike, they must have found China's balance of power behaviour in 
the 1970s and most of the 1980s pleasingly amenable to their 
analytical paradigms. 
How do revolutionary changes as a social process in the 
international system affect China's security? Suffice it here to give 
two examples to illustrate the dynamics of the international 
systemic changes affecting China's (in)security. One is the anti-
colonial revolution, which is sometimes also regarded as part of 
the 'revolt against the West' in this century. 17 As a revolutionary 
state, China diligently capitalised on what James Mayall called the 
'restructuring of international society' . 18 In this 'revolutionary age', 
the PRC was able to find allies against the Western domination by 
identifying itself with anti-colonial revolutions, thus modifying its 
isolation from both the United States plus its allies and the Soviet-
dominated socialist camp. China's revolutionary diplomacy was 
actively cultivated to serve its national security interests. 19 This 
systemic change also made it possible for the increased UN 
membership to vote the PRC into the United Nations in spite of 
persistent US resistance and maneuvering inside and outside UN 
fora. China's support for revolutionary violence in national liberation 
movements throughout the world and its limited, but widely 
distributed aid to Asian and African countries gave the PRC the 
semblance of a Great Power with global interests as early as the 
1960s. It also projected the image of a revolutionary power bent 
on world revolution. 
If anti-colonial revolutions and China's cultivation of them 
modified China's security environment, another set of revolutionary 
changes in the international system-symbolised by the end of the 
Cold War-has more varied complications for China's security. 
The disappearance of ideological and military confrontations 
between the East and the West and the diminishing prospect of an 
all-out nuclear war have appreciably reduced the structural violence 
of the international system. As widely acknowledged by even the 
Chinese leadership, China in the 1990s enjoys an unprecedented 
degree of security as far as external military threat is concerned. 
On the other hand, the end of the Cold War also redefines the 
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international political community. With the collapse of the East-
West dichotomy, the collective identity of the West, the liberal 
democracy, is defined in opposition to non-democratic regimes. In 
civilisational terms, a divide emerges between the West vis-a-vis 
the rest. Either way, China, as belonging to 'the rest' and as the 'last 
bastion of Communism' and the 'remaining Leninist state', is certainly 
the Other. While China is broadly regarded as constituting a threat 
to liberal democratic values and peace, the Chinese leadership 
believes that there is a coordinated conspiracy of 'peaceful 
evolution' that aims to undermine the rule of the CCP and its 
legitimacy. The revolutionary turn of the post-Cold War 
international system has increasingly cast Communist China, once 
a revolutionary state, in the shadow of a counter-revolution. In this 
way, recent revolutionary changes in the international system have 
redrawn the enmity-amity line, and have reconstructed threat 
perceptions between China and the West.20 
War 
The twentieth century is, as Hannah Arendt once remarked, a 
century of wars and revolutions.21 Charles Tilly, in a sweeping review 
of revolutions through centuries, observed that '[t]he histories of 
wars and of revolutions have intertwined'.22 This is truer for China 
than for most other states in international society. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, particularly before 1979, the Chinese 
experience of revolution was closely intertwined with that of war. 
China's involvement in wars (as in the instances of its involvement 
in the Korean and Vietnam wars), in armed confrontations (as in 
the instances of the two Taiwan Strait crises in 1955 and 1958) and 
in what Johnston called 'militarised inter-state disputes'23 (as in the 
instances of its border wars with India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 
1969 and Vietnam in 1979) are just part of that experience.24 
That China has been involved in the use of force in intra-state 
and inter-state disputes and conflicts more than most other states 
in the last fifty years there is no doubt; the question is why. Stephen 
Walt's theory of revolution and war offers partial explanation. His 
arguments that revolution causes a large shift in the balance of 
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threats and creates spirals of suspicion and misinformation that 
lead to war sit relatively well in explaining the initial period of 
hostility between China and the United States and China's eventual 
participation in the Korean War.25 lain Johnston's theory of cultural 
realism, in particular Mao Zedong's socialisation in that traditional 
strategic culture, attempts to identify a particular cultural context 
in which China's war-prone behaviour is made explicable.26 We 
may also note Martin Wight's observation that '[a] revolutionary 
power is morally and psychologically at war with its neighbours all 
the time, even when legally peace prevails, because it believes that 
it has a mission to transform international society by conversion 
. '27 or coerc1on .... 
Three other areas that constitute the specific cultural-institutional 
context that has conditioned China's social experience in war since 
1949, I believe, need to be explored in search for more explanations. 
First, the PRC has been at the receiving end of collective military 
operations, threat, or both, first in the Korean War, the containment 
(of which the Vietnam War was a component), and then in the 
Soviet-orchestrated encirclement, real or imagined. More 
significantly, perhaps, China was subjected to repeated explicit 
nuclear threats in the 1950s and the 1960s by both superpowers, 
in the wake of war or during military conflicts.28 War exposes the 
vulnerability of the PRC and constitutes a constant threat to its 
security and territorial integrity. 
Second, the post-war international system has seen the 
culmination of what Anthony Giddens calls 'the industrialisation of 
war',29 particularly in the advent of nuclear weapons and the 
eventual nuclearisation of war and peace. The post-war order, as 
embodied in the Cold War, was highly militarised and driven by an 
array of warring states. Great Powers, Kal Holsti noted, are 'war 
prone' in the post-war period.30 Warfare 'as a virtuous exercise of 
state power' 31 was not seriously questioned. The Cold War, which 
represented the institutionalisation of social effects in international 
society after the end of the Second World War, therefore legitimised 
an inherently highly violent structural order from balance of terror 
to mutually assured destruction (MAD). More pertinent to our 
discussion here is the fact that Revolutionary China was to be 
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socialised into just such an international system in 1949. The PRC, 
like many other states, acquired its shared knowledge about the 
nature of this anarchic system, the meaning of power and functions 
of war, in its social interactions with this system. War therefore 
not only constitutes a threat to China's security; it is a vital 
instrument for maintaining China's security and territorial integrity. 
Third, exploration of the sociological context must also look at 
the personal experience of Chinese leaders. China's national 
experience and the structural character of the post-war 
international system are, after all, mediated by Chinese leaders-
their decisionmaking ultimately determines China's international 
behaviour. Traditional strategic culture, as Johnston notes, 
constitutes an important historical-cultural context for Mao's 
decision making. 32 Equally, we should note that the first generations 
from Mao Zedong to Zhu De and Deng Xiaoping were all 
revolutionary warriors in civilian clothes. Fighting guerrilla wars 
before 1949 was an indispensable and invaluable social experience 
for them. The Revolutionary War and War of Liberation not only 
ensured their personal survival but also brought them to power in 
the first place. Their socialisation in war and the Marxist conception 
of revolutionary violence, which stayed with them when they 
became the new ruling elite, undoubtedly shaped their conceptions 
of war and the realpolitik view of power politics in international 
relations. 
The intriguing questions are therefore how much Mao's personal 
experience of fighting revolutionary wars throughout his life, mostly 
at the receiving end of militarised violence, influenced his strategic 
thinking of parabellum? In which way did the nature of the highly 
militarised international system and the industrialisation of war 
inform Mao's post-1949 thinking about China's security? If definitive 
answers to these two questions continue to elude us, it is 
nevertheless clear that both influenced Mao's conception of war, 
his concerns about China's security, and his construction of the 
threat to China. Revolutionary violence is therefore an important 
means of achieving peace. World war is inevitable because of 
superpower rivalries around the world, which are the ultimate 
causes of regional conflicts. Military expenditures on building 
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China's nuclear bomb are therefore justified. It is also natural that 
'military imperatives dominate the state in terms of their economic 
organisation' .33 The build up of the so-called Third Front deep in 
China's interior reflects both Mao's acute concerns for China's 
vulnerability and his appreciation of the destruction that the 
industrialisation of war might inflict on China. Mao's fear for China's 
security because of its strategic weakness vis-a-vis the two 
superpowers, as confided by Zhou Enlai to Kissinger during their 
first encounter in July 1971, centred on a US-Soviet condominium 
to destroy China.34 
One particular aspect of China's social interactions with the 
militarised order of the post-war international system alluded to 
earlier can further illustrate China's changing perceptions of war 
and security. This involves China and nuclear arms control. One 
simple fact, which is often under-appreciated, is that in the 1950s 
and the 1960s China was explicitly threatened many times with 
nuclear attack by the United States. In 1969, following the Sino-
Soviet border clashes, the Soviet Union also threatened to carry 
out 'surgical attacks' on China with its nuclear arsenal.35 No other 
Great Power has ever been subjected to so many explicit nuclear 
blackmails by both superpowers in such a short period. In addition, 
when the 'nuclear weapons taboo' was institutionalised in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, China, which became nuclear in 1964, was excluded 
entirely from the process. In this context, China's insistence on 
developing its own indigenous nuclear weapons and its denunciation 
of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1968 Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) are not entirely inexplicable. The same 
logic can also help us make sense of the gradual convergence 
between China's nuclear arms control behaviour and international 
norms in the 1990s. 
Reform 
China's economic reforms in the last two decades are often 
regarded as 'China's second revolution'.36 Radical changes brought 
about by economic reforms in the social and economic life of China, 
as noted by many, have reconstituted the socio-economic order of 
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post-Mao China. Much has also been written about the rise of 
China's economic power, which, it is sometimes argued, has 
transformed China's international status and augmented China's 
economic, and therefore military, cloutY Economic reforms, 
however, have had profound impact on China's security in several 
other important ways. They have induced changed conceptions of 
security, exposed the vulnerability of the regime and the society, 
contested the priorities of security, and called for different means 
to achieve security. Most important of all, these changes have taken 
place while China is transforming from a revolutionary power to a 
post-revolutionary developmental state. 
The economic reforms in China were launched in the wake of the 
devastating Cultural Revolution, at a time when the legitimacy of the 
CCP began to be questioned, if not contested, and when the economy, 
as acknowledged even by the Chinese government, was on the verge 
of bankruptcy. China's 'second revolution' was therefore launched 
to save the Chinese economy as much as to enhance the legitimacy 
of the regime. The shift of the CCP's central focus from political 
campaigns to economic construction in 1978 heralded, however, a 
new phase in the transformation of China as a revolutionary power. 
For most of the 1980s, 'reformist China' was regarded as 'friendly' 
by the United States as much because of its strategic value in the 
global balance of power as its political orientation-in sharp contrast 
to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe. 
The irony is, however, that the very success of economic reforms 
poses new threats to the security of the regime. By raising people's 
aspirations for, and expectations from, the economic reforms, the 
CCP has tied its claim to legitimacy to economic successes. Any 
failure to continue to deliver what people expect from economic 
reforms would cause widespread social discontent, which would 
in turn challenge the legitimacy of the Party and the government. 
In other words, the legitimacy of the Party and the regime no 
longer depends on its revolutionary credentials, but on its ability 
to deliver what it promises. 
Economic reforms do not merely raise people's economic 
expectations in terms of improved living standards, economic 
prosperity, and more choices of, and access to, consumer goods. 
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China's opening up to the world economy and its gradual integration 
into international society have done more than its share to inform 
the Chinese people of what they could and should expect from a 
modern state. More than ever before, the Chinese people have 
been exposed to what Ayoob calls 'the existence of the modern 
representative and responsive states in the industrialised world' 
which, he argues, 'set the standards for effective statehood by their 
demonstrated success in meeting the basic needs of their 
populations, protecting their human rights, redistributing income, 
and promoting and guaranteeing political participation'.As these are 
increasingly accepted as norms of the standard state behaviour, 'they 
undermine the legitimacy of Third World states by prescribing 
standards and yardsticks of statehood in terms of the output functions 
of political systems that most Third World states will be incapable 
of meeting for many decades to come'.38 Rising expectations among 
the people-economic, political or otherwise-which may lead to 
a revolutionary situation in China, therefore constitute a serious 
challenge to the state and regime security.39 
Economic reforms, more than anything else, represent China's 
new drive for modernity. They have therefore exposed China's 
identity as a developmental state. China's catch-up mode has been, 
among other things, inspired and mobilised by the examples of the 
four little dragons-Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Like 
many other Third World states, however, the Chinese state now 
has to deal with the consequences of its march towards modernity. 
Increased labour force mobility means massive rural-urban 
migration foreshadowing the existence of an army of 'floating 
population'. 'To get rich is glorious' inevitably leads to an increasing 
gap between the wealth of the rich and that of the poor and between 
interior and coastal China, both of which create tensions that can 
fragment society. Economic prosperity fosters the emergence of a 
'middle class' and the growth of civil society that would demand at 
least a limited opening of political discourse on democracy. Rampant 
corruption and other social vices erode the fabric of society. 
Increased awareness of global risks, such as environmental 
degradation, narcotics trafficking, and resource shortages, 
emphasises the vulnerability of China as a developmental state. 
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Economic reforms, perhaps naturally, have prompted important 
changes in the Chinese leadership's thinking about security. Coupled 
with China's re-evaluation of its improved external security situation 
in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping deftly replaced Mao's assessment that 
an imminent world war was inevitable with his claim that peace 
and development are the two main trends in world politics.40 During 
the late 1980s and the 1990s, the new thinking on security has 
been articulated through the emergence of two new security-
related concepts-comprehensive security, and comprehensive 
national power. Briefly stated, the concept of comprehensive 
security seeks to emphasise the interface between domestic 
economic development and national and international security. The 
new thinking recognises that military security is insufficient; military 
capabilities alone cannot make China secure. China's security 
calculus should also incorporate economic, scientific and 
technological dimensions. Economic development is the key to 
increasing China's economic, scientific and technological capabilities. 
But economic development cannot be achieved without political 
and social stability. Deng's plea that 'China must avoid chaos' 
(zhongguo buneng luan)-either politically inspired or socially 
induced-thus smuggles domestic political and social stability onto 
the security agenda of the Chinese leadership.41 
The concept of comprehensive national power, on the other 
hand, refers to 'the totality of a country's economic, military and 
political power in a given period' and further, 'economic power, 
including labour power, material resources and financial power, is 
the determinant and foundation of a country's military and political 
power'. Level of technological development has underlining 
importance in economic power.42 In 1992, Jiang Zemin explicitly 
stated that competition in world politics in the post-Cold War 
period is 'in essence, a competition of overall national strength 
based on economic, scientific and technological capabilities'Y In 
these new formulations, security has become a much more inclusive 
concept. Accordingly, the perceived threat to China's security is 
from the external as much as the internal. Second, economic 
development is now seen as the key to China's security not only 
because domestic political and social stability is predicated upon 
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it,44 but also because it enhances China's economic, scientific and 
technological capability, which is essential to make China secure. 
Third, non-military dimensions of power are emphasised. Military 
power is still relevant and important, but is downplayed 
substantially in favour of non-military power in China's security 
considerations.45 Fourth, security concerns have been reprioritised 
in accordance with changed internal and external circumstances 
for China. Military security in terms of defending China's borders 
is no long featured as a top priority.And fifth, naturally, 'the optimal 
approach to national security is to strengthen all the dimensions 
of national power-economic, technological, political, social and 
military', as noted by Wu Xinbo.46 Recent discourse on China's 
grand strategy for the twenty-first century places economic and 
internal security higher than external and military security as 
conventionally understood.47 
Finally, one must also consider the implications for China's security 
conceptualisation of reform that has taken place in the society of 
states. By reform I mean here in particular recent changing norms 
in international society. These include human rights norms, the 
obsolescence of large-scale inter-state wars, the retreat of 
sovereignty-based international order, and globalisation, among 
others.As with the structural change in the international system, 
changing norms in international society redraw the line of enmity 
and amity. If the former has induced the perception of China as 
'the last bastion of Communism' and the 'remaining Leninist state' 
standing against liberal democracy and democratisation, thus 
defining China as the 'Other'; the latter stares blankly at China as a 
'deviant' in international society, sometimes resisting and more 
often violating those norms in its behaviour. As Rosemary Foot 
points out in this volume, China's human rights record falls far 
short of meeting the new'standard of civilisation'. Moreover, greater 
tolerance of, and sympathy for, the claims of ethno-nationalism 
manifested in the international community constitutes a new 
challenge to China's management of ethnic conflicts, which threaten 
the integrity of China. Changing norms of international society 
make new demands on internal governance of a state, and introduce 
new yardsticks of legitimacy for any state. 
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Conclusion 
Peter Katzenstein and others have argued recently that '[h]istory 
is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity'. He 
further stated that'[ d]efinitions of identity that distinguish between 
self and other imply definitions of threat and interest that have 
strong effects on national security policies'.48 All three integral social 
processes discussed above as China's historical experience have 
dearly left their imprints on China's identity either as a revolutionary 
power or a developmental state. By defining and redefining China's 
identity, revolution, war and reform have created a special set of 
social relationships between China and other states, and between 
China and international society as a whole. China's understanding 
of its own identity and of the Other is instrumental in its threat 
construction and therefore its security behaviour. This constitutes 
the social structure in which discussions and evaluation of the 
security problematique of China should be embedded. 
It is beyond dispute that, in its international behaviour, China has 
often not lived up to the collective expectations of the international 
community-largely defined by the West. In that sense, China can 
be said to be irresponsible. But the more important question is 
why? Here there are several layers of questions that can be asked. 
First, if norms are no more than 'collective expectations about 
proper behaviour for a given identity' and if'models of'responsible' 
or 'civilised' states are enacted and validated by upholding specific 
norms', then inquiries as to how and why China shares and upholds 
some norms but not others by examining China's changing identity 
will surely yield necessary insights.49 Second, if identity matters, 
then how and why does China assume a certain identity and not 
share identity with others?What are the domestic and international 
processes that matter in China's identity formation ?Third, if identity 
construction is mutual, that is, if it is constructed by distinguishing 
self against the Other, then how does perceiving China as the Other 
constitute part of China's identity formation? Why should there 
be such a persistent dichotomy between China and the world (the 
West writ large)? The debates about whether China is a status 
quo or revisionist power, and whether China is irresponsible or 
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not, would be futile without an appreciation of the changing purpose 
and identity of the Chinese state; an appreciation that is shaped 
fundamentally by dynamic interactions between domestic social 
processes and those of international society. 
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